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If the lost word is lost, if the spent word is spent 
If the unheard, unspoken 
Word is unspoken, unheard; 
Still is the unspoken word, the Word unheard, 
The Word without a word, the Word within 
The world and for the world; 
And the light shone in the darkness and 
Against the Word the unstilled world still whirled 
About the centre of the silent Word. 
 
-T. S. Eliot, Ash Wednesday 
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Introduction 
This Loquacious Soil: Language and Religious Experience in Early America 
They one and all embarked for the wilderness of America, where they might enjoy, 
unmolested, the inestimable luxury of talking. No sooner did they land on this loquacious 
soil, than, as if they had caught the disease from the climate, they all lifted up their voices 
at once, and for the space of one whole year did keep up such a joyful clamour, that we 
are told they frightened every bird and beast out of the neighbourhood. 
 
 -Washington Irving, The History of New York 
 
The first American colonists so demanded the luxury of talking, Irving imagined, 
that they crossed the ocean to find it: English religious dissenters desired freedom of 
conscience, which soon became liberty of speech because ―they possessed that ingenuous 
habit of mind which always thinks aloud, and is for ever galloping into other people‘s 
ears.‖1 I take seriously Irving‘s joke that America has its roots, at least in part, in the 
desire to talk. But, as he quips, this inclination to loquacity also implies ―the right of 
talking without ideas and without information,‖ which makes the tongue a weapon to 
tyrannize, silence, and indoctrinate the powerless or disagreeable members of society.
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The powerful tongue always stands on the brink of manipulation.  
In Irving‘s narrative, the English dissenters‘ talkative nature necessarily resulted 
in the clergy adopting ―the usual methods‖ of reclaiming the people‘s ears. Yet their 
―invincible spirit of independence‖ could not be subdued, and they embarked for a soil 
that seemed more naturally suited to their loquacity.
3
 The colonial clergy were no less 
interested in reclaiming ears, and they felt there were many obstinate ears. Preacher 
Solomon Stoddard‘s (1643-1729) thunderous hell-fire sermons are one example echoing 
Irving‘s depiction of the American colonists as unbounded speakers. His sermons, 
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preached almost a century after the first loquacious colonists arrived, were explicitly 
aimed at recapturing ears, and through them, souls, with loud, uncontainable words. But 
like Irving‘s depiction of the tyrannous tongue, Stoddard‘s sermons always stood the risk 
of manipulating or drawing attention to their own loquacity rather than authentically 
transforming the soul. Stoddard, thus, poses the central problem of my dissertation: the 
text initiates but threatens the authenticity of religious experience.  
The sermon and the Bible were meant to give the hearer or reader access to God, 
but the text could easily manipulate or disrupt an immediate experience of the divine. The 
theologies of Stoddard, his grandson Jonathan Edwards, their Puritan predecessors, and 
the Puritan‘s heretical contemporaries were all defined by this tension between religious 
experience and the sermonic and biblical texts. Thus, Stoddard strove to make the sermon 
a genre of experiential transference; the sermon conveyed an experience of God, rather 
than an argument aimed at persuasion, but it also rhetorically structured the laity‘s 
religious experience. The hearer was meant to sense his or her experience as authentic 
and individual, despite the sermon‘s work of making all religious experiences fit within 
pre-defined boundaries of a universal spiritual truth.  
Stoddard‘s 1705 sermon, The Danger of Speedy Degeneracy, issues a warning we 
expect from hell-fire preaching: ―God will surely judge you, if you corrupt your selves.‖ 
In order to make his congregation realize the fear of this as yet abstract threat, Stoddard 
rhetorically personalizes God‘s judgment. He explains how God will judge the corrupt: 
you may never recover, the world will reproach you, and you will perish. Under this last 
head Stoddard reinforces his argument with repetition: ―multitudes of you will perish. 
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Multitudes when they dye will go to Hell; when Parents dye, and Husbands dye, and 
Wives dye, and Children dye, they will generally go to Hell;  after all miseries here they 
will have Eternal misery […] and then the Children of the Kingdom are cast into outer 
darkness.‖4 Though Stoddard shifts from the second person to the third, he catalogues 
types that particularize the abstraction of God‘s judgment: God will judge parents, 
husbands, children. He ends his sermon with a repetition of ―children‖ as a generalization 
that exposes the anxiety in every listener‘s mind: even those who assume themselves to 
be children of the kingdom may be cast into darkness. As Stoddard walks away from the 
pulpit, his words echo in the darkness of the listener‘s soul: ―I am cast into outer 
darkness.‖  
This scene, typical of New English meetinghouses throughout the seventeenth- 
and early eighteenth-century, highlights the experience of sermon-listening. The minister 
needed to make the listener feel the fear of being cast into the darkness of hell. Although 
Stoddard promoted the role of education and intellectual application in religion, his 
emphasis on experience made him skeptical of those who relied too heavily on texts in 
their faith. During the revivals in Northampton, Massachusetts in the 1710s, he warned 
young preachers that ―Whatever Books men have read, there is […] need of experimental 
knowledge in a Minister; many particular things will occur that he will not meet withal in 
Books; it is a great calamity to wounded Consciences to be under the direction of an 
unexperienced Minister.‖5 Ministers relying on texts alone would become blind guides, 
he argued. That Stoddard prefaces his sermon on ―how to Guide souls through the work 
of conversion‖ with a warning against the elevation of the text suggests his awareness of 
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the always potential gap between text and experience. Texts act as messy mediators in an 
ostensibly unmediated religious experience, texts elevate reason over experience, and 
texts can never fully convey the full experience of grace. Stoddard argued that every 
minister had a responsibility to attend to these gaps and miscarriages, always appealing to 
experience as the true guide to Christ.  
 Stoddard‘s concern that the text would disrupt experience characterized much of 
Reformed religion in early America. The sermon risked functioning like the books that 
created blind guides—as textual obstacles to experienced religion. Because experience 
was the guide to Christ, as Stoddard argued, the sermon had to become a conduit for the 
lay person‘s experience, not simply another text mediating between God and listener. But 
for Stoddard the sermon had urgent work: ―Many Men are in a fast Sleep, and whispering 
will not awaken them; the threatening of God had need ring in their Ears; they are so 
atheistical and devoted to the World, that it is well if Thunder & Lightning will scare 
them; they are so hardened, that talking moderately to them, as Eli did to his Sons, makes 
no impression on them, than on the Seats of the Meeting house.‖6 Sitting in the meeting 
house, the best listeners urgently scribbled notes, hung on Stoddard‘s every ringing word, 
and experienced the dark fear of being cast into hell. But how did Stoddard‘s thunderous 
words not become one more mediating obstacle between God and the hearer‘s experience 
of God? The answer lies in Stoddard‘s theory of sermonic rhetoric; speech was the site in 
which the tension could be reconciled, or at least addressed; language registered the gap 
between text and experience. 
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This fissure was essentially epistemological. For Stoddard, the minister‘s first-
hand experience of grace meant that ―Christ will be so present with the Gospel-Ministry, 
that His visible Kingdom shall be upheld.‖7 Stoddard‘s conception of the visible kingdom 
relies on the distinction between the visible and invisible church, which also guided his 
Puritan forerunners. While only God knows who is truly among the elect, they all argued, 
the church must have some way, however uncertain, of determining who is a member of 
the church. Earlier Puritan theologians argued that there was always a discrepancy 
between the visible and invisible church, and Stoddard angered his contemporaries by 
arguing that, because regeneracy was not certainly visible, it was lawful for the 
unregenerate to participate in acts of worship like communion. It did not follow, he 
argued, that each individual was truly regenerate. Stoddard and the seventeenth-century 
Puritans believed that there was always a fissure between the seen, material world and the 
invisible, spiritual world. They did not mean that the visible was at variance with the 
invisible, but rather that the visible world was constituted by signs of the immaterial that 
were always potentially illegible. Sermons were such signs. A successful ―Gospel-
Ministry‖ would make visible what was otherwise inaccessible: religious experience 
became sensory—heard, seen, felt. 
The language of the sermon managed the gap between visible and invisible, 
making legible the material signs of the divine. A rhetorical register was necessary for 
connecting and testing the relationship between experience, its outward or material 
manifestations, and the religious texts that initiated the experience. But the sermon was 
not the only form of speech to address this epistemological problem. There were various 
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models of the register at work within early American religion. Within New English 
Puritanism, the plain style sermon became the means for camouflaging the distance 
between experience and text. Within heterodox religious groups in New England, 
language was not the means for closing a gap but instead registered the narrowing gap 
between God and human listeners. Spontaneous, prophetic language was the 
manifestation of immediate revelation for the Quakers and Antinomians. For the 
translators working among Native Americans, the act of translating the Bible or of 
creating a written language exposed the discontinuity between text and experience. And 
Jonathan Edwards, during the Great Awakening, redefined the nature of language as a 
material manifestation of divine realities in order to suture text and experience. The act of 
writing, for example, became a spiritual and experiential act for Edwards. 
These varied responses to the same gap between text and experience constitute an 
epistemological crisis in early American religion. As Lisa Gordis has argued, 
seventeenth-century Massachusetts Bay colony ―faced a crisis in literary theory.‖8 In an 
effort to guide the laity‘s response to the sermon but also to give them ownership over 
their own religious experiences, Puritan preachers made themselves theoretically 
transparent in the pulpit. Teresa Toulouse identified this phenomenon in 1987, but Gordis 
extends it to argue that as such, ministers were ―treating preaching as a fuller form of 
reading,‖ and a crisis in interpretive strategies emerged from the hermeneutic work in the 
pulpit.
9
 I share Gordis‘s insistence that early American texts spoke not only to the issues 
at hand—an explication of a biblical passage, a jeremiadic warning against church 
declension, or a pamphlet war over toleration—but theorized the interpretive strategies 
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that transcended individual debates or sermons. But I also see the interpretive crisis she 
identifies extending beyond the pulpit, beyond the biblical text, beyond Puritanism, and 
into theories of language. 
 While originating in an immaterial experience of the invisible world, early 
American religious experience had a material life in visible signs, in biblical types, and in 
material texts, which imagined language as rooted in the material world. With this central 
similarity, early Americans generated various epistemologies of language that addressed 
the relationship between the visible and invisible: Jonathan Edwards saw language as 
human construct, derived from Lockean empirical knowledge of the natural world; 
seventeenth-century Quaker language theories advocated, not a transcendence of 
language, but a redemption of natural language; and Native American language was 
thought to grow out of the unique American landscape. My dissertation describes the 
ways that religious language was believed to have material agency and uncovers a range 
of epistemologies of religious experience that erased easy boundaries between the visible 
and invisible worlds. Some scholars have demonstrated that early American uses of 
speech and interpretive strategies were profoundly theological and sophisticatedly 
theoretical, yet here I explore the relationship between textuality and spiritual experience 
as generating innovative uses of rhetoric and theories of language.
10
  
The tension between text and experience I identify in early American religion 
builds on and diverges from a long history of early American scholarship that has focused 
on two things essential to New England Puritanism. The first, the doctrine of sola 
scriptura, ―scripture alone,‖ was a reaction to Catholicism‘s mediator priests and its 
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laity‘s lack of access to the biblical text. In my reading of early American texts, however, 
experience is emphasized alongside sola scriptura, and experience is often imagined as 
the evidence of biblical truths. I turn most often to theories of spoken language because 
the ontological instability of oral language made it a more promising and problematic site 
for attempting to express divine things. Ann Kibbey has argued that ―the crucial 
importance of speaking in conversion shows that Puritans believed written texts were in 
some way fundamentally dependent for their intelligibility on their incorporation into 
speech, that sound—however transitory and precarious—was essential.‖11 Kibbey‘s 
argument overturns assumptions about the primacy of the written text, and it implies a 
challenge to sola scriptura. I do not mean to suggest that the Puritans did not, in fact, 
believe in the doctrine of sola scriptura, but the practice of living doctrine surmounted 
belief.
12
 And spoken language was always part of the practice of grace. 
The second critical focus that underlies my argument is the relationship between 
doctrine and experience. Perry Miller first characterized seventeenth-century Puritanism 
as struggling between experience and ideology, and Sacvan Bercovitch revised Miller to 
argue that ideology functioned as the explanation for experience.
13
 By ―ideology,‖ Miller 
and Bercovitch mean something akin to doctrine, but their definitions extend to include 
basic beliefs about identity, epistemology, politics, etc., all of which, they argue, are 
captured in doctrine. I, however, see a distinction between doctrine and some ideological 
assumptions within early American Puritanism. While Bercovitch points to a gap 
between text and experience, he elides the distinction between text and ideology by 
arguing that texts were ideology.
14
 I argue, instead, that the content of a text was not the 
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only thing that seemed disconnected from experience; the way a text was thought to 
function in faith was itself cut off from experience and doctrine. Text inculcated faith, 
spurred on conversion—but that was in stark contrast to the doctrine that held that the 
Spirit, not the text, enacted the work of conversion. A convert was brought to grace 
partially through texts, but he or she felt, and was meant to feel, that experience as the 
work of God, not the minister or text. Doctrine and ideology were in conflict about the 
role of the text.  
By expanding critical attention beyond New England Puritanism, scholars of the 
last two decades have challenged the historiographic trend that dichotomizes experience 
and ideology, but for these scholars the opacity of experience as a category necessitates 
its rhetorical validation.
15
 This more recent work suggests that there is still a critical 
tendency to separate experience and ideology in a way early Americans never imagined. I 
argue that an emphasis on experience in religion was explicit in early American doctrine 
and ideology. The rhetorical forms and linguistic theories emerging in early America 
were less about validating experience and were instead addressing a fundamentally 
epistemological problem. Rhetoric was not a means of justifying experience; it 
simultaneously acknowledged and worked to narrow the distance between experience and 
language, which was always just slightly incapable of describing experience. 
 In revising the role of sola scriptura in religious experience I turn to the oral, but 
in thinking through the relationship between ideology and experience I consider both the 
oral and the written. Of course, all of the sources at my disposal are written, though some 
are written translations of oral texts. Most recent early Americanists working with oral 
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genres address the problem of access to oral historical events. Sandra Gustafson, in 
Eloquence is Power, writes that ―Even at the moment of the performance, the gap 
between what the orator intended and what different members of the audience heard, saw, 
and understood produced an unavoidable indeterminacy.‖16 Gustafson argues that this is 
one of the ―problems with sources‖ in any study of what she calls ―radically context-
oriented art,‖ but I see this as a problem of which early Americans were profoundly 
aware.
17
 Therefore, I address theories of both spoken and written language, working to 
understand how different kinds of early Americans—Puritan ministers, heretical 
laypeople, religious minorities, translators, diarists, and religious philosophers—
responded to the disparity between text (what is spoken or read) and experience (how that 
thing is read or heard and the resulting religious feelings and beliefs). 
In some sense, I follow Gustafson‘s lead when she argues that ―Recognizing the 
flexible boundaries and considerable overlap between oral and textual forms, as well as 
the persistence of oral genres, we must attend to the symbolic and performative meanings 
attached to speech and writing.‖18 Like Gordis, Gustafson has urged us to revise our 
assumptions about what early American texts did in the world and what broader theories 
of interpretation, material textuality, and performance they suggested.
19
 I ask how the 
symbolic meanings attached to speech and text structure broader linguistic philosophies 
that attempt to account or compensate for the perceived gap between language (written 
and spoken) and religious experience. 
 In all of the theories of language I trace here, one commonality stands out. Each 
theory sought to close the distance between words and things, which implies that 
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contemporary thinkers considered religious experience to be more materially grounded 
than we might assume. Rather than imagining spiritual experience as the strictly 
transcendent, early Americans defined it as sensory. In this, they were infusing the 
discourse of natural philosophy into their theology. The work of bringing word and thing 
into a one-to-one correspondence was not limited to the theologies I examine here; it was 
fundamental to seventeenth-century natural philosophy. It was so pervasive a concern 
that when Jonathan Swift‘s Gulliver toured the ―grand Academy of Lagado‖ he 
encountered the Laputian scientists‘ scheme for ―abolishing all Words whatsoever.‖ 
Swift mocks the natural philosopher‘s efforts to suture words to things: 
For, it is plain, that every Word we speak is in some Degree the 
Diminution of our Lungs by Corrosion; and consequently contributes to 
the shortening of our Lives.  An Expedient was therefore offered, that 
since Words are only Names for Things, it would be more convenient for 
all Men to carry about them, such Things as were necessary to express the 
particular Business they are to discourse on. […] Another great Advantage 
proposed by this Invention, was, that it would serve as an universal 
Language to be understood in all civilized Nations, whose Goods and 
Utensils are generally of the same Kind, or nearly resembling, so that their 
Uses might easily be comprehended.
20
 
Swift‘s description of Laputian sages wandering the streets, bent in half by their sacks of 
things is entertaining to be sure, but his parody echoes the actual arguments for a 
universal language, or real character, put forth by some natural philosophers in the mid 
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and late seventeenth-century.
21
 The theories of language I treat here imagine the 
problems of language in fundamentally theological terms, but early Americans, like 
natural philosophers, proposed linguistic theories that assumed universal similarities in 
how language works and the necessity of grounding words in things. The theories of 
language I discover in early American religious texts work to give language the ability to 
materially capture spiritual truths and experience and give it the agency to affect change 
in souls.  
Though British philosophy has long been the preferred object of study for those 
interested in the rhetorical and linguistic theory of natural philosophy, the distinct 
theology of New England generated sophisticated and influential rhetorical responses to 
the epistemological problems British philosophers and language reform projects 
addressed. New English clergy and lay people alike strove to accommodate their 
theology to an empirical epistemology in which sensory experience was the source of 
knowledge. Thus, they rooted their epistemology of the soul in experience; one‘s senses 
perceiving and feeling God work on the soul replaced doctrinal knowledge as evidence of 
sanctification. I argue that this experience was fundamentally experimental. By this, I 
mean that first generation Puritan ministers advocated a reproducible and testable 
experience. Though this is certainly distinct from scientific experiment, they did not 
imagine it as such. For someone like Thomas Shepard, grace was something that worked 
in essentially the same manner on every soul. 
 While natural philosophers like John Locke and Thomas Sprat thought 
empiricism would combat the kind of religious enthusiasm they saw in religious 
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dissenters, early Americans adapted the empiricism of natural philosophy to their own 
religious ends. Michael Hunter touches on this in Science and Society in Restoration 
England when he argues that people reacted to sectarian conflict by ―seeking a fresh basis 
for faith in consensus rather than illuminism, in rationalism rather than dogma […] 
science could play a part through the humble pursuit of knowledge in God‘s works.‖22 
But in my assessment, the New England Puritans did not see science just as a means of 
overcoming sectarian conflict; their brand of empiricism was also a tool for overcoming 
fallible human knowledge and accessing universal, divine truth. The Puritans were not 
alone in this practice; heretics, sectarians, and eighteenth-century Congregationalist heirs 
of Puritanism also saw empiricism as offering a new way of accessing God.  
Thus, when Stoddard‘s advocates ―experimental knowledge‖ over book 
knowledge he implies something more sensory than spiritual transcendence; he means to 
import the discourse of empiricism into religion. A note on terminology is useful here. 
Religious texts throughout the seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries, often use 
―experimental‖ interchangeably with ―experience‖ or ―experiential,‖ but all imply 
something sensory, not just emotional.
23
 For example, William Penn calls all people to a 
“Sensible and Experimental knowledge of God,‖ which he defines in Quakerism, A New 
Nick-Name for Old Christianity (1672): ―Experience is Demonstration; and the World 
without, and the Redemption I know within […] make up that Demonstration; which is 
that Experience.‖24 Penn defines experience as demonstration derived from the natural 
world and from his own internal, spiritual senses. His ―experimental,‖ then, is sensory 
and empirical in the sense that it is formulated through observation of the natural world, 
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but experimental knowledge of faith always includes an internal, spiritual sensation. For 
John Cotton ―experimental‖ naturally carries with it a definition of scientific certainty. In 
A Practicall Commentary (1656) he writes that God‘s spirit, educating through 
experience, offers the faithful a ―scientificall Instruction about certain experimentall 
things.‖25 This is an obvious turn from the kind of experimental knowledge advocated by 
natural philosophy: the unseen Spirit, not just natural observation, guides the senses. Yet 
Cotton intends to borrow the discourse of empiricism.  
Cotton and Penn are representative of the range of responses to the shifting 
paradigms of knowledge and the epistemological gap between text and experience. 
Beginning with the first generation of Puritan preachers who addressed these gaps and 
shifts by infusing their sermons and sermonic philosophy with the discourse of 
empiricism, and ending with Jonathan Edwards‘s philosophy of language‘s relationship 
to the material world, I ask how the particularly loquacious early Americans dealt with 
the epistemological questions circling around the Atlantic world.  
 Opening with the most important genre of religious experience in mid 
seventeenth-century New England, the first chapter, ―Mediating Words,‖ argues that the 
plain style sermon worked metaphorically, mediating between two elements (audience 
and God) while camouflaging that mediation. I read the sermons and sermonic theories of 
three of seventeenth-century New England‘s most influential ministers, John Cotton, 
Thomas Hooker, and Thomas Shepard, to demonstrate how each compensated for his 
own anxiety that language failed to participate in the core epistemological assumptions of 
Puritanism. To close the distance between a minister‘s hermeneutical practice and a lay 
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experience of immediacy, the plain style sermon relied on metaphor, which spoke 
particularly to individual lay listeners by arousing their senses. Reading the metaphor of 
the plain style against Robert Boyle‘s Occasional Reflections, I argue that early 
American ministers attempted to apply the language of empiricism to religion rhetorically 
in order to facilitate and structure the laity‘s experience of grace. 
―Monstrous Words,‖ the second chapter, offers a counterpoint to the first 
chapter‘s exploration of the orthodox view of the sermon by arguing that the so-called 
heretical speech of Anne Hutchinson and the Quakers was experienced as prophetic 
speech emerging from an immediate encounter with the divine. Here I read Anne 
Hutchinson‘s trial and several influential British and colonial Quaker texts on the ―pure 
language‖ and the silent meeting to argue that immediate revelation, the central 
theological claim of each, generated religious experience that removed (or at least 
compensated for) the third terms of the sermon and the minister. Anne Hutchinson‘s 
prophetic speech in her civil trial was a critique of her ministers‘ anxious rhetorical 
performance and an adherence to an epistemology in which a mediating system of visible 
signs was unnecessary for immediate religious experience. The Quaker silent meeting 
also asserted the immediacy of individual religious experience. The silent meeting was 
not a place of silence, despite its name, and I argue that it organically generated an 
ordered hermeneutic for reading silence that resulted in the transformation of daily 
speech. Rather than rhetorically imposing order on experience, like the plain style, 
Hutchinson and the Quakers imagined language arising from religious experience.  
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 The third chapter, ―Metamorphizing Words,‖ demonstrates how linguistic 
encounters with Native Americans transformed or challenged colonial assumptions about 
language. John Eliot and Roger Williams recognized the limits of language to fully 
capture experience or describe the divine, and they imagined Hebrew—their version of a 
heavenly or universal language—as an ideal to which their own English could never 
ascend. Native languages, though, seemed to mirror, or even be linguistically related to, 
Hebrew; Eliot and Williams hoped native languages would be a bridge over the divide 
between language and experience. But for Eliot, translation revealed the failure of 
language to capture experience, and it multiplied the possibilities of misreading. 
Williams, like Eliot, recognized the opacity of translation, but he saw this opacity as 
productive of new mixtures that generated new knowledge. Most critics assume that Eliot 
and Williams imagined translation as transparent, but I argue these translators worried 
about what translation would efface—the original Hebrew Bible, for one, experience, for 
another—ultimately revealing a gap between text and experience that was the landmark 
anxiety of early American Puritanism. 
  The fourth and last chapter, ―The Material Word,‖ argues that Jonathan 
Edwards generated a linguistic theory in which words were images of the divine. His 
linguistic revision was a response to the disjunction between theology and experience he 
witnessed in the Great Awakening and to the seeming inability of language to describe or 
affect experience. Edwards‘s interpretation of John Locke led him to view language as a 
human construct meant to communicate ideas within the speaker‘s mind. Merging this 
with his own philosophy, Edwards created a distinct philosophy of language wherein 
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words were both a part of the natural world and a link between the material and the 
divine. Through his sermons, case histories, and typology, Edwards generated an 
empirical philosophy of language in which words operated as images of the divine, thus 
bridging the divide between the material and the immaterial. 
 I argue that Edwards marks a turning point in early American theories of the 
relationship between language and experience. Edwards‘s philosophy of language 
ameliorated anxiety about the mediating influence of the text and the distance between 
language and experience, but George Whitefield initiated the practice of preaching 
without attending to these gaps and fissures. By way of conclusion, I examine 
Whitefield‘s performative sermonic philosophy of the Great Awakening, developed in 
the same moment Edwards was working out his linguistic philosophy of religious 
experience. Edwards established the philosophy that made Whitefield‘s sermonic practice 
possible, but Edwards‘s sermons lacked the performative spectacle of Whitefield‘s 
preaching. Whitefield‘s conspicuously affective performances in the pulpit register the 
emergence of a distinctly modern conception of the relationship between language and 
experience. His emphasis on performance over the words themselves expressed a belief 
that language unproblematically modeled, reflected, and generated experience in what 
would become a lasting feature of American evangelicalism. 
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Chapter 1 
Mediating Words: The Plain Style Sermon  
 
I. Occasional Reflections 
In a 1779 letter to the Abbe Morellet, Benjamin Franklin included his meditation on 
wine: 
To confirm still more your piety and gratitude to Divine Providence, 
reflect upon the situation which it has given to the elbow. You see in 
animals, who are intended to drink the waters that flow upon the earth, 
that if they have long legs, they also have a long neck, so that they can get 
at their drink without kneeling down. But man, who was destined to drink 
wine, must be able to raise the glass to his mouth. […] Let us, then, with 
glass in hand, adore this benevolent wisdom;—let us adore and drink!1 
Franklin caricatures the epistemology of the seventeenth-century occasional reflection or 
meditation and demonstrates the illogical lengths to which meditations on the natural 
world can be taken if they presuppose the lesson of the observation. The genre of 
occasional meditations assumes that piety requires reflection upon the natural world, and 
then it observes the world as it reasons toward a moral truth.
2
 In Franklin‘s meditation, he 
follows this logic: his observations on the elbow lead to the moral truth ―adore and 
drink.‖ But Franklin‘s meditation, unlike the seventeenth-century religious and moral 
practice, explicitly presumes that wine holds forth truth before observing the animals 
drinking. ―In wine,‖ Franklin writes as an introduction to his meditation, ―there is truth.‖ 
While Franklin satirizes argument from design, the occasional meditation observes the 
natural world leading to new knowledge rather than confirming previous assumptions, yet 
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Franklin‘s parody does turn on the occasional meditation‘s central epistemological belief 
that the material world provides access to knowledge of the unseen.  
Robert Boyle, whose Occasional Reflections (1665) catalogues meditations on 
various ―objects‖ and ―accidents,‖ or occurrences, is clear about the epistemological 
value of reflecting on the material world. For Boyle, the soil sermonized. Meditation on 
natural phenomena will ―make the World vocal,‖ he wrote, and will make ―the very 
Flowers of [a man‘s] Garden, read him Lectures of Ethicks or Divinity.‖3 While Boyle 
admits that the image of the immaterial in the material is hazy, his meditations 
demonstrate an epistemology in which empirical access to the natural world generates 
knowledge of what cannot be seen. In Boyle‘s meditation ―upon the sight of ones 
Shadow cast upon the face of a River‖ he considers that the ―World may without much 
extravagance be tearmed the Shadow‖ of its divine author, but he adds that this shadow is 
―very superficial and obscure.‖4 Occasional Reflections posits the material world as full 
of signs of moral truths, but those signs are always shadowy; objects and occasions are 
not literal manifestations of immaterial realities. Thus, this way of reading the world 
presents an epistemological dilemma. Moral or spiritual truths are not immediately 
accessible or perfectly legible. One could, for example, easily read the elbow as evidence 
for divine endorsement of inebriation. By reading the material world for empirical 
evidence of an a priori assumption, Franklin demonstrates how easily such an 
epistemology can go awry. Boyle exempts himself from the kind of faulty epistemology 
Franklin satirizes, but New English ministers, preaching in the same moment as Boyle 
was writing Occasional Reflections, were anxious that their sermons were too shadowy 
23 
 
as reflections of spiritual truths and thus liable to the kind of misreading Franklin 
parodies. Boyle and New English Puritan ministers attended to the natural world as a site 
of moral truths, but I argue that while Boyle explicitly marked the epistemological 
connection between the material and spiritual worlds as one of shadowy likeness, the 
epistemology reflected in the sermon held the material world to be a more direct 
manifestation of spiritual truths. 
For Boyle, the soil sermonized, and sermons, too, were material reflections of 
spiritual lessons, but their stakes were much higher. Often, in Occasional Reflections, 
Boyle meditates on some object or occasion that emblematizes the problem of the 
sermon. These meditations consider how to merge style and content so that language does 
not distract from piety. That form could upstage content was a constant concern for 
ministers, and Boyle captures this debate, common in seventeenth-century sermonic 
theory. In reflection VI, ―upon the sight of a Looking-glass, with a rich Frame,‖ three 
men dialogue upon the mirror as an image of eloquence in sermons. One of the speakers, 
Eugenius, reflects that eloquence in sermons draws listeners just as the gilt frame draws 
lookers, but his companions find fault in his sermonic philosophy. They argue that 
eloquence has ―no Power, like a good Looking-glass, to acquaint the beholder with the 
true Image or Representation of his own Complexion,‖ and they condemn the preacher 
who works to make ―his Expressions, than to make his Hearers, good.‖5 Boyle‘s 
meditation presents both sides of the debate: should the minister use all available sources 
from art and nature to draw listeners, or would that art distract from or even undermine 
the sermon‘s true goal? Should the sermon present itself as a man-made, material object 
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that is only similar to the spiritual meaning it carries, or should the sermon, instead, 
present itself as an immediate manifestation of divine things? The sermon form worked 
like the objects and occasions on which Boyle reflected, but it also needed to mediate the 
potential misreading that Franklin highlights.  
Boyle‘s empiricism assumed an epistemological connection between the 
observable and larger moral principles, and Puritan sermons incorporated the language of 
empiricism while also obscuring the processes of mediation occurring between the visible 
and the invisible. The sermon, like the meditation, needed to transmit the interpretive 
work behind the lesson to readers or hearers who would experience it as if they had 
discovered it themselves. But the sermon, unlike the meditation, camouflaged the initial 
interpretive work. The epistemological framework of early science, as Boyle‘s 
Occasional Reflections shows, relied on empirical data to generate new knowledge. The 
Puritan ministers in New England recognized this shifting paradigm, and it unmoored 
their usual frames of reference for spiritual knowledge. If Boyle, as scientist, used 
empirical data to uncover natural laws, Puritan ministers began to rely on empirical data 
to confirm their assumptions about God‘s laws. In order to assure themselves that their 
knowledge of God was empirical—testable, reproducible, and sensible—ministers crafted 
their sermons using the rhetoric of the plain style. I argue that the New England plain 
style sermon was a means of overcoming ministerial anxiety, of holding on to the 
revealed Word of God while acknowledging shifting epistemological paradigms. 
     The plain style, ministers believed, presented an answer. Its rhetoric would 
ideally reproduce experimental results, assuring that different readers and hearers, at 
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different times, would have the same experience of God‘s Word and would arrive at the 
same conclusions about it. Early American Puritan ministers used the language and tools 
of early empiricism in order to assure themselves, even more than their audiences, that 
God‘s Word was still God‘s Word. But audiences were always a concern. As Boyle was 
writing the Occasional Reflections, across the sea New England minister Thomas 
Shepard was worrying that the Word of God never ―stirs the soules‖ of some men who 
find it to be only a ―strange thing […] a voice of words, a sound of words, so they hear 
men spake, but understand no more then if they speak in a strange language, or if they do, 
it concernes not them; or if it stirs, ‗tis but as the blowing of the winde upon a rock, 
which blusters for a time; but when the winde is down they are still. Truly they hear the 
word spoken, but they do not hear God speaking.‖6 If Boyle‘s soil speaks, Shepard 
worries that language is as meaningless as rocks.   
Shepard‘s concern was spiritual, but it points to the dilemma on which Boyle‘s 
meditation on the gilded looking glass turns. Eloquence, or art, in a sermon or occasional 
reflection ran the risk of underscoring the materiality of language, and with it, the 
possibility of mishearing and misreading. To keep their listeners from hearing only the 
wind on the rock, or from mistaking the soil for the sermon, the New England Puritan 
clergy relied on the plain style. Along with a ministerial desire for empirical confirmation 
of spiritual laws or religious truths, ministers worried that they, as interpreters of God‘s 
Word for the people, would disrupt the empirical process. Their voices, and the sermon‘s 
style, needed to be transparent conduits for God‘s Word.  
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I argue in what follows that the plain style sermon relied on the primacy of 
experience (in juxtaposition to the Text) as the empirical site of saving grace. Such an 
emphasis on experience necessitated the minister‘s (and the Bible‘s) transparency in the 
pulpit. The long history of the plain style had always emphasized the experiential, but the 
rise of the new science shifted the plain style‘s definition of experiential. New England 
Puritan ministers used the plain style to create a testable and reproducible religious 
experience, and they did so through metaphor. Metaphor in the plain style sermon 
functioned as the link between the universal and the particular: metaphor gave the lay 
listener the sense of being spoken to directly and personally (fostering a sense of 
immediate experience) while facilitating universal experiences that were reproducible 
and testable in what the ministers imagined to be an empirical sense.
7
 
Thus, the plain style sermon camouflaged the minister‘s mediating presence, and 
it did so rhetorically. The obvious conflict, that the medium of language compensated for 
mediation, was not lost on Puritan ministers. Here I look at the sermonic philosophy of 
three of seventeenth-century New England‘s most prolific and influential ministers—
Thomas Shepard, Thomas Hooker, and John Cotton—demonstrating how they merged 
empiricism and metaphor to forge linguistic philosophies that mirrored the central image 
of their faith: the incarnation of Christ. In the end, Cotton argued that Christ was trope, 
but he did not mean Christ was immaterial or a mere image. The incarnation was a 
movement from the universal to the particular, a turn to the visible. It made material what 
had been unseen, and Hooker, Shepard, and Cotton imagined the work of the sermon in 
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just the same way. The metaphor of the plain style made the immaterial material and the 
particular visible. 
 
II. A Study in Mediation: The Plain Style and its History  
The sermonic plain style has often been misunderstood as a rejection of 
ornamentation in speech, part of a broader puritanical rejection of all kinds of 
ornamentation, although a better definition recognizes the plain stylists‘ deliberate—if 
careful—use of ornamentation.8 With this concession, the plain style is better understood 
as a rhetorical effort to subordinate human learning to the Word, to elevate the literal 
sense of the Scriptures, and to make the sermon accessible to a variety of listeners. Such a 
redefinition of the plain style has been occurring in scholarship on New English sermons 
over the past decades, but its connections to shifting epistemological frameworks has yet 
to be explored.
9
   
Although this revision has recognized the frequent use of metaphors in plain style 
sermons, I argue that the epistemological framework of the sermon itself relied on 
metaphor. This is where the sermon diverges sharply from the rhetorical framing of 
Boyle‘s Occasional Reflections. Boyle imagined the relationship between an object and 
its moral lesson, such as a fire and lust, as similitive rather than metaphorical. Boyle‘s 
meditation ―Upon the making of a Fire with Charcoal‖ demonstrates the simile at work:  
For as Wood that is once thorowly set on Fire, may afterwards have that 
Fire quite choak'd, and extinguish'd, and yet by those changes be turn'd 
into Charcoal, whereby it is not only made Black, but dispos'd to be far 
28 
 
more easily Kindled, and Consum'd than before; so those, who have once 
had their Hearts thorowly possest by the pernicious Flames of Lust, […] 
ev‘n when they have stifled these criminal Flames, and feel no more of 
their Heat, may not only have their Reputation irrevocably blemish‘d [ …] 
but commonly carry about with them an unhappy Disposition to be re-
inflam‘d.10  
Boyle explicitly employs the language of simile: x is ―as‖ to y. And his admission of the 
shadowy nature of occasional reflection further suggests he did not assume, as Jonathan 
Edwards would a century later in his similar meditations, that the objects upon which he 
meditated had some inherent spiritual meaning. The rhetoric of Boyle‘s meditations 
makes the simile explicit; he does not attempt to hide the mediation occurring. But the 
contemporaneous plain style sermon sought to do just that. Ministers, though, were 
anxious about this hidden mediation, and they sought linguistic ways to remedy it.  
The occasional reflection demonstrates an epistemology rooted in empirical, 
sensory experience. New England ministers believed that this epistemology, manifested 
in the plain style, would guard against the dangers of mishearing, mediation, and 
enthusiasm.
11
 An overly artful sermon style could produce any one of these miscarriages, 
the ministers believed, but the plain style allowed the laypeople to observe and 
experience God just as the occasional meditator observed and experienced natural 
phenomena. Enthusiasm was a great concern for all ministers; it disrupted the 
hermeneutics in place for reading one‘s soul by severing signs from that which they 
represented. The enthusiast would, for example, read his or her tears as evidence, not just 
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of sorrow over sin, but as evidence of true repentance, true transformation of the soul. As 
a merely affective response to stimuli, enthusiasm overreached the empirical methods of 
deciphering grace in one‘s soul or evil in the world by advancing the experiential sign 
over its spiritual referent, and it was too individualistic ever to be reproducible. The plain 
style made religious experience reproducible: each listener should receive the same 
knowledge and have similarly legible responses. Enthusiasm was an error of sign-
reading, and the plain style meant to ensure that the laity read signs as God intended them 
to be read. Like Boyle‘s famous air pump experiment, the plain style facilitated empirical 
observation. Just as one could observe a vacuum at work in the air pump, so one would 
observe God in the Bible and, via the plain style, in the sermon.  
Steve Shapin and Simon Schaeffer have written about Boyle‘s interest in the 
recreation of the experimental moment in Leviathan and the Air Pump (1985), and they 
argue that Boyle wrote and circulated descriptions of his experiments in order to gather 
what they call ―virtual witnesses.‖ By either replicating the experiments for themselves or 
by visualizing the experiment Boyle describes, readers could re-experience the 
experiment and then validate the results. Without these witnesses, Shapin and Schaeffer 
argue, the knowledge-claims gained from the experiment could not become ―matters of 
fact.‖ Shapin and Schaeffer discuss the literary technologies that Boyle used to 
communicate these experiments and their resulting knowledge-claims to his audience: the 
experimental text ―is a narration of some prior visual experience [that] points to sensory 
experiences that lie behind the text.‖12 I argue that the sermonic moment works similarly. 
It, too, points to some sensory experience that led to the text‘s construction. The minister, 
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like the scientist, communicated through language an earlier, personal experience, and he 
attempted to convey to his audience the sense of immediate observation that Boyle 
implemented in his experimental texts.  
The interpretation of a particular biblical passage, it was believed, was not 
imposed or made by the minister; it was inherent in the Bible itself and simply observed 
there. Because the minister had a set of observational tools (knowledge of biblical 
languages, hermeneutical training etc.), he was more likely than the lay reader to arrive at 
the interpretation that actually inhered in the text. The role of the sermon, then, was to 
give the reader the experience of observing the ―matter of fact‖ in the Bible despite not 
having the minister‘s tools. The sermon opted for a bare style that presented the 
interpretation in language that was accessible to anyone and that erased the presence of 
the human agent. The lay listener did not ―take the minister‘s word for it,‖ but assented to 
his interpretation, because the plain style presented knowledge as evidence, not 
argument.
13
 The act of listening to a sermon or of reading the Bible was experimental; the 
layperson seemed to engage in the work of interpretation alongside the minister, reading 
the signs before her. Thus, the plain style ostensibly provided empirical evidence and 
ensured reproducible results. 
Reformed preaching manuals of the 1590s and early years of the seventeenth- 
century first defined the sermonic rhetoric of the plain style. The New England Puritans 
relied heavily on these manuals for their own sermonic form and rhetoric, though each 
adapted the initial preaching philosophies to the new environment of colonial New 
England. In his 1596 treatise A Declaration of the True Manner of Knowing Christ 
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Crucified William Perkins, the non-separating Puritan minister most influential for the 
New England Puritans, writes: ―Now the knowledge of this [Christ‘s resurrection] must 
not be onely speculative, that is, barely conceived in the braine, but it must be 
experimental: because we ought to have experience of it in our hearts and lives.‖14 
Throughout this treatise, Perkins contrasts ―experimental‖ knowledge with intellectual 
awareness, or the ability to ―handle the whole mysterie of God incarnate soundly and 
learnedly‖ without an ―inward and lively feeling.‖15 Perkins‘s experimental knowledge 
relies on the metaphors of sensory experience to claim that religious knowledge is seen, 
tasted, felt, but in the late sixteenth-century he did not make the claim his New England 
heirs would: that religious experience is real because empirical. Perkins‘s emphasis on 
the emotional transformation of conversion and the minister‘s camouflage of mediation, 
however, were also central to the New England plain style.  
Perkins first published his preaching manual, The Arte of Prophecying, in 1592, 
and it is one of the earliest, and the most formational, articulations of a Reformed plain 
style.
16
 Perkins, and other ministers, devised the plain style as a way of compensating for 
the tension between two central Reformation teachings.
17
 With the rise of Protestantism, 
the sermon took on a more central role in the inculcation of faith in the individual soul: as 
Martin Luther argued, faith comes through hearing (God‘s Word) alone. If Luther 
emphasized the centrality of the sermon, Desiderius Erasmus added that Christ alone is 
Priest. His treatise on preaching and the priesthood, Ecclesiastes, was first published in 
1535 and was an important source for the Puritan preaching manuals that appeared in the 
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last decade of the century and into the next.
18
 Ecclesiastes emphasizes Christ as the sole 
mediator and the priest‘s or minister‘s role as one of mere interpreter.19  
However, these Reformation fundamentals—that the sermon was central to faith 
and that Christ alone was mediator—were in conflict. Although Christ was the sole 
mediator between God and humanity, the minister did hold a mediating role as interpreter 
of Scripture for the people. Therefore he had to be cautious to make his sermon a catalyst 
of faith without making himself the agent. A rhetorical plain style was the result of this 
very contradiction because it deemphasized the physical presence of the minister and his 
voice and gave, or was thought to give, the layperson an unmediated experience of God. 
At the same time, though, the plain style was a way of regulating the potential heresy of 
this unmediated experience. The plain style as a regulatory mechanism became a way of 
assuaging anxieties about individual interpretive agency and ministerial meditation.  
Perkins‘s The Arte of Prophecying created the sermon format used by Puritan 
ministers throughout the seventeenth-century: the four-part sermon that included text, 
doctrine, reasons, and uses. Aside from this format, Perkins provided the minister with 
tools for disguising the art of preaching. The title of the manual points to the 
contradiction between ―prophecying‖ (preaching), which should be a divinely guided 
surrender of human wisdom, and ―arte,‖ which highlights the human agency behind the 
sermon. Throughout the manual, Perkins offers advice for both the preparation and the 
delivery of the sermon that would bring art and prophecy into proper balance.
20
 He 
argues that the minister‘s speech must be ―spiritual‖ and simple, ―fit both for the peoples 
understanding and to express the maiestie of the spirit.‖21 This dual-role of sermonic 
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speech, to reach the simplest minds yet to match the glory of the subject, requires that the 
minister essentially make himself invisible in the pulpit. Perkins is explicit on this point: 
―Humane wisdome must bee concealed, whether it be in the matter of the sermon, or in 
the setting forth of the words: because the preaching of the word is the Testimonie of God 
[…] and not of human skill.‖22 The primary goal here is simple enough: to ensure that the 
hearers do not ascribe their faith to any man, or human knowledge, but to the grace of 
God alone. But how is the minister to enact such transparency in the pulpit, especially as 
he is allowed to use the ―arte‖ of human wisdom in his private preparations?  
Perkins answers this potential counter-argument by claiming that the minister 
partially erases his presence in the pulpit through small verbal and physical gestures. He 
recommends abandoning the use of Greek or Latin phrases, uncommon words, or the 
―telling of tales‖ in order to make the minister appear artless. More importantly, Perkins 
advises ministers to be grave in their gestures: ―It is fit therefore, that the trunke or stalke 
of the bodie being erect and quiet, all the other parts, as the arme, the hand, the face and 
eyes have such motions, as may express and (as it were) utter the godly affections of the 
heart.‖23 For Perkins, the body performs ministerial transparency by making itself as 
invisible as possible. 
Although these small strategies were calculated for their effect, the Perkinsonian 
sermon form had the greatest role in rendering the minister transparent in the pulpit and 
creating a sensed immediacy between God and congregant. Teresa Toulouse, in The Art 
of Prophesying: New England Sermons and the Shaping of Belief (1987) has most fully 
and influentially treated the problem of ministerial mediation in Puritan New England. 
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She argues that the sermon form, as Perkins describes it, encapsulates the minister‘s 
interpretative process: ―Once the true ‗literall‘ meaning has been established, the process 
of how the preacher arrived at it can then be shaped within the public text-doctrine-
reasons-uses model.‖24 Toulouse does not directly discuss the minister‘s struggle for 
transparency in the pulpit, but her argument here suggests that the Perkinsonian sermon 
form acts as a kind of scrim; the form conceals the minister‘s previous interpretation 
because it recreates the interpretive process in the pulpit. Or, as Toulouse puts it, 
Perkins‘s model ―involves preacher and listener in a nascent narrative that unfolds in the 
logical movement from the sacred text to its applications in the present moment.‖25 The 
shape of the sermon, in Toulouse‘s description, persuades the listener because it seems to 
develop immediately and spontaneously; the Perkinsonian model controls the 
interpretation for the audience. Toulouse emphasizes what she sees, and what others have 
seen, as the rationality of Perkins‘s model. She argues that Perkins desired to view 
―God‘s ways as ultimately rational,‖ but I would add that her description of Perkins also 
emphasizes the transparent nature of the preaching minister. The form of the sermon 
erases the minister‘s previous interpretive work by creating that work anew in the pulpit 
and by allowing the Bible to ―open‖ immediately before the listeners.26  
Although the plain style sermon sought to create immediacy between Word and 
listener in the moment of delivery, Perkins dedicated a significant portion of his treatise 
to the minister‘s preparation before the sermon. This suggests that, one, some of the work 
of transparency occurred before the sermon was performed, and two, that the minister‘s 
private experience of the Word was essential for the delivery of an effectively transparent 
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sermon. The majority of Perkins‘s The Arte of Prophecying offers instructions along 
these lines. The minister‘s work of interpretation in his private study requires opening the 
text so that the ―one entire and natural sense may appeare.‖ Perkins is clear that the 
―supreme and absolute means of interpretation is the Scripture it selfe.‖27 Lisa Gordis has 
most thoroughly theorized this in Opening Scripture: Bible Reading and Interpretive 
Authority in Puritan New England (2003). Here she describes the Puritan belief in a self-
interpreting Bible: ―Puritan theorists saw the Bible not as a closed book, but as an open 
text, a locus for ongoing interaction between God and his chosen saints. Clergy and laity 
often described that interaction as ‗opening.‘‖ She adds, ―[p]rivileging God as author and 
interpreter, Puritan interpretive strategies minimized the role of the human interpreter, 
relying on methods that in theory allowed the text to interpret itself.‖28 Gordis observes 
an ―interpretive fluidity‖ in Puritan practice that, because of a complex relationship 
between text, minister, hearer/reader, and God, permits a more disruptive, exciting, 
contentious, and lively biblical interpretation than we once allowed the Puritans.
29
  
However, Gordis is careful to note, the biblical text was only theoretically 
interpreting itself. While the Puritans believed the Bible was a fully transparent, self-
opening text, the minister‘s work of interpretation was far from passive. Rather than 
having the text magically opened to him (or, as the minister believed, alongside having 
the text spiritually opened to him), the minister applied a variety of hermeneutical tools to 
the Bible. The Arte of Prophecying was largely an instruction manual establishing the 
interpretive strategies the minister could use without imposing his own will on the Bible. 
Referencing the original language, collating related passages, and deciphering tropes and 
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figures in the Bible, to name a few, were all hermeneutical activities that allowed the 
minister to more actively open the text. These ―helps,‖ as they were called, were tools 
that allowed the minister to observe divine knowledge in the text. But they, unlike the 
tools of empirical observation, confirmed the minister‘s a priori assumptions. Perkins 
warned that the audience must not discern the workings of human art in the minister‘s 
interpretation: ―the Minister may, yea, and must privately use at his libertie the artes, 
philosophie, and varietie of reading, whilest he is framing his sermon: but he ought in 
publike to conceale all these from the people, and not to make the least ostentation.‖30 
The minister had to conceal these tools so that the people would, as Gordis observes, 
sense the text opening before them. Thus, the laity was able to observe truth in the text. 
Perkins used art to disguise art in order to make the sermon‘s argument 
immediately accessible to all audiences. In this sense, the sermonic plain style was 
simply a rhetoric of accessibility; all types of listeners could understand the theological 
logic of the sermon when presented through the clear and structured logic of the plain 
style. But there were certain forces at work in the colonial communities that made the 
plain style‘s regulation of religious experience more important than Perkins could have 
anticipated. Threats of hypocrisy and heresy loomed large in New England because the 
communities were geographically isolated and because their success, both religious and 
otherwise, depended on a cohesive community free from internal subversion. The New 
England Congregationalist churches strove for consensus, and those individuals who 
threatened this theological consensus were forced from the region.
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 The plain style made 
consensus more likely because it controlled biblical interpretation. But the plain style was 
37 
 
not only a means of regulation; it was most interested in fostering unmediated 
relationships between the laypeople and their God. These two contrasting purposes of the 
sermonic plain style highlight an anxiety over the minister‘s role as mediator, and this is 
the distinguishing characteristic of the New English sermonic plain style. Varying 
degrees and types of ministerial anxiety concerning mediation structured each minister‘s 
use of the plain style. And each minister I read here—Shepard, Cotton, and Hooker—
addressed these anxieties through language itself; style, hardly ―plain,‖ became the means 
for appeasing anxieties about mediation. 
Although Perkins advocated the use of ―art‖ in preaching, ministers worried that 
their words were always potential sites of distraction. God spoke nothing but truth, but 
that was always in danger of being misheard. The Bible could not be wrong, but it could 
be misread. And the material world could provide insight into spiritual truths, but 
miscarriages between spiritual truth, natural world, and human interpreter would occur. 
The New England ministers were all too aware of these potential miscarriages, and thus 
they relied on the sermonic plain style as the safeguard against mishearings and 
misreadings. In the plain style, language mediates all potential problems of mediation.  
Boyle‘s Occasional Reflections, addressing the use of art in sermon writing, 
clarifies why ministers rely on art and natural knowledge. In the meditation ―upon being 
presented with a rare Nosegay by a Gardener,‖ Eugenius and his companions once again 
turn to the sermon, and reflecting on the labor involved in producing the beautiful 
arrangement, Eusebius makes the object an image of the sermon, and of writing in 
general: ―to be able to write one good book on some Subjects, a man must have been at 
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the trouble to read an hundered.‖32 Eloquence in sermons, he argues, is the result of much 
learning and labor, and both nature and art play a role: ―For though an Author‘s Natural 
parts may make his Book abound with Wit, yet without the help of Art he will scarce 
make it free from faults. And to be well stock‘d with Comparisons, which when skillfully 
manag‘d make the most taking passages of fine Pieces, one must sometimes survey and 
range through the works of Nature and Art.‖33 For Boyle, careful observation of the 
natural world made the writer clearer and more effective. And the plain style sermons 
relied on comparisons from the natural world and on the knowledge derived from many 
―good books.‖ Yet, as Perkins cautioned, ministers should always hide the work of art in 
their sermons. Both Perkins and Boyle warned that style could hinder meaning if not 
managed with skill. 
The style of an occasional reflection could, Boyle admitted, become an obstacle to 
true understanding of the object‘s figurative significance. Though his reflections employ 
figurative language—and Franklin‘s caricature is stylistically sophisticated—Boyle 
argued that the observer need not have ―much wit or eloquence‖ to engage in reflections. 
He or she needed only ―cherish piety,‖ because the reflection‘s purpose was to ―make the 
man good, whether or no they make his style be thought so.‖34 But style mattered for 
Boyle. A poor style could keep the written reflection from communicating its intent, and 
an overly ornamented style would distract from the lesson itself. This stylistic tension is 
part of the epistemology of both the occasional reflection and the sermon. The sermon‘s 
spiritual truths and the reflection‘s moral lessons are mediated by a speaker and by 
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language itself: the material world is full of shadowy signs of moral truth, but it is always 
mediated.  
Boyle‘s reflections prioritize the figurative significance of the observed object; 
there is surprisingly little consideration of the naturalness of the things observed in 
Occasional Reflections. Michael Hunter argues, in Robert Boyle Reconsidered (1994), 
that the natural philosophy Boyle espouses in Occasional Reflections ―pushed literal 
details into figurative significance.‖35 The figures in the material world are best captured 
in figurative language. Though Thomas Shepard argued that ―it is a rule, never to flie to 
metaphors, where there can be a plain sense given,‖ the plain style relied on a similar 
conception of the relationship between figurative language and truth. Plain style sermons 
often began with the work of unpacking biblical metaphors, and they used figurative 
language borrowed from the natural world to illuminate spiritual truths.  
In making the medium of language a remedy for the problems of mediation, 
ministers anxiously realized they had to rely on the tools and helps Perkins described. But 
fifty years after Perkins, New England ministers seized opportunistically on the language 
and methods of the new science. Beyond emphasizing the sensory experience that 
Perkins argued should guide the sermon listener, the New England plain style sermon 
extended the meaning of Perkins‘s ―experimental knowledge‖ and incorporated the 
discourse of empiricism. By deferring to this authoritative discourse, ministers imagined 
the work of the sermon as experimental. Where this manifests itself most importantly, I 
argue, is in metaphor. Plain style sermons employed metaphors taken from the natural 
world, which became one means of making an argument more efficacious and 
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experiential. Natural metaphors seemed to ground language to the material world, ideally 
closing the gap between word and thing. And New England ministers characterized the 
work of the sermon itself as metaphorical: it made visible and particular the invisible and 
universal. 
 
III. The Empiricism of Metaphors: The New England Sermonic Plain Style  
In 1653, the British Fifth Monarchist John Rogers published Ohel or Beth-
Shemesh. A Tabernacle for the Sun, partially a collection of forty conversion narratives 
that he gathered from his congregants in Dublin and that all roughly follow the same 
rhetorical structure.
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 In discussing the requisites for church membership, he argued that 
―Everyone to be ADMITTED, gives out some EXPERIMENTAL Evidences of the work 
of GRACE upon his SOUL.‖37 The experimental evidences to which Rogers points were 
also those of the New England plain style. In Roger‘s conversion narratives, and in the 
plain style sermon, experience included external experiences, internal sensations, and a 
third category that occupied a space between the external and internal: spiritual or 
internal sensations of physical experience, or metaphor.   
The first, outward experiences, included both the supernatural—such as visions—
and the natural—like illnesses, hearing sermons and more general outward actions (as 
both pre-conversion evidence of a sinful state and as evidence of conversion). Internal 
sensations included dreams and various emotional states like longing, awareness, 
temptation, or, as one narrator reported, the ―sweet enjoyments of Jesus.‖38 The third 
category of more metaphorical sensory experience involved seeing, hearing, or perhaps 
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even touching the divine. Although I label these as metaphorical experience, the 
congregants often described them quite literally. Rogers‘s conception of experimental 
knowledge does seem metaphorical in relation to the material sensory experience of 
Boyle‘s experiments, but Rogers speaks of this knowledge in sensory terms: ―If so be ye 
have tasted how gracious the Lord is,‖ he writes citing William Ames‘ commentary on 1 
Peter, ―not onely taken grace (for many do) but tasted grace […] and found 
experimentally feelingly […] O then, will you say, O it is good!‖39 Tasting grace is the 
empirical work of reading the signs of grace in one‘s soul. And it is both a metaphorical 
and sensory tasting. 
Hooker, Shepard, and Cotton all relied on this conception of metaphor in 
experience: metaphors in sermons allowed the audience to taste grace. Metaphor was 
both a means of incorporating empirical evidence into the sermons, and it was the 
epistemological mechanism of the plain style sermon. Whereas Boyle‘s reflections 
functioned by simile, the plain style sermon itself worked metaphorically, eliding the 
actual analogy and representing the sermon as the audience‘s own experience rather than 
the minister‘s educated argument. The sermon as metaphor works like the incarnation, 
which collapses tenor and vehicle into the one God.  
Thomas Shepard, Thomas Hooker, and John Cotton wrote most directly about the 
plain style in the 1640s through the 1660s, and while the sermon styles of all three fit 
Perkins‘s general definition of the plain style, they each had different, and at times 
oppositional, stances on the role of the sermon and on the minister‘s relationship between 
audience and Scripture. Each minister built on Perkins‘s sermonic theory, generating 
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individual theories of the sermon that attempted to soften anxiety about the process of 
conveying biblical interpretations to listeners through the means of the sermon. 
Encouraging true hearing was every plain stylist‘s aim, and the rhetoric of the plain style 
accommodated this. Cotton, Hooker, and Shepard each wrote sermons or pamphlets 
designed to instruct the layperson‘s hearing, but in order to provide the key to true 
hearing, experience, the sermon also needed to engage a full sensory knowledge. True 
hearing was the plain style‘s goal, but true hearing meant more than just hearing. In The 
Soules Preparation (1632), Hooker wrote that antagonists of the plain style opposed it 
―because thereby the eye of the soule comes to be opened.‖40 The plain style, he argued, 
was more than mere sermon form. More than sounds. More than words. True hearing 
reached the heart and opened the eye of the soul. Despite the plain style‘s ostensible 
rejection of metaphor, Hooker‘s metaphor of the soul‘s eye represents the basic theory of 
the New England Puritan plain style. Metaphor, not plainness, became the sermon‘s 
means for opening the eyes of the soul. 
Hooker, Shepard, and Cotton were not unaware of the ironies of their rhetorical 
solution to the problem of mediation. How can language, a medium by definition, 
become the remedy for mediation? The anxiety each minister experienced in realizing 
this contradiction led to different forms of compensation, explanation, and performance, 
all of which combined to form the sermonic and linguistic theories of each minister. 
Hooker demanded from godly ministers a deliberate use of every word so that meaning 
did not miscarry in the midst of communication, and figurative language was often his 
preferred tool for knitting meaning and form. Shepard articulated a sermonic theory in 
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which the act of listening for God‘s voice in the sermon became a full sensory 
experience, thus placing more emphasis on the layperson‘s testing of that experience than 
on language itself. And Cotton, the most prolific of the three, formed a middle ground, 
worrying about his own mediating presence but anxious that language would always be 
too imprecise, too much a part of mediation, to remedy mediation. Cotton addressed these 
anxieties, though, by equating language itself with Christ‘s incarnation. 
Thomas Hooker worried that language was the obscuring agent in the pulpit. He 
advocated a plainness of speech in which word corresponded as closely as possible to the 
thing it represented. His Application of Redemption (1656) offers the clearest articulation 
of his ideal pulpit style. He writes:  
The plainness of the Ministery appears, When the Language and Words 
are such as those of the meanest Capacity have some acquaintance with, 
and may be able to conceive; when the Preacher accommodates his 
Speech to the shallow understanding of the Simplest Hearer, so far as in 
him lies, alwayes avoiding the frothy tinkling of quaint and far fetched 
Phrases, which take off, and blunt as it were the edge of the blessed Truth 
and Word of God.
41
  
Hooker‘s assertion that the sermon‘s language should be directed towards the lowest 
common denominator suggests that language is always potentially unruly, spinning out 
into inaccessible and unintended meanings. But the real force of Hooker‘s argument is his 
worry that a ―frothy tinkling‖ will impede Scripture‘s power. Hooker argues that a 
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minister who fills his sermons with sweetness tries too hard to ―please the pallat‖ of the 
listener, overlooking the true health of the patient.  
If the minister is a doctor for the soul, Hooker‘s Application suggests that the 
minister is an instrumental and persuasive, not transparent, figure in the pulpit. Hooker 
claims this outright, writing that ―the Minister must hew and square your hearts before 
they can be prepared for the Lord Jesus.‖42 Therefore, Hooker stresses using the precisely 
right word so that the sermon will have particular and ultimate efficacy. In Puritan 
theology, although an individual could not actively choose salvation, he or she could 
prepare his or her heart to be worked upon by God, and the hearing of sermons was both 
an essential part of this preparation and a means through which God could act on the 
prepared heart. For Hooker, though, the minister‘s words seem to be a prerequisite for 
preparation. If this is true, there is little room left in the pulpit for the Word of God to 
speak directly to the people.  
 But Hooker shifts the responsibility to the listener. In exhorting his audience to 
cultivate itself in preparation for the preached word, he writes: ―when you hear the Word 
plainly and powerfully preached to you, labor that the Word may be so unto you as it is in 
it self.‖43 Hooker addresses his anxiety that he, like the Catholic priests, might be acting 
as mediator between God and man by removing himself from the equation. The 
individual works to hear the Word not as it is preached, but as it is. Regularly in his 
sermons, as he begins to interpret a biblical passage, Hooker uses the language of 
―opening the text.‖ This (theoretical) transparency is what Hooker references when he 
asks his audience to hear the Word ―as it is in itself.‖ His sermonic philosophy intended 
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to render the minister transparent in the pulpit, yet he gave the preacher an essential and 
active role in the process of conversion. 
Hooker‘s anxiety about his role as mediator was connected to his worry over the 
tendency of words to become unmoored from the things they represented and to his 
worry over a minister‘s tendency to manipulate words to serve his own base purpose. The 
―far fetched‖ phrase, that which does not adequately convey the minister‘s meaning, 
corrupts the listener‘s understanding not just because it sounds too pretty but because the 
word or phrase is too distant from the minister‘s meaning. Too close an attention to the 
―sugar‖ ruins the ―potion‖ of the sermon‘s intended effect.44 Yet this argument itself 
relies on metaphor. How does the clear metaphorical imagery of this passage not fall 
under the condemnation of frothy sugariness? Hooker would argue that the metaphor 
here, the Word of God as sword, ―make[s] way for the efficacy of the Gospel‖ by 
clarifying rather than hindering meaning. In this passage, Hooker‘s primary concern is 
that biblical truths are not corrupted with sugary language, the very pleasure of which can 
undermine the medicinal work of the Spirit.  
The Spirit‘s medicinal work, though, is knit to—and partially dependent on—the 
minister‘s words. Frothy tinklings impede the Spirit‘s work, but careful and plain words, 
Hooker argues, sharpen the edge of the Word. Hooker‘s plain style is an expression of the 
relationship between words and things, not a rejection of figurative language. In 
Application, after Hooker describes his plain style, he offers a definition of an anti-plain 
style, an unfaithful and deceptive use of words: 
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Plainness of Preaching, appears also in the matter that is spoken: when sin 
and sinners are set out in their native and natural colours, and carry their 
proper names, whereby they may be owned suitable to the loathsomeness 
that is in them […]; A Spade is a Spade, and a Drunkard is a Drunkard, 
&c. and if he will have his Sins, he must and shall have Hell with them.  
Its Satans Policy (who painter or tyre-maker like, cozens all the world 
with colors) to smut and disfigure the beautiful wayes of Godliness, and 
the glorious Graces of the Spirit, with the soot and dirt of reproaches, and 
base nick-names: Sincerity, he terms Singularity; Exactness, Puritanism 
and Hypocrisie; and so ignorant men (who judge the person by the picture) 
are brought out of love and liking with those blessed wayes.
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Hooker defines plain preaching as using a thing‘s ―proper name;‖ his plain style is a 
rhetorical commitment to ensuring that words honestly represent ―natural colours‖ rather 
than paint a false picture. Painting a false picture is Satan‘s policy. In the passage above, 
Hooker lists words that Satan uses to paint God‘s good things as undesirable, and he goes 
on to list words Satan uses to represent sinful things (drunkenness, cowardliness) as 
desirable (fellowship, discretion). Satan‘s project is to obscure language‘s relationship to 
experience and to make the clergy his middlemen, so that the layperson has no access to 
divine truth.  
Hooker is most troubled by ministers who become ―the Divels Brokers‖ and 
refuse to call a spade a spade, instead making sin the punch line for sugary jokes: ―Those 
secret wipes, and witty jerks, and nips at sin, at which the most prophane are pleased, but 
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not reformed; are utterly unsavory and unseeming in the Place, the Person, the Office, 
and the Messenger of the Lord of Hosts. What! A Minister a Jester! O fearful! to make 
the Pulpit a Stage, to play with sin.‖46 The Jester, for Hooker, speaks only in riddles, 
spinning the truth through language. The minister‘s most important role is to speak truth, 
but to do so he must call a spade a spade. The devil‘s broker might use figurative 
language to obscure truth, making language itself a joke, but the plain style, if nothing 
else, took language very seriously. If Satan‘s goal is to unmoor language from 
experience, the minister‘s is to connect the two—to offer his message in language that 
reflects and generates experience. Hooker does this, often, by recourse to figurative 
language, which posits the material world as a sign or shadow of the immaterial. His 
preaching was renowned for its liveliness, and his use of figurative language contributed 
to that reputation.
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 When used carefully, metaphor fosters immediacy and conveys 
empirical knowledge. 
In The Soules Preparation, Hooker writes that ―a speciall application of particular 
sinnes, is a cheife means to bring people to […] a true sorrow for them.‖48 The sermon 
that strikes out generally will not hit any target, Hooker says. To make this argument 
Hooker employs a series of figurative comparisons: 
A Master commands a servant to doe such a thing, and because he names 
him not; one thinks it is not hee, and another it is not hee […] So when a 
Minister saith, In many things we sinne all, he hits no man, and so none 
are affected with it. But now particular application brings every mans part 
and portion, and not onely sets the dish afore him, but cuts his meate, and 
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carves for him. […] The words of a faithfull Minister are like arrows, 
which if they be shot a cock height, they fall downe againe and doe 
nothing; but when a man levels at a mark, then, if ever, hee will hit it.
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Masters and servants, meat and arrows. Hooker uses each of these figures to achieve the 
particularity he demands from the sermon—a particularity that gives each layperson the 
sense that the minister speaks directly to him or her—and metaphor is the vehicle of this 
particularity. The compounding of figure upon figure reinforces this particularity, each 
figure revealing a different element of Hooker‘s argument. The master shouts an order, 
but no one responds: the minister‘s responsibility is to particular application. The steward 
buys the meat, serves it, cuts it: particular application gives the listener not just an 
argument about sin, but a taste of his own sinfulness. The marksman aims, shoots, hits. 
And Hooker‘s arrow pierces a listener‘s heart. 
Particular application alone, Hooker argues again and again, makes way for true 
hearing. Only when the minister says ―This is thy drunkness, and thy adultery and 
prophaneness‖ can application touch the heart.50 Hooker does not mean that a minister 
calls out individual names from the pulpit, but the general ―thy‖ achieves particularity 
through metaphor; the particularity of language, and not just argument, pierces the heart. 
Hooker demonstrates this, again, through metaphor:  
For the fashion that God useth in framing the heart is different; two men 
are pricked, the one with a pinne, the other with a speare: two men are cut, 
the one with a pen knife, the other with a sword: So the Lord deals kindly 
and gently with one soule, & roughly with another, and handles it 
49 
 
marvelous sharply, and breakes it all to pieces. There is the melting of a 
thing and the breaking of it with hammers.
51
  
Through this particular application, Hooker argues, the word ―sincks deepest into the 
heart,‖ and ―the eye of the soule comes to be opened.‖52  
For Hooker, metaphor was also a means of compensating for the mediation of the 
minister and sermon. If language itself could be made to place before a man his meat so 
near he could taste it, then the minister was simply a server and the sermon a serving 
platter. The hearer saw and tasted the meat for him or herself, hardly aware of the 
mediating influence of speaker and form. The many metaphors for the work of the 
sermon that Hooker marshals in The Soules Preparation highlight the agency of language 
over the agency of the minister. The Word, a sword, will wound a man when struck with 
a ―full blow,‖ Hooker writes. But then: ―I confesse it is beyond our power to awaken the 
heart, but ordinarily this way doth good.‖53 Ministers do not have power over their 
listeners‘ hearts, but ―this way‖—the way of language—does have some agency. 
Ultimately, Hooker answers his anxieties about mediation by conflating his 
interpretive voice with the voice of God. The metaphor, or particular application 
composed of language itself, effaces the minister‘s mediating presence. He describes this 
in his sermon, Wisdomes Attendants: or, the Voice of Christ to be obeyed (1651). The 
sermon opens the text of Proverbs 8:32, ―Now therefore hearken unto me, O ye children: 
for blessed are they that keep my ways.‖54 Hooker explains, in several steps, what it 
means to ―harken,‖ the first of which is hearing with the ear, and this naturally leads 
Hooker into a discussion of preaching. He writes: ―It is not onely the voice of man that 
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persuades you, and enjoyns you to give audience to the Lord Jesus, but God himself, and 
that from heaven, and that immediately from his own mouth.‖55 The sentence moves 
from minister and God joining voice together (―not onely‖) to God‘s voice speaking 
directly (―with his own mouth‖) to gradually erase the minister‘s presence and voice. In 
the end, this is where Hooker lands: although he claims for the minister a persuasive 
agency, he is only able to make the claim because God, and not the minister, is the actual 
speaker in the pulpit. And because the words themselves have power, like nails set fast 
upon the heart, Hooker need only prepare his own heart to be pierced by God.  
 If, for Hooker, metaphor achieved particularity, Thomas Shepard added to this the 
power of metaphor to awaken the mind to a full sensory experience of God. His 1652 
sermon, Of Ineffectual Hearing, begins where we left Hooker: with an explication of 
what it means to hear God speak. Shepard opens his sermon with a reading of John 5:37, 
―Ye have neither heard his voice at any time, nor seen his shape.‖56 These two sensory 
experiences—hearing and seeing—form the foundations of religious knowledge.57 True 
hearing, for Shepard, means true experiencing.  
Shepard did not explicitly argue for the particular force of metaphor, though his 
sermons relied on the same need for and use of particularity that Hooker‘s did. Shepard‘s 
sermons worked like Hooker‘s, effacing his own presence in the pulpit through language 
itself, despite his clear anxieties about language. And he, like Hooker, believed that God 
spoke with particularity. Reading John 5, Shepard argues that God speaks literally: 
―Some think they are metaphorical speeches, to express their ignorance of God,‖ Shepard 
writes of the seeing and hearing John describes. Yet he continues: ―Now though this be 
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the scope, and the general truth, yet I conceive, the Lord speaking particularly, and 
knowing what he spake, intends something particularly: and it is a rule, never to flie to 
metaphors, where there can be a plain sense given.‖58 The hearing John references, 
Shepard argues, is quite literal. Shepard sees the Word of God as two-fold: one part is 
―Gods external or outward word, containing letters and syllables‖ and the other is ―Gods 
internal word and voice, which secretly speaks to the heart.‖59 The plain sense, then, is 
that God‘s voice is literal, real, material: words spoken, letters read. Never fly to 
metaphors. 
But, of course, Shepard does. In distinguishing between effectual and ineffectual 
hearing, Shepard references the Gospel of Luke‘s parable of the sower.60 Because this is a 
scriptural, and not invented, metaphor, it avoids charges of flying away from the plain 
sense. But Shepard goes on to invent his own metaphor for the same situation: ―When the 
Sun is down the Moon may arise, but yet a man is cold and dark; but then the Sun ariseth, 
oh it warmes […] so it is here, when the Lord speaks inwardly and effectually to the 
heart.‖61 This metaphor, compared to the abstraction of the preceding lines, ―they may 
hear it inwardly, but never effectually,‖ attempts what Christ‘s parables accomplish. 
After relating the parable of the sower, Christ‘s disciples ask what he means by it, and he 
replies: ―hearing they may not understand.‖62 The work of understanding a metaphor in a 
sermon engages the heart, Shepard would argue, in a way that reason in the sermon 
cannot. The addition of Shepard‘s sun metaphor reinforces this. In case the biblical 
metaphor, spoken from the mouth of the Word himself, does not generate effectual 
hearing, Shepard piles metaphor on top of metaphor. 
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The metaphor, the sermon suggests, is part of God‘s internal voice. It speaks to 
the heart. And it encourages the second experience that John 5 references: seeing God‘s 
shape. This, like hearing God‘s voice, works empirically to generate faith. The visual 
experience of God, Shepard says, refers to the mind ―com[ing] to have a true Idea of 
God, as he reveals himself in the Word and Means by the Spirit.‖63 Shepard compares 
gracious experience with sensory experience, and metaphor makes this comparison more 
than mere figure; Shepard argues, as Rogers did, that the experience of grace is sensory. 
Shepard‘s sun metaphor is full of the language of sensory experience—cold, dark, 
warm—and this, like Christ‘s parables, is meant to provide an understanding that mere 
hearing cannot. 
Shepard‘s concern that his listeners might not ―hear God speaking,‖ is resolved by 
particular application that comes through a particularity of language itself—often in 
metaphors that provide a fuller sensory experience. Yet Shepard‘s anxiety rears itself 
again: though Of Ineffectual Hearing is directed towards the listener, it is not lost on 
Shepard that he, as a giver of sermons, is largely responsible for how the audience will 
receive his sermon. Shepard resolves this problem, a nagging sense that even his 
particular language is still just ―a voice of words,‖ by arguing for what he calls the 
―eternal efficacy‖ of the Word. Though Shepard may not see the immediate effects of his 
sermon‘s particular application, he has faith that the Word will transcend his words. He 
places responsibility on the hearer for using all available means to ensure that the Word 
―may come with efficacy.‖64 Much of Of Ineffectual Hearing is given to expounding the 
tools for trying one‘s experience of hearing the sermon. ―There is great need of trial,‖ 
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Shepard writes, ―for a man may reade, hear and understand externally, whatever another 
may; and yet the whole Scripture a sealed book.‖65 External hearing does not necessarily 
actualize experience, and Shepard uses language to transmit sensory experience of the 
sermon‘s content. 
Shepard‘s attempts to remove his anxieties about his role as mediator, though, end 
with a grave sense of his own responsibility: ―something is to be done by Ministers; that 
is, to preach truth, and Gospel-truth, fetch‘d from heaven with many prayers, and soaked 
with many tears.‖66 The minister must first have his own immediate, sensory experience 
of spiritual truth in order to provide his audience with the means to hear God‘s voice and 
see his shape in the sermon. Shepard acknowledges the minister‘s responsibility, but he 
places all hope of immediacy between God and congregation in the Word—Christ, the 
Bible, and language itself. The medium of language remedies the problems of mediation. 
Metaphor makes abstract spiritual truths accessible and material. Shepard, like Hooker, 
relieved his worry over his own role as mediator. 
John Cotton understood himself as a medium. If Hooker and Shepard used the 
plain style to efface their own mediating presence, Cotton used it to ensure that his was 
guided by the Spirit. He writes of this in A Practicall Commentary (1656), a collection of 
sermons on 1 John, arguing that God ―clears the Medium.‖ Divine testimony instills true 
knowledge in the heart, and as a result, God clears ―the Word and Sacraments, Prayer & 
Christian Communion, so that whereas before we lookt at them, but as beggarly 
rudiments, of little power or worth, after God hath once enlightened us, we see the power 
and virtue of God therein, so plainly, as if we had been touched by the Sun beams.‖67 The 
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sermon, a medium like those Cotton lists here, is not erased, but in it the audience is able 
to see God clearly and plainly.  
Cotton believed that assurance of faith was possible, while Hooker and Shepard 
always worried over the implications of such confidence. The core of Cotton‘s sermonic 
theory was his belief that he preached to two distinct audiences, the regenerate and the 
unregenerate, and those two audiences would hear and experience a sermon differently. 
While the sermon could provide for the elect an experimental knowledge of faith leading 
to assurance, the non-elect audience would not hear the sermon as it was. Hooker, 
Shepard, and many of their fellow clergymen believed that the sermon had an essential 
role in the preparation of hearts for justification and sanctification, but Cotton was not 
such a preparationist.
68
 Teresa Toulouse argues that Cotton believed the elect could 
―conceivably read and hear the Word of God preached without ‗vaile‘ or ‗shadows,‘‖ 
because their hearing had already been transformed.
69
 Cotton‘s trust in his elect 
audience‘s hearing relieved some of the anxiety over mediation that Hooker and Shepard 
worked so hard to overcome.  
But Cotton also addressed the problem of mediation through language, and the 
audience‘s experience of listening was structured as much by the words themselves as by 
the listener‘s election. As Ann Kibbey argues in The Interpretation of Material Shapes in 
Puritanism (1986), ―The more of a rhetorician Cotton becomes, the more invisible he 
becomes as an orator, for the more it all seems to come from the words themselves and 
from a deity who uses ministers the way he uses words, as a material vessel in the fallen 
world through which the order of things, words, and people is redeemed and given 
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expression.‖70 Language and Cotton as minister act as conduits for the Spirit, and while 
they become, in Kibbey‘s assessment, invisible mediums, both are material. For Cotton, 
she argues, ―[b]ecause the figures of acoustic design are inextricable from the material 
fact of speech, all language use is figurative in some way,‖ and Puritan preachers 
believed that ―[e]ven literal meaning was dependent on the interplay of signifiers and the 
use of tropes.‖71 Cotton sees all language as working figuratively in some sense. 
Cotton writes in A Practicall Commentary that ―Christ spake in parables, but after 
his ascension, the Spirit revealed things clearly.‖72 Yet Cotton himself admitted the 
occasional obscurity of even post-ascension revelations in the Bible. Parables are 
sometimes still necessary, and Cotton‘s sermons do make use of them. ―Three things go 
to clear discerning,‖ Cotton writes, ―the object must bee clear, the medium clear, and the 
eye clear, and then wee may discern; now the Holy Ghost plainly reveals the Counsells of 
God, and then opens our judgements to discern it, and then clears all the mediums, so that 
a Christian may plainly discern; so that the Spirit is a clear Instructor, no men need bee 
taught more clearly.‖73 Because he still needed to fulfill his ministerial duties, Cotton 
made the language of his sermons the conduit for Spirit‘s instruction.  
In Magnalia Christi Americana, Cotton Mather records a listener‘s response to 
Cotton‘s preaching: when he ―preaches out of any Prophet or Apostle, I hear not him; I 
hear that very Prophet or Apostle; yea, I hear the Lord Jesus Christ himself speaking in 
my heart.‖74 No doubt Cotton Mather was attempting to paint a flattering picture of his 
grandfather, but John Cotton represented his own preaching in the same way. A sermon 
should be judged, he wrote, ―not in excellency of words, but in evidence of the Spirit.‖75 
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But Cotton‘s words were excellent—famously so. Mather describes John Cotton‘s 
preaching: ―When a Golden Key of Oratory should not so well open a Mystery of 
Christianity, he made not stick to take an Iron One, that should be less Rhetorical. […] 
Nevertheless his more Judicious and Observing Hearers, could by his most Untrim‘d 
Sermons perceive that he was a man of more than Ordinary Abilities.‖76 Even his 
plainest, least rhetorical sermons were judged as great. By a ―golden key,‖ Mather means 
eloquence and ornamentation, and it is partially due to descriptions like this that the plain 
style has been misjudged as a rejection of figurative language. Cotton‘s Iron Key of 
Oratory, though Mather calls it ―less Rhetorical,‖ made use of metaphor just as Hooker 
and Shepard did. It seems ―less Rhetorical‖ because, as Mather describes it, Cotton ―had 
the Art of concealing his art‖ when preaching.77  
Cotton‘s act of concealing art leads to preaching that is a ―scientificall Instruction 
about certain experimentall things‖—clearing the medium for the Spirit‘s 
enlightenment.
78
 Cotton discourses on sermonic language at length in A Modest and 
Cleer Answer to Mr. Ball‟s Discourse of Set Forms of Prayer (1642). Though Cotton‘s 
central argument is against set forms of prayer, or the reading of sermons, A Modest and 
Cleer Answer is also an articulation of his sermonic theory. Reading another man‘s 
sermon from the pulpit is sinful, Cotton argues, because it suggests the speaker values the 
words of men more than the things of God. Reading a sermon is not preaching, because 
God will not ―blesse the heart with gracious affections, when the eyes go a whoring after 
the imaginations and inventions of men.‖79 The ―inventions of men‖ refers to linguistic 
and rhetorical inventions. Preaching and scriptural interpretation are, Cotton argues, 
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commanded by God, ―but the phrase and method of Interpretation is of men.‖80 The 
words of a prayer or sermon are manmade, but Cotton is explicit that though invented, 
these words are inspired. They are not ―such words as mans wisdom teacheth, but which 
the Holy Ghost teacheth.‖81  
Cotton privileges the minister‘s inspiration over the mere words of the sermon: in 
A Modest and Cleer Answer Cotton distinguishes preaching and the public reading of 
sermons. He objects to Mr. Ball‘s argument that a minister may rightfully read a sermon 
before the congregation:  
Though reading and pronouncing of a thing, be both of them adjuncts, and 
common adjuncts too, to that which is propounded and read, yet according 
to the ends and subjects, to which they may be applied, the one may be 
lawfull, the other not indifferent but sinfull, the reading of a Sermon for 
preaching, is a sinfull manner in preaching: The difference will ever hold 
between the word read, and preached.
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Cotton is addressing the controversy over reading sermons; whether the minister reads 
another man‘s sermon or reads his own carefully written sermon, he precludes the 
inspiration of the Spirit in the sermonic moment.
83
 Although Cotton‘s argument was not 
uncommon, his seriousness here (―not indifferent but sinfull‖) reveals his own 
commitment to the indispensability of the minister‘s private inspiration. The minister‘s 
experimental knowledge was, for Cotton, essential to the construction of a sermon that 
communicated anything to the congregation. Cotton‘s belief that the sermon did not 
actively, immediately convert its listeners and his belief that the layperson had individual 
58 
 
authority in biblical interpretation were part of this larger valuing of experimental 
knowledge and part of his acknowledgement that language—at times, even biblical 
language—was slippery. 
Teresa Toulouse argues that, for Cotton, language could never quite ―reach‖ the 
―mystery of a Deus Absconditus—the true Logos.‖84 Hooker and Shepard anxiously 
acknowledged that this was true of the sermon—God is indescribable—but Cotton 
extended this to describe the biblical text as well. For Cotton, Toulouse argues, the Bible 
is not reducible to its ―mechanically extractable uses,‖ but is instead something to be 
searched for keys to the mystery that is God. Cotton relied on a host of hermeneutical 
tools in order to access these mysteries, but he was also willing to acknowledge that the 
Bible was at times dark and obscure. And unlike many of his fellow Puritans, Cotton 
located this darkness, not in the reader‘s sinfulness, but in the text itself. Cotton‘s 
sermonic ideal, whatever the degree of his use of various rhetorical or hermeneutical 
―helps,‖ was that the minister relied not on his own intellectual strength but on the 
Spirit.
85
 The helps, or tools, provided a safeguard against misinterpretation, and true 
immediacy with God occurred through divine inspiration and the Spirit‘s strength. 
Ideally, the Spirit would transform faith into experimental knowledge. The Spirit cleared 
the medium, making the sermon itself a space where experimental knowledge could 
occur. 
Hooker and Shepard both used metaphors as a means of achieving a particularity 
that generated experimental knowledge, and Cotton explicitly advocated experimental 
knowledge as the foundation of true piety. But he, better than either Hooker or Shepard, 
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articulated the fraught relationship between faith, knowledge, and language. A Practicall 
Commentary opens with a reading of 1 John 1:1, ―That which was from the beginning, 
which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, 
and our hands have handled, of the Word of life.‖86 Cotton reads 1 John as a divine 
argument for experimental faith, which is more certain because it is not merely 
demonstrated, but experienced. Cotton‘s definition of experimental knowledge is 
different than Perkins‘s; for Cotton, experimental knowledge carries with it a sense of the 
empirical.
87
  
Cotton‘s main claim in A Practicall Commentary is that faith comes through 
experimental knowledge. Referencing 1 John 1:1, Cotton argues that seeing, hearing, and 
touching are all ways of accessing and knowing the Word of Life. For John, faith comes 
through metaphorical sensory experience of the divine. Cotton, though, distinguishes 
faith and knowledge through different kinds of sensory experience: 
Faith comes by hearing, when we assent to any thing upon Divine 
testimony, as if God hath given us some word, we believe it, but if we see 
a thing by sense, or by experience, or by some certain Arguments of Gods 
dealing with us, that we do not now only believe it from Gods Word, but 
we plainly see it by experience in our hearts from some love of God.
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The faith that comes through hearing God‘s word is transformed into certain knowledge 
by experience, Cotton suggests. Though faith and knowledge work similarly because they 
are ―both acts of the judgement, for both are Scientia axiomatic certi, the knowledge of a 
certain truth,‖ there is a difference.89  
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Cotton argues that ―Faith is a perswasion or trust a man takes up upon the credit 
of Divine testimony‖ but ―we know and believe, and we know that we know, which is an 
Actu judeii, and more than opinion, or faith; Knowledge is such an acknowledgement as 
ariseth Ex principis scientificis, such as proceeds from certain Principles.‖90 For Cotton, 
faith comes first: divine testimony initiates faith, a trust, and then experience breeds 
certain knowledge and assurance of faith. If faith and knowledge work economically, 
then knowledge, or scientific demonstration is the ―gold standard,‖ and faith is ―credit.‖ 
A man takes up faith, Cotton writes, ―upon the credit‖ of God‘s Word, but knowledge 
means a man sees and knows that he knows, and knowledge comes from empirical 
experience.  
But at times Cotton defines faith in a more expected way: ―Faith which is wrought 
in us by the work of the Holy Ghost […] is greater, and more certain, than any science 
gotten by demonstration.‖91 Here faith seems to be the gold standard. While this 
illuminates the central tension in Cotton‘s work—faith versus knowledge—this passage 
also defines faith as certainty arrived at through empirical experience. And it defines 
―science gotten by demonstration,‖ like faith through hearing, as information taken upon 
the credit of someone (or thing) else; here faith is demonstrated, not experienced. True 
knowledge and true faith, Cotton argues, require experience, and that experience is 
formed on ―sure grounds‖ of empirical reason, not just a rational assent to a reasonable 
argument. 
The sermon is a space where seeing, hearing, and touching the Word of Life 
occur, where one can transform faith taken upon credit into experienced and certain 
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knowledge, or assurance of grace. This is one of the central doctrines of A Practicall 
Commentary, and referencing 1 John, Cotton asks why Christ is called the Word of God: 
―here is a metaphor, and every metaphor is a short similitude, and it must not bee 
expected that any similitude should agree in all points.‖92 The metaphor, as a medium, 
strives to represent something, but it will always be limited. Yet this is one medium 
Cotton does not attempt to clear: Christ as Word is metaphorical, Cotton, argues, but not 
simply so.  
His further explication of Christ as Word sheds light on how he understands the 
metaphor of the logos and how he imagines the sermon to be efficacious though limited. 
Christ is the Word of God in four respects, Cotton says: ―hee is the wisdome, image, and 
interpreter, and promise of the Father.‖ In describing the first, wisdom, Cotton writes that 
the Word is ―not any accident to [the Father], but of the same nature.‖ Second, the word 
is the image of God, or of the same character. The Word is interpreter because it declares 
God‘s will and meaning, and last, the Word is the promise because ―hee it was of whom 
the Lord spake from the beginning.‖93 In each case, Cotton sutures vehicle to tenor; 
Christ is a metaphorical manifestation of God, but he is of the same nature as God. 
Metaphor, then, does not necessarily imply an invented figuration. Metaphor is the 
particular manifestation of the universal. Though Cotton writes that God is love ―without 
a Trope,‖ because love itself and not just having the quality of love, his reading of 1 John 
suggests that God does, in some sense, need tropes.
94
 Christ as Word is a metaphor, and 
Christ himself stands in relationship to God as a figurative image stands to the moral 
truth it represents. Christ is trope. 
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In the end, Cotton, Shepard, and Hooker allowed themselves some hope in 
language. Because they must: faith comes through hearing, they all remind us. But 
beyond this, the irony that the medium of language serves as a remedy for mediation is a 
divine irony. It is the paradox of the Christian faith: God becomes flesh, encasing himself 
in the material in order to redeem the material. Language, as medium, clears the medium. 
The gilt frame from Boyle‘s mirror-as-sermon would only serve to highlight the medium. 
The plain style, though, fully embraces the purpose of the mirror. It does not require 
ornamentation, because the process of reflection is itself full of images, figures, and 
meaning.  
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Chapter 2  
Monstrous Words: Anne Hutchinson, the Quakers, and Heretical Speech 
I. Miscarried Theologies 
In 1638 Anne Hutchinson‘s sixteenth pregnancy miscarried, producing half a 
dozen or so monstrous creatures all ―at once; some of them bigger, some lesser, some of 
one shape, some of another, few of any perfect shape, none at all of them […] of humane 
shape.‖1 Several months earlier Hutchinson was tried and imprisoned as an Antinomian, 
and just a month before her trial she had helped another Antinomian woman, Mary Dyer, 
through her own miscarriage. Then governor, John Winthrop, describes the product of 
Dyer‘s birth as such:  
it had a face, but no head, and the ears stood upon the shoulders and were 
like an ape‘s; it had no forehead, but over the eyes four horns, hard and 
sharp; […] behind, between the shoulders, it had two mouths, and in each 
of them a piece of red flesh sticking out; it had arms and legs as other 
children; but, instead of toes, it had on each foot three claws, like a young 
fowl, with sharp talons.
2
  
For the ministers and magistrates, these monstrous births were material evidence of 
theological error and spiritual failure—hence Winthrop‘s rendering of a conventional, if 
tiny, devil and Thomas Weld‘s refusal to see any ―humane shape‖ among Hutchinson‘s 
progeny. Weld makes explicit the correlation between monstrous births and monstrous 
ideas: ―Then God himself was pleased to step in with his casting voice […] by testifying 
his displeasure against their opinions and practices, as clearly as if he had pointed with 
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his finger, in causing the two fomenting women, in the time of the height of the opinions, 
to produce out of their wombs, as before they had out of their brains, such monstrous 
births.‖3 To the ministers and magistrates, Hutchinson‘s and Dyer‘s miscarriages were 
easily legible signs of error, demonstrating an epistemology characteristic of mid 
seventeenth-century New English Puritanism. That is, material and physical realities were 
visible signs of invisible truths: the Pequot War was a sign of providential displeasure, 
conversion narratives verbalized unseen spiritual realities, and the world and the self 
were searched for tangible evidence of grace.  
The first chapter argues that the sermonic plain style was an attempt to hold on to 
this epistemology, to make language a link between the visible and the invisible. But at 
the core of the heretical claims that led to Hutchinson‘s trial and banishment was an 
assertion that the invisible world was immediately accessible without the need for a 
system of visible signs.
4
 The ministers, Hutchinson believed, were vulnerable to biblical 
misinterpretation and ineffective preaching, suggesting that their rhetoric, sermonic style, 
and hermeneutics shielded the fact that language somehow failed to participate in an 
epistemology that posited the visible as a direct sign of the invisible. Hutchinson pursued 
a religious experience that removed (or at least compensated for) the third terms of the 
sermon and the minister. She claimed to receive immediate revelations from God and 
therefore, to eliminate the epistemological uncertainties of divine knowledge by asserting 
an immediacy that precluded any possibility of miscarriage—between the Bible and its 
reader, between the sermon and its hearer, and between God and the individual. 
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Hutchinson believed that relying on Christ‘s voice in immediate revelation 
(transcending the biblical text) would render interpretive miscarriages unlikely. The 
distinction between the Bible and Christ as Word was a defining characteristic of 
seventeenth-century Quakerism as well, to which Mary Dyer converted after being 
banished from Massachusetts following her monstrous birth. In her 1659 For Those that 
Meet to Worship at the Steeplehouse, Quaker Rebecca Travers succinctly captures the 
position of her fellow Quakers and of Hutchinson: Travers reprimands those who had 
―turned the invisible God into the similitude or likeness of visible things‖ and ―let Ink 
and Paper in his place, calling it by his Name.‖5 Hutchinson may not have drawn an 
explicit opposition between the Bible and Christ, but her embrace of immediate 
revelation did assume that Christ‘s voice was not limited to ―ink and paper.‖ At stake for 
Hutchinson, Dyer, and Travers was a central contrast between letter and spirit. Travers 
takes her cue from 2 Corinthians 3:6—―for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life‖—in 
order to oppose what she saw as the natural text of Scripture to the spiritual force of 
Christ. The prophetic speech of Hutchinson, Dyer, and Travers exposed the orthodoxy as 
relying on the Bible as a third term, a mediating object obscuring direct divine 
experience.  
Hutchinson and the Quakers sought to bridge the gap between text and experience 
they saw in the Puritan orthodoxy by making language reflective and generative of 
spiritual experience. But New England authorities targeted Quaker and Antinomian 
speech, in particular, as certain evidence of spiritual error. Hutchinson‘s prophetic speech 
in her court trial, the contagious quality of Antinomian speech, the strangeness of the 
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Quaker ―thou,‖ and the Quaker silent meeting all received criticism as sites of enthusiasm 
and unrestrained speech. The orthodoxy described this speech as heretical in stark 
opposition to their own ordered rhetoric. The plain style stood as a corrective for the kind 
of enthusiastic experience the orthodoxy assumed was occurring in the Quaker meeting, 
where there was no minister and no official sermon, as well as in the prophetic speech 
issuing from Hutchinson‘s immediate revelations. 
Puritan ministers emphasized the text over experience, Hutchinson and the 
Quakers believed, but Hutchinson and the Quakers sought to give the letter spiritual life 
by bringing it closer to experience. This chapter looks at the ―heretical‖ responses to the 
same questions posed in the first chapter, which examined the Puritan orthodoxy‘s 
positions on the relationship between language and religious experience. I ask how 
Hutchinson and the Quakers, some of the most fiercely targeted heretics in mid-
seventeenth-century New England, posed an alternative theology that mapped itself out in 
and against a rhetorical rubric for accessing, understanding, and communicating religious 
experience—particularly the experience of hearing Christ speak directly to the soul. 
Hutchinson‘s immediate revelations and prophetic speech offered an alternative model of 
religious experience that insisted on unmediated access to God, but the Quakers 
thoroughly embraced immediate revelation and systematized the relationship between 
revelation and public speech. They performed the same type of prophetic speech 
Hutchinson did—speech arising from an unmediated experience of God‘s voice—but 
they organized their doctrine and public meetings around this practice.  
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Both Hutchinson and the Quakers went against the grain of Puritan orthodoxy by 
claiming access to divine revelation; for Hutchinson this was immediate revelation, and 
for the Quakers it was the inner light. Though immediate revelations and the inner light 
had importantly different theological implications, they shared a sense of proximity to 
God that transcended or superseded orthodox Biblical revelation, thus ostensibly 
rendering meaning transparent. In this Hutchinson and the Quakers acknowledged that 
the Bible, as written text, was liable to all kinds of miscarriage; language was always 
potentially confused and confusing, and they sought ways to make divine truth more 
accessible, communicable, and understandable by modeling alternative relationships 
between religious experience and language. Rather than attempting to impose order on 
experience rhetorically, as the plain style did, Hutchinson and the Quakers imagined 
language arising from religious experience. Bridging the gap between text and experience 
that they saw in the orthodoxy, Hutchinson and the Quakers sought a theology without 
any third terms—without miscarriage. 
 
II. Speech without Miscarriage: Hutchinson’s Prophetic Speech  
Anne Hutchinson was taken to civil trial at the Boston General Court in 
November, 1637, officially banished from Massachusetts colony and held prisoner in a 
Roxbury home for some months (while Thomas Shepard worked to convince her of her 
errors), and then given a church trial in March of 1638, before finally leaving 
Massachusetts. Hutchinson‘s accusers found much threatening in her immediate 
revelation and attending unorthodox hermeneutic, but they also found easy evidence of 
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heresy in the form of her speech.
6
 Winthrop described Hutchinson‘s language as he did 
her womb: as the source of unrecognizable, prolific, and uncontrolled monstrosity. He 
and Weld saw Dyer‘s and Hutchinson‘s monstrous births as clear providential signs of 
punishment, and Winthrop characterized Hutchinson‘s language as the clear agent of the 
controversy and of her own fate.  
Winthrop‘s account of Hutchinson‘s trial and the Antinomian Controversy, A 
Short Story of the Rise, Reign, and Ruin of the Antinomians (1644), opens with a 
catalogue of the erroneous and false opinions that Hutchinson and the other Antinomians 
held.
 7
 Thomas Weld is the author of this list, and among the twenty-nine errors he lists, 
language and its uses appear in several. The first error, ―That the Law, and the Preaching 
of it is no use at all, to drive a man to Christ,‖ exposes a ministerial fear that Hutchinson 
invalidated their spiritual and earthly purpose by questioning the salvific role of 
preaching and of the Bible itself.
8
 What is more, Hutchinson undermined the value of 
words, not just the Word, by using her language to seduce and manipulate. Winthrop 
maintained that Antinomian speech, not just Antinomian ideas, seduced away members 
of the church: ―with much faire speech they caused them to yeeld, with the flattering of 
their lips they forced them.‖9 Her speech was cunning, Winthrop insinuates, but it was 
also a legible sign of error: 
for here she hath manifested, that her opinions and practise have been the 
cause of al our disturbances, & that she walked by such a rule as cannot 
stand with the peace of any State; for such bottomless revelations, as 
either came without any word, or without the sense of the word, (which 
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was framed to humane capacity) […] for they being above reason and 
Scripture, they are not subject to control.
10
 
The ―here‖ Winthrop mentions is Hutchinson‘s admission, on the second day of her two-
day trial before the General Court of Boston, that God would deliver her from the 
―calamity‖ of the trial by a miracle, and that she knew this by way of immediate 
revelation. The controversy is condensed into Winthrop‘s above sentence: Hutchinson‘s 
Antinomian opinions are the source of civil unrest, but in this passage Winthrop does not 
focus on matters of justification and sanctification or the covenants of works and grace 
(some of the major theological issues at stake). Instead, he concentrates on the Word and 
its proper uses, thereby positing a relationship between Hutchinson‘s unruly tongue and 
her disorderly relationship to Scripture. In Winthrop‘s assessment, Hutchinson‘s abuse of 
language made her dangerous, but it was also the error that led to her banishment: her 
―owne mouth should deliver her into the power of the Court,‖ Winthrop wrote. Winthrop 
believed he had caught her in a trap of her own making when she admitted to immediate 
revelation, and he read her prophetic speech as direct evidence of her reliance on 
immediate revelation, because it came without any ―sense of the word,‖ meaning it was 
fully unmoored from the doctrine of sola scriptura. Hutchinson did rely on the Bible as a 
source of spiritual truth, but she exposed Winthrop and her ministers as substituting the 
Bible—either the word or the sense of it—for immediate religious experience. She 
claimed they put ink and paper in God‘s place. 
Hutchinson‘s unruly tongue has received much critical attention, though scholars 
often focus on issues of gender when discussing her speech. Jane Kamensky argues that 
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Hutchinson‘s dissenting voice ―offered New England leaders a chance to define their own 
voices as the speech of authority by classifying the words of disorderly women as the 
archetype of social danger.‖11 Although Hutchinson‘s ―feminine‖ speech certainly was 
threatening, focusing solely on gender obscures the criticism she leveled at her ministers‘ 
use of language. In her ―unruly‖ speech she claimed interpretive agency and exposed her 
ministers‘ biblical interpretations as faulty. As Lisa Gordis has argued, Hutchinson 
―highlighted the interpretive crisis and the ways in which it was shaped by Puritan 
theories of reading, preaching, and interpretation. Most dramatically, Hutchinson‘s 
claims about immediate revelation exposed the potential dangers of Puritan theories of 
exegesis.‖12 Hutchinson challenges the very basis of Puritan epistemological systems, but 
she does so, first and foremost, by criticizing her leaders‘ conception of language and 
positing an alternative way of understanding the relationship between word and thing. 
Patricia Caldwell, in her 1976 ―The Antinomian Language Controversy,‖ was the 
first to call sustained attention to the linguistic theories at play in the Antinomian 
Controversy. She argues that, on one level, Hutchinson was ―speaking a different 
language‖ than her adversaries.13 She does not mean, simply, that Hutchinson was 
making heterodox theological claims, though Caldwell assumes this; instead she means 
that Hutchinson saw language as ―imprecise and uninformed before grace and [was] 
swept away in a tidal wave of spirit after grace.‖14 Hutchinson, according to Caldwell, 
believed that words could not ―fill their basic denotative function‖ and that words were 
not a ―part of what one is.‖15 Although I agree with Caldwell that the Antinomian 
Controversy, and Hutchinson‘s trial in particular, represents a controversy over language, 
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not just theology, she misreads Hutchinson‘s distrust of language.16 Rather than thinking 
of language as incapable of truly representing one‘s heart and mind, Hutchinson argued 
that her ministers misused and abused language, severing the word‘s relationship to thing. 
Hutchinson herself, though, used her prophetic speech as a means of overcoming the 
linguistic failure she saw in her leaders. In this sense, her language was caught up ―in a 
tidal wave of spirit‖—not deposed by the Spirit, but a part of it—but Hutchinson did not 
argue that language was swept away by or in spirit. 
Tamara Harvey has most directly responded to Caldwell‘s argument, pointing out 
that ―all Puritans were suspicious of human language and interpretations.‖17 For Harvey, 
the difference between Hutchinson and ―all‖ Puritans was in how each ―conceptualized 
language‘s performative actions.‖18 In opposition to the rejection of language that 
Caldwell identified in Hutchinson, Harvey argues that ―[f]or Hutchinson, bodies and the 
Word are not stable signs that signify God‘s will but rather are conduits for the Holy 
Spirit, witnessing to God‘s will functionally.‖19 Harvey emphasizes the ―functionally‖ 
here, arguing that Hutchinson‘s performative body was a ―third term‖ in her testimony. 
She ―recognizes the limits placed on her body,‖ Harvey writes, ―but challenges the 
accepted relationship between body and soul and in doing so, redefines ‗power‘ such that 
her body is no longer a manipulated object within a symbolic hierarchy, but rather a 
transitory vessel serving as a conduit for the Holy Spirit.‖20 Against Caldwell, then, 
Harvey argues that Hutchinson imagined an alternative relationship between material 
(word, body) and immaterial (signified, soul) that reclaimed language from the abusive 
hands of her ministers. And in Harvey‘s assessment, as in my own, Hutchinson espouses 
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a view in which the material is overcome by the spiritual; language is remade as spiritual 
power and the body as spiritual vessel. 
I argue that, though in many respects they contradict one another, both Harvey 
and Caldwell are right. Although, as Harvey argues, Hutchinson attempted to reclaim 
language and her body as vessels of the Spirit, she ultimately failed, as Caldwell helps us 
realize. Hutchinson failed because her attempts to reclaim language ended in a 
repudiation of the very epistemological link between seen and unseen that Puritanism 
posited and in which Hutchinson sought a more consistent role for language. 
Hutchinson‘s trial, then, uncovers a shift in her conception of language. Although she 
tried to reclaim her ministers‘ epistemology from what she saw as errors in their use of 
language, she failed. In her speech to the court she left behind the literal, physical text of 
the Bible and she denied her body‘s physicality. She was made over, and made the text 
over, in the image of the Spirit, but with that renovation she lost control over her material 
existence and was banished from the colony.  
Throughout the first half of her trial, Anne Hutchinson seems a confident, careful, 
and smart speaker: she overturns the faulty arguments of her accusers, uses the law to her 
advantage, and employs scriptural references to support her arguments and defeat those 
of her accusers. She is decidedly in control of her language, and understands its potential 
to persuade; she does not assume a voice that is purely prophetic. Eventually, though, this 
control over her own voice fails to spare her from punishment when she admits to 
immediate revelations, and as we have seen, delivers herself into the hands of the court 
by ―her owne mouth.‖ Because of this Hutchinson‘s admission is often read as surrender: 
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Hutchinson simply gives up, gets too weak, or sees no way around her fate.
21
 While we 
now understand, especially in the wake of Janice Knight‘s Orthodoxies of Massachusetts, 
that the Antinomian theological ―errors‖ were not inherently unorthodox, but merely 
vying for the upper hand in a theological, social, and political battle of ideas, we still 
imagine Hutchinson as an unruly speaker.
22
 Certainly, she loosened her voice from the 
social strictures of her moment and upset convention, but her performance in her court 
trial is disciplined, at least initially. It is precisely in the speech in which she admits 
immediate revelation—often read as unruly—that she becomes most verbally disciplined, 
because she relies on a disciplined hermeneutic of reading Christ‘s voice and understands 
her own voice as disciplined by God. Hutchinson must submit herself to God‘s voice; she 
must die to the flesh to become a vessel for the Spirit‘s voice. But ultimately language 
spins out of control. It is not the case that Hutchinson‘s voice is unruly; instead, language 
itself is severed from things. Language has no material ground in Hutchinson‘s attempts 
to make her body and voice pure spiritual vessels. 
 If, as I will argue later, the Quakers rejected an orthodox hermeneutic for 
immediate revelations accessed through the inner light, Hutchinson does not transgress 
quite so far; she never denies the literalism of the Bible, and she unequivocally states that 
she derives all her theological opinions directly from Scripture. When asked to provide 
scriptural support for holding meetings in her home to instruct other women, Hutchinson 
quickly offers one: ―I conceive there lyes a clear rule in Titus, that the elder women 
should instruct the younger.‖23 After some debate about whether it is lawful for 
Hutchinson to instruct any men that come to her, Hutchinson asks the court to ―set me 
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down a rule by which I may put them [men] away,‖ and Winthrop responds that it is not 
the court‘s job, but hers: ―You must shew your rule to receive them.‖24 Hutchinson 
reminds them that she had previously brought scriptural rules as support, but then 
Winthrop changes the burden of proof by arguing that her meetings are ―greatly 
prejudicial to the state‖ and completely abandons the scriptural line of argument.25 The 
ministers and magistrates do not, in the court trial, respond to Hutchinson‘s miscarried 
interpretation with substantial debate about the meaning of her scriptural references or 
offer her religious guidance; instead they abandon their arguments. In the face of 
Hutchinson‘s careful and quick speech, the ministers and magistrates are silent. 
Although she uses the proper hermeneutical tools, Hutchinson‘s interpretation 
miscarries into a monstrous claim about divine revelation. Hutchinson follows the 
exegetical guidelines handed down to her from her ministers but still derives an 
unorthodox reading, thus threatening to undermine the hermeneutical system of New 
England Puritanism by implying that if the sermon and biblical hermeneutics were to 
correspond to the ministers‘ epistemological assumptions, there could never be real 
theological consensus. Hutchinson sees her ministers‘ reliance on hermeneutical tools, or 
human helps, as a tacit acknowledgment of the impossibility of a truly unmediated 
relationship to God, thus also admitting that language itself fails to truly represent. In 
place of this she turns inward to the voice of God, searching for a more legible and 
communicable experience.  
Hutchinson‘s admission of immediate revelations occurs in the context of her 
longest speech in the trial. In response to one of the fiercest charges against her—that she 
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undermined the authority of her ministers by claiming that many of them were under a 
covenant of works—Hutchinson takes the floor: ―If you please to give me leave I shall 
give you the ground of what I know to be true.‖26 ―What I know to be true‖ is immediate 
revelation. Hutchinson begins her story in England, describing her religious journey of 
the past few years. She recalls being tempted to become a separatist, doubting the Church 
of England‘s authority, and questioning whether ―papists‖ are not actually ―anti-christ‖ 
because they do not deny Christ in the flesh.
27
 In some ways, Hutchinson‘s speech 
presents itself as a conversion narrative, but it does not follow most of the genre‘s 
rhetorical conventions. Those it does incorporate are turned to new ends: although 
Hutchinson chronicles her movement from a place of doubt into clarity, she not only 
discusses her own justification and sanctification, but also her ability to discern these in 
others. And while she describes how God had opened her heart and mind through 
Scripture, her realizations come through ―the voice of his own spirit to my soul‖ and not 
Scripture alone.
28
 This narrative reveals Hutchinson‘s own epistemological struggles, but 
she closes with an assurance of spiritual knowledge achieved through a direct experience 
of God‘s voice that disciplines her sight and her speech. 
As a result of her divine experience, Hutchinson believes God has given her the 
ability to discern the inner spiritual state of individuals—particularly her ministers. Much 
of the trial is spent confirming the rumors that Hutchinson had questioned her ministers‘ 
authority. Early in the trial Thomas Dudley, the deputy Governor, says that Hutchinson 
had ―disparaged all our ministers in the land that they have preached a covenant of works, 
and only Mr. Cotton a covenant of grace.‖29 Though Hutchinson attempts to deny this by 
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saying that ―one may preach a covenant of grace more clearly than another,‖ the court 
does not believe her. Eventually Hutchinson admits that she might have said the ministers 
preached a covenant of works, but here she makes a distinction between preaching a 
covenant of works and being under such a covenant. She, like Travers, uses 2 Corinthians 
3:6 to argue the difference.
30
 When Hutchinson claims to know the ―clear ministry,‖ then, 
she means this distinction between the letter and the spirit. Those ministers preaching a 
covenant of works, Hutchinson argues, labor under the Law, not the Gospel. For 
Hutchinson‘s accusers, the Gospel was the new covenant of grace, marking the passing 
away of the Law, but Hutchinson, like Travers, argued that her ministers emphasized the 
letter over the spirit, accusing them of making ―ink and paper‖ their god. She exposed 
their faith as false, because highly mediated, and she dismissed the authority of any who 
would deny her an immediate experience of God. 
Hutchinson‘s speech in her trial opens with and turns on the question of 
interpretive authority. But unlike her ministers, whom she views as having assumed 
authority, Hutchinson asks who has authority. In an earlier moment of doubt, Hutchinson 
reports, the Lord had opened the Scripture to her and brought to her mind a passage from 
Hebrews, revealing to her that ―those which did not teach the new covenant had the spirit 
of the antichrist.‖31 Hutchinson begins conventionally, describing the Lord opening a 
passage to her—a customary way of describing the bible-reading experience—but then 
transcends the sense of that passage by applying it to something outside its explicit 
meaning. She continues: 
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upon this he [God] did discover the ministry unto me and ever since. I 
bless the Lord, he hath let me see which was the clear ministry and which 
the wrong. […] Since that time I confess I have been more choice and he 
hath let me to distinguish between the voice of my beloved and the voice 
of Moses, the voice of John Baptist and the voice of antichrist, for all 
those voices are spoken of in scripture.‖32 
Hutchinson goes beyond claiming an interpretive authority that some of her ministers, 
Cotton in particular, encouraged, to asserting an ability to discern who had such 
authority.
33
 She makes the Bible the ground for all of these claims, something her 
ministers and judges overlook, but such a claim to discernment relies on immediate 
revelation, not the Bible. To her claim to distinguish which of her ministers is in the 
―clear ministry,‖ Hutchinson adds that she has gained the ability to discern the voice of 
her beloved, the voice of God. This discernment is a form of discipline, and Hutchinson 
implies that her spiritual journey is fully realized when she gains discernment of voices. 
It is a sign, to her, that she hears God‘s voice outside biblical revelation, and it affirms 
her belief in an unmediated experience of God. 
The minister and magistrates seize on this moment, attempting to expose 
Hutchinson‘s ―discernment‖ as enthusiastic, or absolutely undisciplined. When asked 
how she knew that the Spirit, as opposed to Satan or her own fancy, gave her this 
discernment Hutchinson answers, ―How did Abraham know that it was God that bid him 
offer his son,‖ to which Winthrop responds, anxiously one imagines, ―By an immediate 
voice.‖ Hutchinson replies without any apparent hesitation: ―so to me by an immediate 
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revelation.‖34 Claiming the kind of revelation Abraham experienced on Mount Moriah 
constituted, from the perspective of the court, a contagious enthusiasm that undermined 
real (biblical) revelation and warped the Word of God. Hutchinson claimed to discern 
between the ―bad‖ and ―good‖ ministers and practiced an alternate hermeneutic—not the 
one modeled by her ministers, but one directed by God‘s voice and not Scripture alone. 
God spoke to her, she believed, not just through Scripture, but above it, and Scripture was 
of little direct application when discerning which of her ministers practiced the ―clear 
ministry.‖  
After Hutchinson‘s speech, Winthrop rejoices that God‘s providence has made 
her ―lay open her self‖ and tells the court that ―the ground work of her revelations is the 
immediate revelation of the spirit and not by the ministry of the word […] Ey it is the 
most desperate enthusiasm in the world, for nothing but a word comes to her mind and 
then an application is made which is nothing to the purpose, and this is her revelations 
when it is impossible but that the word and spirit should speak the same thing.‖35 
Winthrop takes issue with Hutchinson‘s speech, not because she claims that God had 
revealed something to her, but because she claims this through the Spirit, not the Word. 
Winthrop, and the other authorities in the court room, believed that the Bible was the 
source and touchstone for any revelation, but here Hutchinson receives revelations from 
―nothing but a word.‖  
From her perspective, though, these were clearly God‘s words, and her 
applications were something ―to the purpose.‖ For instance, when God ―revealed‖ to her 
a ―place out of Daniel,‖ promising her deliverance, Hutchinson was practicing a 
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typological reading, applying moments from the Old Testament to living individuals and 
to the community as a whole. The end result, and not the method, is what Winthrop found 
disruptive. What her ministers saw as a miscarriage between method and monstrous 
product, Hutchinson claimed as evidence that their hermeneutic and epistemological 
systems were obstacles to an immediate experience of God. Hutchinson‘s biblical 
interpretation married method and product in a way her ministers‘ exegesis could not.  
At the close of her narrative, Hutchinson assumes her prophetic voice and 
preaches to the court, providing evidence that immediate access to the Spirit is 
manifested in language. After she offers her reading of Daniel, wherein she claims God 
had promised to deliver her from the ―calamity‖ of the trial, Hutchinson moves outside 
the literal text of the Bible. She ends her speech with these words:  
Therefore I desire you to look to it, for you see this scripture fulfilled this 
day and therefore I desire you that as you tender the Lord and the church 
and commonwealth to consider and look what you do. You have power 
over my body but the Lord Jesus hath power over my body and soul, and 
assure yourselves thus much, you do as much as in you lies to put the Lord 
Jesus Christ from you, and if you go on in this course you begin you will 
bring a curse upon you and your posterity, and the mouth of the Lord hath 
spoken it.
36
 
Although she opens with reference to Daniel, Hutchinson offers no scriptural support for 
the argument she sets forth. She does not bring ―rules‖ or make explicit her exegesis. 
Rather, the language of this paragraph is typical of prophecy, and when Hutchinson 
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closes with ―the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it‖ she unequivocally marks the 
preceding speech as a prophetic one. She moves outside the language of Daniel that 
precipitates her speech and speaks directly to her accusers. What is more, she represents 
her words, unambiguously, as God‘s words.  
 With this conclusion, Hutchinson suggests the entire speech had been prophetic. 
Her language reflects her immediate religious experience and demonstrates a rejection of 
an ink and paper God. Throughout the speech she relies on experience, even turning the 
biblical text into a tool for accessing God. The text does not mediate because she always 
moves beyond it. Hutchinson‘s claim that God has power over her body and soul 
suggests a relationship between the two that is mirrored in her prophetic speech, as 
Harvey argues. Language ushering from the Lord‘s mouth, to her soul, to her mouth 
suggests an immediacy between God, soul, and body. Hutchinson exposes her minister‘s 
sermonic rhetoric as obscuring the intimate connection between God and the individual, 
and she offers prophetic speech as an alternative. The ministers and magistrates, 
Hutchinson says, put Christ ―from‖ them, but her prophetic speech assumes his absolute 
immediacy.  
Yet some of Hutchinson‘s heretical theological opinions suggest she did not think 
of the body as an agent in the way Harvey characterizes it. Instead, Hutchinson imagined 
the body as swept away in the spirit, almost immaterial. Her speech in the trial, as a 
manifestation of God‘s immediacy, reaffirms this. Hutchinson imagined an alternative to 
her ministers‘ sermonic rhetoric, but it was a highly spiritual alternative. Her speech was 
prophetic, or spiritual. In this sense, Caldwell is right: Hutchinson did not imagine 
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language as fundamentally ineffective, as Caldwell argues, but she also did not imagine 
efficacious language as material. Prophetic speech renounces the material word. 
Hutchinson‘s prophetic speech in the trial corresponds to her mortalism, one of the 
theological heresies most discussed in her church trial.
37
 And her mortalism further 
suggests that she understood her prophetic speech as evidence of an unmediated 
relationship to God.  
In the seventeenth-century, there were various forms of mortalism, and while the 
most extreme, annihilationism, professed the ultimate spirituality of the soul and denied 
any resurrection of body or soul, most argued for a ―soul-sleep,‖ in which the soul dies or 
sleeps upon death and is resurrected in the general resurrection at the end of history. In all 
versions, though, mortalism was a spiritist argument that denied individual selves agency 
in history and instead prioritized God acting in and through the self. Although there is 
some argument about whether Hutchinson was an annihilationist, her mortalism suggests 
a particular understanding of the relationship between the visible and the invisible. 
Orthodox eschatology held that while the body and soul separated upon death, awaiting 
their reunion at the general resurrection, the soul lived on eternally, but Hutchinson‘s 
mortalism argues for the primacy of the invisible over the visible. In Hutchinson‘s 
mortalism, we see the invisible overtaking the visible; the soul is valued highly above the 
body, and the self dissolves into God‘s being. Thus, when she claims that the court may 
have power over her body and not her soul, she thinks to render them essentially 
powerless.  
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A hint of perfectionism underlies Hutchinson‘s mortalism. Although she did not 
profess perfectionism, she implies it in her church trial—or at least her judges thought so. 
As evidence for her perfectionism, the court argued that she read many scriptural 
resurrection prophecies as speaking of earthly bodies rather than spiritual bodies after 
death and that she denied the resurrection of the physical body. So, they argue, 
Hutchinson believed God had transformed her earthly body into a spiritual one. In place 
of an orthodox eschatology, Hutchinson implied that a spiritual resurrection occurred 
upon reception of saving grace; the gracious individual received an immortal spiritual 
body on earth. Like language, the body was immaterial. Both functioned as pure spiritual 
vessels, thus removing the gap between the material and immaterial by making 
everything spiritual. 
Hutchinson‘s trial begins with her desire to correct the failings of her ministers‘ 
linguistic forms, to replace the plain style sermon with immediate, inspired prophetic 
speech. But she ends with a rejection of the plain style‘s epistemology. ―You have power 
over my body, but the Lord has power over my body and soul,‖ are almost her last words, 
and with these—seen in the light of her mortalism—Hutchinson realizes that the body is 
not an empirically reliable sign of the soul‘s state. Her only recourse is to abandon the 
body for the soul, to embrace a spiritism that denies the need for an epistemological link 
between the visible and invisible. Hutchinson‘s theology and her speech tend toward a 
repudiation of the visible, and directly after her speech she says ―But now having seen 
him which is invisible I fear not what man can do unto me.‖38 These words conjure 
Travers‘ words about those who turn the invisible God into the likeness of a visible thing. 
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Hutchinson, in her prophetic moment, turns toward the invisible God, leaving the 
tangible object of the Bible in the shadows of his immediate voice. And having accessed 
the invisible, Hutchinson believes that what happens to her body is ultimately 
inconsequential. After her speech, Hutchinson speaks very little; when she does, her 
words are strikingly bare of the self-defense that marked the first half of the trial. Once 
God has spoken through her, once she has heard his promises and spoken forth his 
warnings, she has nothing left to say, and why should she if man cannot harm her? Her 
repudiation of the visible resigns her to silence.  
That is, until her last line. Once the court has pronounced its verdict, Hutchinson 
asks, ―I desire to know wherefore I am banished‖ and plunges back into the visible world, 
suddenly concerned with the details of her physical life. ―I fear not what man can do,‖ 
she had said, but here the body asserts itself as a reminder of material life. Winthrop 
refuses to comfort her: ―Say no more, the court know wherefore and is satisfied.‖39 And 
with that, Hutchinson is officially silenced—one last attempt by her authorities to assert 
their power—once again reminding her that the court did in fact have power over her 
body. 
While the Quakers practiced the same kind of prophetic speech Hutchinson did in 
her trial, understanding the need for divinely disciplined speech, they also saw language 
itself as an epistemological tool—something Hutchinson‘s spiritism could not realize. By 
regulating words themselves, in daily speech as well as religious practice, the Quakers 
found linguistic forms that collapsed the visible and the invisible. But rather than 
rejecting the visible world, as Hutchinson had, the Quakers believed that the spiritual 
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transformed the natural. New Creatures were born out of the inner light. This was the 
essential difference between Hutchinson and the Quakers; their systemization of 
immediate revelation enabled them to demonstrate their epistemology in and through 
language and to make language itself a tool for experiencing God. Their speech achieved 
what Hutchinson‘s could not. 
Just as the authorities in Massachusetts charged Hutchinson with unruly speech, 
the courts and churches relentlessly persecuted the Quakers as strange, disorderly 
speakers.
40
 The accusers, of both the Antinomians and the Quakers, were concerned with 
theology, but speech was a visible sign and thus an easy target. I have argued that 
Hutchinson‘s prophetic speech marks a rejection of orthodox rhetorical and sermonic 
form and instead models a prophetic speech that claims immediate access to the invisible 
world, and the Quakers systematized this process by organizing a hermeneutic for 
hearing Christ speak to the soul. In addition to their systemization of immediate 
revelation, the Quakers transformed their daily speech, disciplining their language, and 
transforming it—like themselves—into the image of Christ, the incarnate Word. Rather 
than repudiating the material, like Hutchinson, the Quakers transformed language into the 
material reflection of God‘s Spirit. 
 
III. “To Speak New Things”: Quaker Speech and Silence 
When, in 1676, Roger Williams, once a defender of freedom of conscience in 
New England, wrote his scathing critique of Quakerism (directed at Quaker founder 
George Fox and Quaker writer Edward Burroughs), titled George Fox Digg‟d Out of His 
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Burrows, Fox quickly retaliated, defending his faith against every one of Williams‘s 
critiques. Although not the most theologically significant point of contention for Fox, 
what seemed to agitate him most was Williams‘s harsh condemnation of Quaker speech. 
Early Quaker speech was composed of several features aimed at transforming daily 
language, such as the rejection of conventional polite greetings, a mandate to address all 
people by first names, the refusal to swear oaths, and the use of the second person 
singular ―thou‖ in place of the plural ―you.‖ They called this the pure language, and the 
Quaker ―thou‖ was the characteristic on which Williams—and countless other anti-
Quaker writers—focused most.  
The Quakers were prolific writers and published countless tracts, pamphlets, and 
broadsides defending themselves against their accusers; they also debated amongst 
themselves the purpose, value, and proper theology of their use of language. Their 
persecutors, in turn, churned out an enormous body of anti-Quaker literature.
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 While 
this literature most often came out of the British press, New England was never far out of 
sight, for it was the location of the most violent anti-Quaker activity, and countless 
English texts cited the colonial situation as representative of the severity of Quaker 
persecution. The Quakers first went to the colonies in July of 1656, when the first of 
several groups of Quakers landed in Massachusetts Bay to spread their particular gospel. 
It did not take long before the General Court took legal action against the Quakers: the 
two Quaker women who came to the colony in July were imprisoned for five weeks 
before being banished, and in the same month the General Court passed the first of many 
anti-Quaker laws, which stipulated that anyone caught importing Quaker books to the 
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colonies would be fined. The severity for breaking anti-Quaker laws quickly escalated, 
and by 1659 Mary Dyer was led to the gallows—the first round of Quaker executions in 
Massachusetts Bay.
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 This persecution quickly drew attention from England, and the General Court 
began to defend its actions through the English press. In 1660 A True Relation of the 
Proceedings Against Certain Quakers was published in London, and it offered legal and 
ecclesiastical support for the Massachusetts executions in October of 1659, when Dyer 
was first sentenced to death and two other Quakers were hanged. The whole ―design‖ of 
the Quakers, the True Relation states, was to ―undermine and ruine‖ the ―peace and 
order‖ of the colony.43 The True Relation directly opposes Quaker unruliness, violence, 
and contagion to the measured prudence of the court, aligning the English and the Boston 
Court against the Quakers: the court had followed the ―example of England‖ and its anti-
Jesuit laws, it had acted according to English laws more generally, and it was prepared to 
confront the Quaker threat because it had ―intelligence from good [English] hands.‖44 
Both the English and colonial authorities targeted speech as one of Quakerism‘s most 
unruly characteristics. Though the True Relation makes no explicit charge against Quaker 
language and speech, the Quakers‘ ―impetuous frantic fury,‖ which the Massachusetts 
General Court claimed necessitated action, was one of the most common indictments 
against Quaker speech on both sides of the Atlantic.
45
  
Most Quaker writers, though, argued that the pure language, in particular the 
second person changes, were encouraged, if not mandated, by Biblical precedent. In The 
Pure Language of the Spirit of Truth (1655) Richard Farnsworth was the most direct, 
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claiming that the pure language was ―the proper Language to any single person 
whatsoever.‖ 46 Farnsworth has no patience for the critics of the Quaker ―shibboleth,‖ for 
they ―cannot endure the language and life that gave forth the Scripture, therefore art thou 
manifest to be the serpent, and the painted Harlot, which was ever judged with the spirit 
of truth, in which is the pure Language, which is the judge of all false Languages, and the 
judge of unclean spirits.‖47 Farnsworth sets up a direct relationship between spirit and 
language, arguing that pure language can only emerge from pure spirits. 
Quaker critics also saw speech as a visible sign, but one of spiritual error rather 
than redemption. The very name ―Quakers,‖ to which they objected (often referring to 
themselves as ―those scornfully called Quakers‖), carried with it an assumption of bodily 
unruliness. 
 
Texts mocking Quakers often played on this assumption and read the body as 
a sign of spiritual error, in the same way Winthrop read Hutchinson‘s and Dyer‘s 
monstrous births.
 
Perhaps the best example of such a text is The Character of a Quaker in 
his True and Proper Colours or, The Clownish Hypocrite Anatomized (1671), written by 
R. H. As the title states, R. H. paints the Quaker as a clown, but he uses this mockery to 
sell his stronger claim about Quaker monstrosity. From the very first sentence, R. H. 
draws attention to Quaker speech as essential evidence for their heresy and hypocrisy. 
Calling Quakers the ―fag-end of the Reformation,‖ he criticizes their ―characteristick 
Thou‖ and their idolization of ―Phrases,‖ and assumes his readers will easily identify a 
Quaker because he refuses to ―speak like his Neighbours.‖48 The Quaker, R. H. reveals, is 
an ―enemy to all Order,‖ and nowhere more than in his speech:  
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His discourses are nothing but a Rhapsody of oft repeated Non-sense; and 
when he hath darkened your understanding with a cloud of insignificant 
Babble, he cries, Ah! Friends mind the Light. He usually begins with 
Raving like Mahomet in his Falling-fit, or the Devil of Delphose‟s Priests, 
that never delivered their Lying Oracles, but with extravagant gestures 
and odd distortions of body. Swear not at all, is his Motto, but Lies he 
holds in many cases venial.  […] He cheats worse then a Long-lane 
Broker, by pretending to deal at a word.
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By aligning the Quaker with Islam and comparing him to the priests of the Delphic 
oracle, R. H. draws on a host of assumptions that malign the Quaker‘s theology and 
verbal and bodily manifestations of that theology.
50
 The Quakers were often criticized as 
greedy, double-dealing merchants (Long-lane being notoriously associated with 
especially dishonest brokers of second-hand clothing), but here R. H. roots that deception 
in language.
51
 The Quaker‘s theology, body, and speech are all characterized by frenzy, 
disorder, and, ultimately, a lack of substance. Their speech, R. H. repeatedly asserts, is 
meaningless, and deception is their norm. R. H. writes that the Quaker ―strew‟d his face 
into a Religious frame, and tun‘d his voice to a puling sanctimonious key.‖52 Though 
unruly, R. H. claims, the Quaker is fundamentally ineffective. The sheer amount of 
literature written to unmask the Quaker, however, proves that R. H. and his ilk did, in 
fact, fear the Quaker‘s voice. 53 R. H. was but one among many who dismissed Quaker 
theology by mocking the Quaker clown‘s language, but underneath his mockery one can 
sense an abiding fear of Quaker monstrosity and theological contagion. For R.H. 
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hypocrisy was the Quaker‘s essence, and the mismatch between external claims to truth 
and internal spiritual state made the Quaker much more dangerous than a clown; it made 
him a monster. 
Roger Williams was one of the most bombastic colonial critics of Quaker speech. 
In Fox‘s response to Williams, A New England Fire Brand Quenched (1678), he quotes 
Williams‘s original denunciation: ―And thou say‘st: In their first Creeping […] out of the 
Cradle, how doth this Spirit dare the Spirits of Kings &c. to Thou and Thee to the Faces 
of Mighty Monarchs: with what Brazen Faces.‖ Fox replies: ―The Reader may see, what 
a plague the word THEE and THOU is to R. W! yet was the Language of Christ and the 
holy Men of God both to Superior and Inferior.  And R. W. who calleth himself an 
Orator, what! hath he not read his Accidence and Grammar, Plural and Singular?‖54 
Readers of Fox, both then and since, have focused mostly on his implication that the pure 
language was modeled on a biblical stylistic precedent, but his recourse to grammar here 
matters. The Quaker pure language was not a rejection of language, or a search for a pre-
lapsarian, Edenic ideal; it was, as Fox‘s grammatical focus demonstrates, grounded in the 
material. It was not an effort to transcend language, but rather to mirror in language the 
incarnational principle of Christ as Word. The goal of the pure language was to transform 
carnal, material language into holy, material language—to redeem language. 
Amidst all of the concern over Quaker verbal frenzy, the Quakers were sitting 
quietly in their meetinghouses, awaiting God‘s voice. The Quaker ―silent meeting,‖ as it 
was called, had no minister or sermon; instead every Quaker sat silently until moved to 
witness or prophecy and then spoke whatever God had revealed to him or her through the 
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inner light, Christ within. The Quaker meeting received censure for its sheer strangeness, 
but much of this criticism focused on the rather loud aspects of the meeting. Roger 
Williams, for example, wrote about the cacophony he witnessed in the Quaker 
meetinghouse, describing the meeting as full of ―vapours,‖ ―gusts,‖ and ―interruptions.‖55 
The Quakers, however, saw this possible proliferation of speech as the ordered Word of 
God ushering forth. In Let Your Words be Few (1983), one of the most comprehensive 
studies of seventeenth-century Quaker speech and language, Richard Bauman describes 
the play between Quaker silence and speech as essentially ordered. In his assessment, 
Quaker silence was not only a means to a prophetic end but was the ideal result of 
speech: ―it was also the ultimate purpose, the desired outcome, of speaking.‖56 To 
demonstrate this Bauman quotes George Fox: ―the intent of all speaking is to bring into 
the life […] and to possess the same, and to live in and enjoy it, and to feel God‘s 
presence, and that is in the silence.‖57 Any prophecy uttered by any Quaker (and any 
Quaker could witness, regardless of class or gender) was meant to bring individuals into 
new silenced supplication towards God. The silence was not mere preparation for an 
official sermon, for which the Quakers criticized the formalism of Protestantism. Bauman 
describes the relationship between silence and speaking as circular: silence begets 
speaking, which in turn produces more silence. The Quaker meeting, as Bauman notes, 
attempted to slough off the forms of the world, especially empty linguistic forms. 
Bauman rightly characterizes the Quaker rejection of formalism, but by focusing on 
Quaker silence he wrongly argues that Quakers desired to transcend language. Quaker 
writings reveal that they paid careful attention to the form of their speech: the silent 
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meeting had an attending hermeneutic that was an organized system for hearing Christ 
speak to the soul and then communicating that revelation to the religious community. I 
argue that, ultimately and ideally, the silent meeting would transform speech in order to 
manifest God in the word. Rather than transcending language, Quakers sought to redeem 
language.  
 William Britten‘s Silent Meeting, a Wonder to the World (1660) best represents 
this system, and Britten begins by defining the silent meeting in opposition to the formal 
Protestant sermon. Britten describes the highly mediated, and therefore dishonest, quality 
of the Protestant pulpit: ―and speaking by hear-say (as others did) and not upon 
experience from Christ within me, but by imitation; as Players on a Stage, assume the 
Names, and act the person or Princes, Nobles &c. but being come off, and unmasked, 
they are no such men.‖58 Britten exposes, or unmasks, the Protestant sermon as mere 
performance, lacking the substance of experience. In contrast, the Quaker meeting brings 
internal ―experience from Christ,‖ because ―when earthly thoughts, earthly words, and 
earthly works are all laid aside, and the Temple within us is ready, the Light of Christ 
shining in it, and the Lord with a further Manifestation of his Love, enters it by his 
Eternal Power […] making us feel the power of an endless life.‖59 Part of what the critics 
objected to was the emotional tenor of this experience. Britten‘s description fits the 
definition of enthusiasm all too easily, but Britten anticipates and undercuts these 
censures by arguing that those who do not keep watch over the tongue, through silence, 
―run hastily upon action, and their tongues speak unadvisedly, in hasty Questions and 
Answers, oftentimes proceeding to Passion, and Rage, like short fits of madness.‖60 The 
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silent meeting, he argues, is a corrective for enthusiasm. Silence itself disciplines the 
religious experience and the language uttered as part of that experience. Britten‘s 
contention that ―earthly words‖ must be laid aside in order to truly experience Christ does 
not mean speech had no place in the Quaker meeting, but it does distinguish carnal from 
spiritual language. The speech uttered in the silent meeting was prophetic, but it did not 
assume the spiritism of Hutchinson. Quaker speech was the earthly container for spiritual 
language, just as Christ was the physical incarnation of God.  
 Christ‘s light shining in the ―temple within‖ is the Quaker inner light—the source 
of this discernment. As Britten describes it: ―except Christ in Spirit be within, to work 
Faith and Obedience, the seeing, hearing or reading the Letter avails little without us.‖61 
The inner light enables the Quaker to do more than read the letter (the Bible or the Law) 
and acts as a source of continuous immediate revelation. Although the inner light is a 
constant presence within the individual, the Quaker meeting requires that each individual 
discern between private revelations and those meant to edify the community. Britten 
offers a hermeneutic for listening to this inner light, and whatever passivity ―silent 
meeting‖ might suggest, this hermeneutic requires alertness in mind and body, and 
profound activity of the soul. 
Britten describes the interior work that occurs in the silence, when the ―tongue 
speaks not‖: ―The body in Silent-Meetings, resting from labour (which is all the rest in a 
carnal man‘s worship) but we go further, with a heart striving to rest from sinful 
imaginations, and entering upon a true rest in God, of which we feel, see and taste in its 
beginnings, as an earnest of our blessed Inheritance.‖62 He distinguishes the Quaker 
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meeting not by the lack of motion or noise (other meetings have that outer stillness, 
which is but a form), but by internal striving and entering. ―Striving to rest‖ seems 
paradoxical, if not impossible, but Britten‘s phrase encapsulates the essence of the silent 
meeting. While ―rest‖ is Britten‘s stated goal, self-denial being necessary for hearing 
Christ, that rest is neither passive nor achieved without the full activity of body, mind, 
and soul. It is only in this ―true rest‖ that the individual becomes alive to God, to ―feel, 
see and taste,‖ fully experiencing. The quietness of body and mind, then, is necessary for 
true experience of God, but this ―true rest‖ is brimming with activity, activity Britten 
describes in bodily, sensory language. This sensory awareness is brought on by striving. 
Only the disciplined can achieve a full religious experience. 
Britten breaks this silent striving into several distinct steps: 1) A Spiritual Watch, 
2) A Spiritual Touchstone, and 3) The Spiritual Scales. As he describes this process, 
Britten articulates a hermeneutic of silence. He argues that because the ―time of Tryal‖ is 
unknown, ―the spiritual watch must be truly kept within‖ always.63 Failing to keep watch 
results in the enthusiastic unbridled tongue, and to keep a true watch, one must ―learne 
first to come unto a pure Silence in thine own self, which is to silence all in thee that is 
evil […] so thy tongue, heart and hands shall be under the Faithful Watch, and the 
Actions without in the body, with thy Actions within of the mind, as Love, Joy, Desire 
&c, will by degrees be all brought into true Obedience.‖64 Although Britten is clear that 
this work happens ―by that Eternal Power of God,‖ it is still a work that occurs ―by 
degrees‖ and requires constant vigilance. And this silence transforms the ―actions within 
of the mind‖ but also the ―Actions without.‖ Body and mind must both be ―brought into 
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true Obedience‖—a divine discipline—but the ―faithful watch‖ is carried out by God and 
the striving self. The silent meeting is not the only place of silence; pure silence is lived 
silence, in both body and mind—a fully experienced silence.  
 The last two steps of Britten‘s hermeneutic describe what types of speech are 
acceptable in the silent meeting and how one discerns their rightness. Britten describes 
the Touchstone, the step wherein the silent individual tries the ―work, word or thought‖ 
aroused through the silent striving to determine whether it is ―pure or impure.‖ The 
touchstone thus exposes words of ―zeal, or pretence of holiness,‖ as Satan ―cover[ing] 
Vices under the name of Virtues.‖65 While the evidence for or against a pure work, word, 
or thought seems murky, Britten provides some guidelines: ―note in the words 
themselves, how sometimes they are too many; sometimes unsound and untrue; 
sometimes too short, in telling but half a truth.‖66 Britten connects the form and content 
of words, and uses the form itself as a touchstone. The form of one‘s speech acts as a 
touchstone, but impure words could be either ―too many‖ or ―too short,‖ suggesting that 
speech in the silent meeting was judged not by its abundance or scarcity but by its 
intention and spiritual value. The ―Spiritual Scales,‖ the last step of the spiritual 
hermeneutic, asks the potential speaker to ―weigh, ponder, or consider all things to be 
spoken or done, before they pass from thee.‖67 This differs from the touchstone because it 
involves the act of speaking, and the scales assure that one will speak what he or she 
means: ―Yea and Nay, Yes and No, must bee the same as they are spoken, and so speak 
the same thing intended.‖68 This is the philosophy guiding the pure language as well—
transparency and honesty—not scarcity. 
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 The spiritual hermeneutic is an internal one, but Britten maintains that it should 
have legible external consequences. New Creatures, changed by Christ within them, 
―Speake and Act New Things from that Law of God written in their inward Parts; and 
such dare not Vent their Frothy words, as Flesh did formerly.‖69 The new creature does 
not stop at speaking fresh words, he or she acts new things—the natural becomes 
spiritual. Internal spiritual changes have external effects, and the external is made over in 
the image of the spiritual. The monstrous flesh is transformed, and ―all their Parts, 
Members, Faculties, and Abilities; are put to a New Use, the New Heart, and the New 
Spirit is in them.‖70 The transformation is not just spiritual for Britten; the new heart and 
new spirit ensure that members, faculties, and abilities—―all their parts‖—are also 
changed. As part of this transformation, the new creature speaks a new language—a 
language as pure as the silence. 
The pure language is a manifestation of internal transformation, but it is also a 
disciplined effort to live that transformation—to endure the constant, daily striving to 
enter an internal silence. The alteration of daily speech marked the Quakers as a people 
set apart, made over as New Creatures, but it also communicated important theological 
and epistemological assumptions. The pure language was an attempt to speak the 
language of the Bible, to discipline language itself. But Quakerism understood the Bible 
as only one instance of divine revelation, and it was neither the primary source of 
revelation nor the single touchstone for other revelations. Throughout Quaker writing, 
Christ as Word replaces the Bible as the source of revelation and language. The Bible, 
many Quakers argued—George Fox foremost among them—was not the Word of God; 
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Christ was. This fundamental belief structured Quaker theories of language, and the pure 
language was an attempt to bring language closer to Christ.  
George Fox describes how spiritual transformation generates a metaphorically 
silent speech, a daily language that manifests the inner light. A Battledoor for Teachers 
and Professors (1660) is perhaps the most comprehensive and polemical case for the pure 
language. Fox begins with the English ―battledoor,‖ moving through various languages 
and arguing in each case that the ―thou‖ is singular and the ―you‖ is plural. Though this 
looks much like a pedagogical grammar, and Fox did intend it to be read by teachers and 
scholars, it is also a defense of Quaker speech and theology. In the introduction he writes 
that ―all Languages are to me no more than dust‖ but bemoans the degeneration of the 
English tongue.
71
 He begins by describing all language as ineffectual and insubstantial, 
but he ends by arguing that the pure language offers redemption.  
What at first seems a straightforward rejection of ―natural,‖ earthly language 
becomes more complicated and contradictory as Fox moves through the Battledoor. He 
states that language itself offers no redemption, reprimanding both Catholics and 
Protestants for believing that they can ―make their Divines by their Tongues‖ and that 
training will allow these ministers and priests to transcend or reverse Babel and make 
their sermons comprehensible to all. He writes that ―Tongues is no more to learn then to 
do a natural thing, and is attained and gotten in that knowledge and wisedom, that must 
be confounded.‖72 What Fox criticizes here is not the notion that language is spiritually 
efficacious; he finds fault with the order in which the divines place the relationship 
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between language and soul. Language cannot make one holy, Fox argues, but language is 
a manifestation of the state of one‘s soul. 
Fox argues that the divines‘ language is evidence of spiritual degeneration: ―If 
they have degeneration from their own words, and goings as they have from their own 
Tongues, from the Tongues which are natural […] sure all cannot but judg that they are 
far degenerated from the Divine things, and Spiritual things.‖73 Natural degeneration is a 
sure sign of spiritual degeneration. This epistemological link between the visible and the 
invisible leads Fox to demand a transformation of speech that is not ―natural‖ or taught, 
but that is an organic reflection of internal, spiritual transformation. The pure language 
accomplishes this: 
But now there is a redemption from Degeneration, from the naturalls, and 
nature is come and coming into its right course again, and so now the 
Truth hath to drive all this degeneration back gain to the Pope from 
whence it came, and to travel through to the Protestants through all their 
degenerations till it come to the head of the Pope […] that all may come 
into the true understanding of God again.
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―That all may come into the true understanding of God again‖; Fox looks for a 
redemption from spiritual ignorance perpetuated by all those (Catholics and Protestants, 
for example) who do not have true divine knowledge. The pure language offers 
redemption from the degeneration of language, which is a reflection of spiritual 
degeneration. But the pure language itself does not effect transformation; rather, the truth 
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shadowed forth in and through language redeems language. And the truth in language is 
Christ. 
In a 1659 broadside directed at the magistrates of Nottingham (whom Fox calls 
inquisitioners), Fox describes the relationship between Christ as truth and language: 
Did you never read that the Scriptures saith Christ is the Word, and the 
Word of God?  Is not he the living Word? and the Word immortal; are 
writings immortal? [...] what would ye have done to John if he had been 
under your power, who tells you Christs name is the word of God? And 
tells you, the Revelation is words? [...] will you set the scriptures in the 
room of God, and give them his name? […] you want the Word to give 
you an understanding to know a fulfiller, and that which is to be fulfilled; 
a fulfiller is the Word, and that which is to be fulfilled is the words and 
outward types and figures of changeable things: so who is in the Word, he 
is in the unchangeable which was in the beginning, in whom the Scripture 
end, Christ.
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For Fox the Bible is simply a declaration of all that Christ eventually fulfills and is itself 
merely words. All languages are dust, because they are mere ―figures of changeable 
things,‖ but Christ the Word as the source of all words transforms the dust into something 
immortal and substantial. Fox takes his description of Christ as the Word straight from 
the language of the Bible: Christ is living, immortal, reconciling, and the fulfillment. Fox 
suggests that the passages of Scripture to which he alludes here are not self-referencing, 
and instead he points to the Word behind the words. When the biblical text speaks of the 
105 
 
Word as immortal, then, it means Christ. If, for Fox, the Bible is a declaration of all that 
Christ fulfills, Christ trumps Scripture; the Word surpasses words.  
Fox goes on in his broadside to argue that the distinction between the Word and 
the words of Scripture is a natural one: ―are you not blind that cannot distinguish 
writings, weh [sic] is Scriptures, from Christ, & God, but put them in their place? Surely 
you are far off from spiritual things, while you do not understand natural things, have you 
not read that John saith in the beginning was the Word, and was writings at the 
beginning?‖76 The Bible, as text, is a natural thing, and those who rely on texts over an 
immediate experience of God will be but blind guides. ―You remain in the mortal,‖ he 
tells the magistrates, ―where the jars and strifes are about words,‖ but Fox, seeing beyond 
the natural thing of Scripture to Christ rises above such strife and is ―redeemed out of 
language.‖77 The battles about words, interpretations, hermeneutics, and philosophies of 
language, all cede before the Word. The pure language is, therefore, not a mere pre-
lapsarian linguistic ideal. The pure language is a spiritual language, transcending 
arguments about words themselves and actually using words to reach Christ, the Word 
and source of all words.  
Thus, the Quaker shibboleth—the ―thou‖—comes directly from the Bible, which 
is one manifestation of Christ as Word, and it marks daily language as redeemed out of 
the natural and made over in the image of Christ. The hermeneutic of the silent meeting is 
also a redemption out of language, because the words spoken there are literally God‘s 
words. The individual is made a New Creature, and his or her language reflects that 
transformation. Language becomes a visible sign, but it is also more than mere sign. Just 
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as Britten argued that the silent meeting would transform the striving person, Fox claims 
that language—both that of the religious meeting and everyday speech—is redeemed out 
of the natural. Both the silent meeting and the pure language are attempts to make 
language capture and reflect the Word with a capital W. Christ, manifested in language, 
redeems language, and language thus mirrors the internal silence of the silent meeting, 
where ―earthly words‖ are ―laid aside,‖ and the Light of Christ shines in the temple 
within. 
The Quakers, working from the same epistemological assumptions that eventually 
led Hutchinson to repudiate the visible world, did just the opposite. They made over the 
whole visible world in the image of the spiritual. Everything becomes more than mere 
sign, and words themselves provide access to the Word, Christ. Where the Quakers saw 
Christ in everyday words, Winthrop saw devils in the banality of childbirth, but both saw 
the invisible world encroaching on the visible. The visible was not, even for Winthrop, 
just an echo of the invisible, a small window into a greater reality. In Winthrop‘s view the 
material world was overtaken by the monstrosity of sin, and the Quakers strove to 
transform the natural into the spiritual—to let the inner light shine until it was all that was 
visible. In the end, Hutchinson alone seems stuck in the visible world, try as she might to 
escape it. Her last words in the trial are a reminder that she must go about living in this 
monstrous world—a world that would imprison and banish an ill, pregnant woman. The 
material realities of life overwhelm her, and at times the materiality of language escapes 
her grasp. More than once in the trial Hutchinson excuses her theological errors by 
arguing that her words do not properly convey her meaning: ―I doe not acknowledge it to 
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be an Error but Mistake: I doe acknowledge my Expression to be ironious [erroneous] but 
my Judgment was not ironious, for I held befor as you did but could not express it soe.‖78 
In these moments, words are loosened from the things they represent, and Hutchinson 
once again is caught in a trap of her own making. The Quaker ideal was that words would 
never stray from the things they represented, because words themselves could have a 
spiritual quality, but Hutchinson held no such ideal, and in the end the materiality—of 
language, of place, of daily life—disrupted her access to God, and her words became 
monstrous, even in her own mouth.  
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Chapter 3 
Metamorphizing Words: Native American Language and Translation 
I. Strange Speech  
For thou art not sent to a people of a strange speech and of an hard language, but to the 
house of Israel; Not to many people of a strange speech and of an hard language, whose 
words thou canst not understand. Surely, had I sent thee to them, they would have 
hearkened unto thee. 
 
-Ezekiel 3:5-6  
 
Cotton Mather‘s 1707 Another Tongue Brought in to Confess the Great Saviour of 
the World opens with the second half of this passage from the book of Ezekiel, obscuring 
the communication gap at the heart of cross-cultural encounter: if sent among ―people of 
a strange speech and of an hard language,‖ the prophet‘s speech would be heard and 
understood because it is God‘s speech. God‘s language is transparent, Ezekiel and Mather 
both suggest. Yet Another Tongue, because it is a catechism in Iroquois intended for use 
by ―English and Dutch traders among the Iroquois,‖ implicitly acknowledges the 
necessity of translation in the Indian missionary project.
1
 Another Tongue was published 
decades after the English colonists first began to evangelize the Native Americans, but 
earlier translators—the kind who made Mather‘s circulation of an Iroquois catechism 
possible—recognized the ―hardness‖ of learning Indian languages. And unlike Mather 
they did not portray translation as a transparent process. 
In his influential Forked Tongues: Speech, Writing, and Representation in North 
American Indian Texts (1991), David Murray argues that seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century colonists portrayed language as fully transparent and portrayed translation as 
invisible. The ―process of translation,‖ Murray writes, ―is obscured or effaced‖ in many 
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texts. Rather than effacing the act of translation, as Murray suggests and as Mather 
demonstrates, the most well-known seventeenth-century New English translators of 
Native American languages, John Eliot and Roger Williams, worried about what 
translation itself might efface or obscure, namely the original text and experience.
 2
 Both 
men recognized the limits of language to fully capture experience or describe the divine, 
and they imagined Hebrew—their version of a heavenly or universal language free from 
constructed representations—as an ideal to which their own English could never ascend. 
Native languages, though, seemed to mirror, or even be linguistically related to, Hebrew, 
and Eliot and Williams hoped native languages would bridge the gap between language 
and experience. Because native languages were not written and were thought to arise 
organically, they seemed to emerge straightforwardly from experience. Native languages 
seemed to connect words to things. 
 Williams and Eliot approached the problem of reconciling experience and text 
differently, and they had distinct ideas about how native languages fit into this project, 
but their translation work among the Native Americans reveals their theological and 
theoretical ideas about language—how it works, where it fails, and how it corresponds to 
or diverges from one‘s experience of God and the natural world. This chapter examines 
the ways Williams and Eliot engaged with the complexities of language and its 
relationship to meaning and experience, specifically in relation to the work of translation.  
Eliot and William worked among the Native Americans in the wake of British 
universal language schemes, that flourished from the 1640s through the 1680s. The 
language schemes attempted to bring word and thing into a one-to-one correspondence 
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and influenced Williams‘s and Eliot‘s conceptions of translation. Like the British 
advocates of philosophical grammars and universal language, Williams and Eliot strove 
to make language correspond to experience and to link words to things. But unlike 
universal language theorists such as John Wilkins or Cave Beck, Williams and Eliot 
faced the daily problems of translation. What was only theory in England was practice in 
the New World. For Eliot, native languages failed to deliver the promise of a universal 
language, and translation exposed the layers of mediation between experience and text. 
Therefore, Eliot tried to manage the failure of translation through the proliferation of 
translated texts, which resulted in a self perpetuating cycle. For Williams, on the other 
hand, translation was generative of new knowledge and novel experiences. Where Eliot 
imagined translation as the foundation to Indian evangelism, Williams saw translation as 
an epistemological tool. 
The connection between Native American language and universal language 
schemes has been provocatively elucidated by Sarah Rivett in ―Empirical Desire: 
Conversion, Ethnography, and the New Science of the Praying Indian‖ (2006). Rivett 
argues that native languages offered evidence for ―the possibility of a universal language 
that would make divine phenomena visible in their pure, spontaneous, and unadulterated 
forms.‖3 By identifying Native Americans as a lost tribe of Israel, seventeenth-century 
missionaries and thinkers categorized native languages as a linguistic cousin to, or 
descendent of, Hebrew. Because of their assumptions about the representational capacity 
of divine language, these thinkers saw in native languages confirmation of the potential 
for a universal language. The Native American conversion testimonies Eliot translated in 
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texts like Tears of Repentance (1653), Rivett argues, ―presented an idealized vision of a 
universal language.‖4 Yet the actual practice of translation, removed from the 
philosophical community of something like the Royal Society, reveals a more 
complicated picture of seventeenth-century language theory than the one Rivett 
describes. Eliot and Williams offered their English audiences curiosities and evidence, 
and certainly they themselves sought tangible evidence of invisible grace as Rivett 
argues, but the work of translation necessarily removes some of the idealism with which 
Rivett characterizes seventeenth-century translation theories. 
Limiting the study of translation theory to English philosophy narrows critical 
understanding of the practice of translation; similarly, recent revisionist narratives of 
native-colonial encounter that uncover the complexity of native language and 
communication discount how these encounters also transformed the colonist and his 
theorizations of language.
5
 Some of the recent work attending to language and translation 
has argued that trans-cultural contact transformed both the Native Americans and the 
colonizers, but none demonstrate how.
6
 Matt Cohen observes in The Networked 
Wilderness (2010), that colonial assumptions about communication confronted a 
complicated and sophisticated indigenous system, resulting in what he calls ―a complex 
interplay involving emulating, appropriation, subversion, signifying, and outright 
contest.‖7 Similarly, Susan Castillo‘s Performing America (2006) challenges the critical 
tendency to characterize colonialism as a ―unidirectional flow of language, institutions 
and ideological structures from the active, stable, economically and technologically 
advanced colonizer to the passive, barbaric colonized.‖8 In her intervention, though, 
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Castillo is more concerned, as are most of her fellow scholars, with revising the picture of 
the ―passive, barbaric colonized‖ than with reimagining the ―unidirectional flow‖ as a 
dynamic process of exchange and mutual transformation.
9
  
I want to stress the mutual transformation that occurred through indigenous-
colonial encounter. What happened to colonial assumptions about language as a result of 
inter-linguistic contact? Eliot‘s and Williams‘s respective approaches to translation and 
their preconceptions of indigenous language led to distinct ideas about language in 
general and about native language itself. Eliot‘s Indian Tracts reveal not simply a 
controlling desire to civilize and convert, and Williams‘s A Key into the Language of 
America is not only the possession of the colonizer.
10
 These texts also depict language 
theories forged through contact with and translation into native languages and the 
resulting linguistic mixture that was seen, alternately, as corrupting or productive.
11
  
Both Williams and Eliot, in their work of rendering the complicated texture of 
translation, sought guiding principles or reproducible structures. In their early translation 
work, they experimented, searching for the formula(s) that would make future translation 
less fuliginous, though not necessarily less arduous. They pursued, as Rivett 
demonstrates, a language that bridged the gap between visible and invisible, but the very 
process of translation exposed that gap and complicated its mediation.  
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II. Breaking the Ice: John Eliot and Translation  
To form Words of Art, is a work that requireth time and judgment. I have adventured to 
break the ice. 
 
 -Eliot, Logick Primer 
 
From the 1640s through the 1680s, John Eliot worked among the Algonquian 
people, spreading the Gospel and establishing ―Praying Towns‖ of converted Native 
Americans.
12
 Eliot understood that without fluency in native language, he ―would make 
but slow progresse‖ in converting the Indians.13 Throughout the Eliot Tracts he 
underscores the need for increasing his own language skills, for finding Native American 
interpreters, and for teaching the people to read and write. When Eliot began 
evangelizing the Algonquians, they had no written language; he faced a culture whose 
orality posed a stark contrast to his own textually-oriented religion and culture.
14
 Thus, 
translation of the Scriptures became Eliot‘s life task.  
In translating the Bible for the Native Americans, Eliot believed that he provided 
them with a textual center for the faith to which he introduced them. As a good Puritan 
minister, Eliot imposed the tenet of sola scriptura on the Native Americans, but he also 
recognized the mediating nature of the biblical text in a faith that was meant to be 
unmediated.
15
 Translation, of course, is another form of mediation, and Eliot was anxious 
about the mediating role the translated text and he, the translator, played. He writes in the 
preface to the Logick Primer (1672), an Algonquian guide to the reasonableness of the 
Scriptures, that ―To form Words of Art, is a work that requireth time and judgment‖ and 
that he had only first begun ―to break the ice.‖16  
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The Logick Primer appears roughly halfway into, but at the height of, Eliot‘s 
missionary career, and in it he acknowledges that his translation work has merely 
scratched the surface. Fewer Native Americans had been converted than Eliot had hoped, 
the whole Bible had not appeared in translation, and few English had competency in 
Algonquian.
17
 Eliot struggled with the seeming fruitlessness of his evangelism, and he 
saw translation as part of the problem. Translating the Bible had failed to actualize Eliot‘s 
dream, and though he never abandoned it, he saw the work of translation as an unfulfilled 
promise. Despite Eliot‘s doubts and frustrations, he continued to conceive of translation 
as the formation of ―words of art.‖ Contrary to the way much scholarship portrays him, 
Eliot was interested in the texture of language.
18
 In his translations of Indian confessions, 
or conversion narratives, in conjunction with his more explicit theorizations of language, 
Eliot theorized the problem of mediation inherent in translation and in religious 
experience. 
In Tears of Repentance (1653), a collection of Indian confessions from inhabitants 
of Natick, the first and most famous Praying Town, Eliot theorizes conversion, 
translation, and the relationship between experience and text. He explicitly represents 
translation as a problem.
19
 Tears is a language experiment, offering experimental proof, 
demonstrating the reproducibility of the confessions, and attempting to establish a 
methodology for the translation of the confessions.
20
 Grappling toward a methodology, 
Eliot interrupts the confessions with a justification for his translation: 
And because all witnesses [translators] failed me, let me say but this, I 
began and have followed this work for the Lord according to the poor 
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measure of grace received, & not for base ends. I have been true and 
faithful unto their souls, and in writing and reading their Confessions, I 
have not knowingly, or willingly made them better, than the Lord helped 
themselves to make them, but am verily perswaded on good grounds, that 
I have rendered them weaker […] than they delivered them; partly by 
missing some words of weight in some Sentences, partly by my short and 
curt touches of what they more fully spake, and partly by reason of the 
different Idioms of their Language and ours.
21
  
Eliot appends to his text a statement of the translation‘s faithfulness because he was the 
only English Algonquian speaker present for the confessions and because he realizes that 
the process of translation is not transparent. His own shortcomings as a translator, he 
suggests, perform the erasure of his mediating presence. Eliot‘s translations themselves 
are not the evidence of grace his audiences seeks; readers desire proof of experience, 
which comes through the tears in Eliot‘s title. The authenticity of the confessions is 
hindered by their representation in text, because translation further removes the reader 
from the source. Though Eliot argues that the message will be communicated despite his 
―weak‖ translations, his faults as translator do not suggest the transparency of translation; 
instead they claim the transparency of the confessor‘s experience. Translation, if 
anything, obscures the authenticity of experience: it makes the confessions seem weaker.  
Because the translated text of Indian confessions alone is not evidence enough of 
authentic conversion, Tears multiplies assenting witnesses. In Tears‘ opening letter to the 
Christian reader, Richard Mather invites the reader to ―weigh and consider the ensuing 
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Confessions‖ as proof that ―any sound and saving work be yet wrought in‖ the Indians.22 
Mather sets the stage for Eliot‘s experiment, acting as witness and inviting readers to 
become additional validating witnesses. Then he presents the problem—translation: ―But 
how shall we know that the Confessions here related, being spoken in their Tongue, were 
indeed uttered by them in such words, as have the same signification and meaning with 
these that are here expressed‖?23 Mather, and by extension Eliot, is concerned that 
readers will doubt the results of the conversions represented in the confessions because 
Eliot was the sole translator. ―It is true,‖ Mather writes, that we only have only one man‘s 
testimony, ―but yet it is such an one, as is unwillingly alone in this matter, having 
seriously endeavored to have had divers other Interpreters present at Natick that day.‖24 
Mather puts his trust in Eliot‘s translations and argues that the readers should do the 
same. Other interpreters, though, and witnesses like Mather, could not verify that the 
English words in Tears ―have the same signification and meaning‖ as the Algonquian 
words the Indians spoke. Mather‘s validation appeals to the experience of the Natick 
Indians—to their tears—and not to the veracity of the translations. 
Eliot‘s familiarity with Algonquian was unusual. He could not find any other 
qualified English-speaking translators to certify his translations at Natick, and he was 
thus compelled to find someone else to justify his translations in the opening letter. It is 
important that Mather, rather than Eliot alone, did the work of justification; he was an 
assenting witness to Eliot‘s character and to the faithfulness of his translations, but he 
himself could not speak the native language. Mather‘s authenticating opening letter 
suggests that translation hinders transparency, and he instead turns to other kinds of 
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evidence. Those present during the confessions who were unable to understand the 
language spoken, like Mather, could still understand the events occurring: ―To see and to 
hear the Indians opening their mouths, and lifting up their hands and their eyes in solemn 
Prayer to the living God‖ was confirmation enough. Hearing the mouth open, without 
understanding what it produces, is coupled with seeing; bodies, not words, authenticate 
experience for Mather and for Eliot‘s English audience. Mather goes on to accumulate 
evidence for the confessors‘ true faith: 
And though they spake in a language, of which many of us understood but 
little, yet we that were present that day, we saw them, and we heard them 
perform the duties mentioned, with such grave and sober countenances, 
with such comely reverence in gesture, and their whol carriage, and with 
such plenty of tears trickling down the cheeks of some of them, as did 
argue to us that they spake with much good affection, and holy fear of 
God.
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Mather, and the others present, read the bodies of the Indians as evidence of conversion. 
Bodies become assenting witnesses, and countenances stand in for words. When 
linguistic translation fails, material signs must be read, and the very necessity of this 
body-reading confirms the difficulty of translation itself. Mather is not the lone witness in 
Tears. In some individual confessions, Eliot appends a witness statement to an Indian‘s 
speech. After Waban‘s speech, for example, Eliot includes another witness‘ testimony 
that Waban ―spake these later expressions with tears.‖26 Proliferating witness statements 
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testify to the authenticity of an Indian‘s conversion, and they are necessary because 
translation is not transparent. 
Not only is translation opaque, but Eliot suggests that translation exposes another 
site of opacity; it reveals the gap between text and experience. The gospel Eliot preached 
to the Indians was not simply textual; his goal was to prepare Native Americans to have a 
saving experience of God by providing them with basic knowledge of his faith. Through 
his missionary and translation work, Eliot sought to forge a link between the 
experimental and the textual. In one sense, translation further removed the text from 
experience: it presented another layer of mediation. Yet the goal of translation for Eliot 
was to bring text closer to experience by providing Bibles and religious texts in the 
Algonquians‘ own language. The complexity of translation meant that it had the potential 
to reinforce or undo the link between text and experience. Like all his fellow Puritans, 
Eliot believed that a direct experience of God was the only authentication of true 
conversion and that, although the text (biblical, sermonic, etc) could facilitate that 
experience, the text could also become one more mediating obstacle to an immediate 
encounter with the divine. Translated texts, Eliot worried, posed an even greater risk of 
mediating experience and obscuring truth. 
Yet Eliot firmly believed that by providing religious texts in the Native 
Americans‘ own language, he was giving them individual access to God. In 1664, Robert 
Boyle wrote to Eliot that ―we desire care may be taken that they reteyne their owne native 
Language.‖27 Both men recognized the importance of this, not only for the conversion of 
the Indians, but also for the project of scientific inquiry. Rivett reads Boyle‘s desire as an 
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expression of the Royal Society‘s ―nullius in verba,‖ thus Eliot ―marks an 
epistemological turn from reliance on textual language to reliance on a disciplined kind 
of sensual data discernable through techniques of performed speech and witnessing.‖28 
Eliot expected that his translations would enable the Indians to access God in their own 
language so they would not need to ―take [someone‘s] word for it.‖ Because most Native 
Americans could not read, the text was most often a ―performed speech;‖ therefore Eliot 
hoped that the translated text would act more like ―sensual data‖ for the listening Indian 
than as an obstacle to conversion.  
But in response to Boyle‘s letter, Eliot wrote the Indian Grammar, a text designed 
to teach the Indians to read, and his ultimate goal was to produce an entire Bible in their 
language. So Eliot marks a crossroads in the epistemological turn Rivett rightly 
identifies; in his translations, he made the Indians reliant on a ―textual language‖ and on 
an empirical ―science of the visible.‖29 Throughout the Eliot Tracts, Eliot enacts an 
empiricism of grace, teaching the Indians methods for discerning grace in their own souls 
while yet relying on the text as a technology of grace.  
Although the Bible was central to Eliot‘s missionary project, the text was never a 
substitute for the experience of grace. In a June 1681 letter to Boyle Eliot writes: ―Lord 
open a gospel dore! until we have Bibles, we are not furnished to cary the Gospel unto 
them for we have no means to cary religion thither.‖30 The text, then, was the means, the 
vessel through which authentic experience of the saving gospel could occur. Like his 
fellow ministers in New England, who worked to compensate for the mediating nature of 
the Bible as textual center of religious experience, Eliot sought to lay the foundation for 
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an experimental faith. At the close of one of the Eliot Tracts, The Light Appearing More 
and More (1651), largely a collection of Eliot‘s letters, compiler Henry Whitefield 
explains the role of the biblical text in conversion: 
The Lord hath made this Word the only outward instrumental means to 
bring home these wandring sinners; to the Word they have attended from 
the first; from this they have received their light; unto this they have given 
up themselves; without this they will not stirre; from this they will not 
depart; from hence they have their peace, and have seen good days under 
the Kingdome of our Lord Christ.
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English assumptions about Native Americans ooze through Whitefield‘s words. He 
highlights the agency of the material text as a kind of token (―outward instrumental 
means‖); its anchoring affect on a people whose presumed nomadic way of life seemed to 
stand in the way of English religion (from ―wandring sinners‖ to ―they will not depart‖); 
and its pacifying nature for an ostensibly war-like people. Like Whitefield‘s conclusion, 
most of the Eliot Tracts emphasize how the Bible enacts change on Indian culture, but 
even Whitefield writes that the text is only an ―outward instrumental means.‖ The Indians 
receive ―their Light‖ from the Word, but the Spirit of God is the source of that light. In 
order to prepare the Indians for the light‘s reception, Eliot also taught them to appeal to 
the natural world and to their natural reason as sources of divine knowledge. 
In The Light Appearing Eliot records a question some Indians had asked him: 
―Can one be saved reading the book of the creature?‖ Eliot tells his readers that the 
Indians had asked this question when he ―taught them, That God gave us two books, and 
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that in the book of the creature, every creature was a word or sentence.‖32 The natural 
world, like the biblical text, instructs on matters of faith. Though we cannot know just 
what Eliot taught the Indians about the book of creation, that he taught them to read their 
experience of the natural world confirms his interest in experimental faith. Other tracts 
demonstrate Eliot‘s appeal to the Indians‘ natural reason. A Further Accompt of the 
Progress of the Gospel (1659) includes, in addition to several of Eliot‘s letters, a 
translation; ―Some Helps for the Indians Shewing them how to Improve their Natural 
Reason‖ is a short defense of the Christian religion that relies on reason not Scripture. In 
A Further Accompt, ―Some Helps‖ follows Eliot‘s attempts to undermine the concerns of 
some commissioners that his translation might not be ―understood‖ or ―true,‖ but then he 
offers not a biblical translation but a treatise on natural religion.  
―Some Helps‖ displays the link between experience and text that translation 
potentially threatens: it prepares a way to the biblical text through experience. The title 
page suggests that the text will ―improve [the Indians‘] natural reason‖ in two ways: ―1. 
By leading them to see the Divine Authority of the Scriptures. [and] 2. By the Scriptures 
the Divine Truths necessary to Eternall Salvation.‖33 ―Some Helps,‖ though, only 
provides the foundation for these realizations. Although it functions as a language-
learning tool—the opening letter gives instructions on pronunciation and parts of 
speech—―Some Helps‖ appeals to the spiritual man through the natural man. As the letter 
to the reader states, ―Some Helps‖ will persuade the Indian reader that he is ―utterly out 
of the way‖ and then will move him to ―inquire what he shall do to be saved, and listen 
127 
 
unto that.‖34 ―Some Helps‖ demonstrates Eliot‘s theorization of the relationship between 
text and experience. Texts can only appeal to the natural.  
The main text of ―Some Helps‖ is written in Algonquian with the English 
translation printed in small text directly above it, and it is structured in question and 
answer format, the first question being ―How prove you that there is a God?‖ (343). The 
text proceeds to answer this and logically subsequent questions without recourse to 
Scripture. To the question ―How can you prove that there is but one God?,‖ for example, 
the text answers: ―Because the reason why singular things of the same kind are 
multiplyed is not to be found in the nature of {God} for the reason why such like things 
are multiplyed is from the fruitfulnesse of their causes: but {God} hath no cause of his 
being, but is of himself therefore he is one.‖35 The natural world is a religious manual for 
the illiterate and ―natural‖ Indian that ultimately opens the way to an authentic religious 
experience. 
In his letters to the New England Corporation and other English audiences, Eliot 
emphasizes the experiential transformation of individuals in the praying towns. The 
importance of experience in faith is apparent in the frequently included lists of the 
Indians‘ questions, like that in which the question about the book of the creature 
appears.
36
 The questions also communicate to the English the Indians‘ interest and 
instruction in doctrinal knowledge. Experience, the proof of faith, and text merge in the 
question lists. Eliot writes, ―You may perceive many of the questions arise out of such 
texts as I handle, and I do endeavour to communicate as much Scripture as I can,‖ but 
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communicating scripture could not assure the saving experience of grace, nor was 
knowledge of it evidence of conversion.
37
  
The first of several questions Eliot lists in The Light Appearing exhibits his dual 
stress on experience and text. One question the Indians ―have propounded,‖ Eliot writes, 
is ―If a man know Gods Word, but beleeve it not; and he teach others, is that good 
teaching? and if others beleeve that which he teacheth, is that good believing, or faith?‖38 
Eliot brings attention to the potential broken linkage between textual knowledge and 
experiential faith. He does not include whatever answer he gave this question, but the 
question with which he replies accentuates the distinction between knowledge and 
experience. The Indians respond to Eliot‘s query, ―how they could tell when a man 
knoweth Gods Word that he doth not beleeve it,‖ with ―When he doth not do in practice 
answerable to that which he knoweth.‖39 This is not simply faith versus works, for 
certainly Eliot the Puritan believed that only God can truly judge the soul; here he 
demonstrates the Indians‘ awareness that knowledge—in particular, knowledge of the 
Text—does not equal experiential transformation.  
The Eliot Tracts intimate that the Indians often inquired about the disjunction 
between external behavior and the internal state of the soul. The Indian confessions, or 
petitions for church membership, that appear throughout the Tracts also highlight the 
potential discontinuity between textual and experimental knowledge. Although true 
grace, for Eliot, does come through the Bible, it does so only once it is experientially felt. 
The goal of translation should be to offer the biblical text in its purest possible form, a 
form that is not experience itself but that paves the way for experience. 
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Though the confessors do attempt to demonstrate some doctrinal knowledge, their 
main purpose is to narrate their paths towards conversion and to provide evidence for 
their changed souls. They do so by illustrating how their attitudes, behaviors, beliefs, but 
most of all, hearts have been transformed. A Late and Further Manifestation (1655) 
recounts the examination of a small group of Native Americans who were intended for 
church membership at Roxbury in April of 1654. The elders sought to determine whether 
the Indians truly understood their answers through lived experience: the elders ―thought it 
not fit to ask them in Catechisticall method strictly, in which way Children might 
answer‖40 The elders seek confirmation of catechistical and doctrinal knowledge requisite 
for Church membership even among the English colonists, but the examination privileges 
questions pertaining to experience.  
Eliot writes that the recorded trial concerning doctrine was the second part of an 
extended examination, the first being ―what experience they had found of Gods grace in 
their hearts, turning them from dead works, to seek after the living God.‖41 Though Eliot 
writes that he had a better knowledge of the confessors‘ sincerity than others might and 
―believed the conversion of these poor Indians,‖ he and the elders express caution about 
too quickly granting church membership.
42
 Eliot‘s witnessing of Indian conversions 
confirms for him an experiential knowledge that the language of the examination and the 
textual words of confessions could not capture.  
Like his contemporaries Cotton, Shepard, and Hooker, Eliot emphasized the 
necessity of transforming the heard word into lived experience. His letter to the reader in 
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Tears shows that his Indian audience enacts this transformation despite his own linguistic 
failings:  
their expressions, both in Prayer, and in the Confessions which I have now 
published, are far more, and more full, and spiritual, and various, then ever 
I was able to express unto them; in that poor broken manner of Teaching 
which I have used among them. Their turning Doctrins into their own 
experience, which you may observe in their Confessions, doth also 
demonstrate the Teachings of Gods Spirit.
43
  
―Turning Doctrins into their own experience‖ is Eliot‘s ultimate hope. The Spirit, not the 
text, is the true teacher. Eliot represents his work among the Indians as prophetic work, 
demonstrating the power of God‘s word and the agency of human language inspired by 
the Spirit. He desires that the Indians will overlay previous experience with new, godly 
experience, which the text facilitates, giving experience a foundation and vocabulary. But 
experience supersedes the text.  
The initial act of hearing is central to each confession and confirms for Eliot‘s 
English audience the important role he and other missionaries have played and have yet 
to play. One confessor, Monequassun, makes the experience of hearing the word central 
to his conversion. He recounts multiple occasions on which he had heard the word but 
―broke‖ or rejected it until he finally prayed, ―teach me to hear thy Word.‖44 The ―word,‖ 
in each confession, has multiple meanings: a text from Scripture, a catechism, a sermon. 
For Monequassun and others, the repeated act of hearing eventually takes effect and 
God‘s Spirit uses the word to induce internal realization and lived experience. But 
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hearing becomes especially tricky when language barriers exist. The confessions in 
Tears, Eliot argues, will become ―instruments‖ of conversion for their readers, but he 
admits that the instrument and its resulting knowledge could be limited by the challenges 
of translation. Although he ultimately argues that linguistic obstacles only serve to 
confirm the experimental nature of Indian conversions—God‘s language breaks into their 
souls via spiritual, not natural, means—he recognizes the opacity of translation and its 
potential to disrupt authentic experience. 
 While both text and experience must be active in true conversion, Eliot‘s 
emphasis on the text creates problems for translation. In Tears and in the confessions 
included in A Further Account of the Progress of the Gospel (1660), Waban expresses 
concern that something is lost in translation. He begins: ―Unto this day I do understand 
but little of the English Language; the Word of God came not first unto my heart by the 
English Language.‖45 Because he did not first hear the Word of God in what he takes to 
be its original language, Waban fears he does not understand it. After this first sentence, 
he continues in the traditional confession structure, but his confession is haunted by the 
anxiety that his ignorance of the English language suggests the deficiency of his belief. In 
Tears, Waban asks if he ―prayed to God in our Language, whether could God 
understand‖ his prayers, and Waban mentions this in the A Further Account confession as 
well: ―but if I should pray, it may be it is vain to pray in my language; could I speak 
English, I might learn to pray.‖46 Though he confesses that he comes to faith and learns 
that God can understand all languages, Waban feels a barrier between himself and the 
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text. Because Eliot emphasizes the text as a tool for accessing God, Waban‘s felt distance 
from the text means he also senses an experiential lack and feels a distance from God. 
Waban‘s anxiety implies that the Bible and the Christian God are the property of 
the English—that language and content are inseparable and that God is bound by words. 
Though Eliot does not comment on it, Waban‘s fear echoes through the Eliot Tracts. Eliot 
recognizes a similar fear in the New England Corporation‘s reluctance to support the 
printing of an Algonquian Bible.
47
 In every text from the Tracts that contains translated 
Indian confessions, and in each moment where he addresses the process of translation, 
Eliot legitimizes the translations. The self-anxiousness of these justifications echoes 
Waban‘s fear that the translated text is somehow inauthentic and cannot therefore 
generate a genuine experience of God.  
Again, Eliot does not let his assenting voice stand alone. In A Late and Further 
Manifestation, Eliot informs his readers that before the examination he told the assembly: 
if any one doubted of the Interpretations that should be given of their 
Answers, that they would Propound their doubt, and they should have the 
words scanned and tried by the Interpreters, that so all things may be done 
most clearly. For my desire was to be true to Christ, to their soules, and to 
the Churches: And the trying out of any of their Answers by the 
Interpreters, would tend to the satisfaction of such as doubt.
48
  
In this passage, one of many similar calls for validating witnesses, Eliot acknowledges 
translation as an often opaque and difficult process and admits that his readers may doubt 
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the veracity of the translations. The ―trying out‖ is necessary because translation does not 
work in a one-to-one correspondence.  
The universal language theories, with which Eliot was familiar, sought the one-to-
one correspondence that translation made impossible; they attempted to reverse Babble, 
and they looked for a language free from ambiguity. Though Eliot had some faith in such 
a project, he did not find its confirmation in the native language he translated; he did not 
find a ―pure‖ and natural language. Rather than opening up previously unexplored 
meanings, the meeting of languages in translation exposed the fundamental difficulty of 
making language correspond to experience. His experience with translation suggested to 
him all the more the need for such a universal language. 
In a letter to English minister Richard Baxter, Eliot shows his hand: he worries 
over translating Baxter‘s A Call to the Unconverted, performing humility but also 
exposing his own anxieties about how translation transforms a text. In asking permission 
to translate A Call to the Unconverted for the Indians, Eliot writes to Baxter that he is 
―forced sometime to alter the Phrase, for the facilitating and fitting it to our Language, in 
which I am not so strict as I was in the Scripture.‖49 He at once apologizes to Baxter for 
taking such arrogant liberties, worrying that he might alter the meaning of Baxter‘s 
sermon in some fundamental way. If the Bible‘s form is essential to its meaning, as Eliot 
suggests, then translation does transform it. The impossibility of a one-to-one 
correspondence in translation necessarily results in transformation.  
Eliot goes on in his letter to Baxter to dream of some way around the problems of 
translation. A ―universal Character and Language,‖ Eliot writes, would be ―a singular 
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Promotion of the great Design of Christ.‖50 He proposes Hebrew as a universal language 
because ―it is capable of a regular Expatiation into Millions of Words‖ and, as an added 
bonus, because it is the language spoken in heaven, so ―why may we not make ready for 
Heaven in this Point?‖51 Eliot slightly misses the goal of universal language schemes, as 
Baxter hints in his response, but he nonetheless implicitly acknowledges that translating 
the Bible from one language to another changes the text in meaning not just in outward 
form.
52
 Baxter addresses Eliot‘s interest in the universal language in his response: ―For 
the universal Character that you speak of, many have talked of it, and one hath printed his 
Essay, and his way is only by numeral Figures, making such and such Figures to stand for 
the Words of the same signification in all Tongues; but nobody regards it. I shall 
communicate your Motion here about the Hebrew, but we are not of such large and 
publick Minds as you imagin.‖53 Baxter all but dismisses Eliot‘s idealism, arguing for the 
impossibility of erasing the problems of translation.   
The epistemological problems Eliot identifies in the work of translation address a 
fear, not unlike Waban‘s, that translation somehow corrupts the original text. Eliot‘s does 
not suggest that the universal language projects he has heard rumors of would be exempt 
from the kind of textual corruption he imposes on Baxter‘s sermon; instead, he proposes 
Hebrew construed as a language apart from all others. It is the language of heaven, God‘s 
language, and thus—as the doctrinal scripture in Mather‘s Another Tongue intimates—
free from problems of mediation. In Eliot‘s mind, Hebrew allows access to the original, 
uncorrupted biblical text.  
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Even the English Bible was a translation, whatever Waban may have thought, and 
it, too, further removed the reader from God‘s voice. Eliot believed and practiced sola 
scriptura, but because translation exposed a gap between text and experience, text itself 
was never a sufficient barometer of experience or the authenticity of that experience. The 
text could only enlighten the natural mind and prepare the heart for the experience of 
grace. To authenticate the conversions of his praying Indians, though, Eliot always 
propped up his texts with validating voices, but those voices, too, were textualized and 
translated. 
In a letter to the New England Corporation dated October, 1658 and included in A 
Further Accompt, Eliot encloses several ―notes‖ from various Indians at Natick. These 
notes, he writes, are ―exhortations‖ the Indians ―did deliver‖ on a day of fasting and 
prayer, and they directly respond to some passage from either Genesis or Matthew, the 
only two biblical books to have been translated at the time. Waban begins his note with a 
summary of a biblical passage, loosely following the plain style sermon format by 
opening with the doctrine.
54
 He then offers an explication and an application: ―Therefore 
what should we doe this day? goe to Christ the Phisitian. […] Again, what is the lesson, 
which Christ would have us learne, that he came not to call the righteous, but sinners to 
repentance.‖55 Through these notes, Eliot demonstrates how avidly—and more 
importantly, how correctly—the Natick Indians read the Bible and digest its message. A 
Further Accompt was written as a plea for further funding for the printing of the entire 
Bible in Algonquian, and Eliot used the Indians‘ own voices to validate the success of his 
translation project. 
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By relying on Indian voices for validation, though, Eliot relied on translation. 
Thus, his translations proliferate, building one upon the other. First, Eliot translated the 
English Bible (which was, of course, already translated) into Algonquian; then the 
Indians translated it into experience (which was essential for conversion and what the 
confessions meant to prove); then the Indians translated that experience into verbal 
confessions; finally Eliot enacted a double translation, transcribing the oral confession 
into written English text. Not all of these layers were acts of linguistic translation, but the 
possibilities of misreading proliferated within each layer. This is why so much ink in the 
Eliot Tracts was dedicated to authentication and why readers at each level offered their 
own validating testimonies.  
That Eliot includes witnesses for each stage of translation suggests his 
acknowledgement that translation always includes interpretation. There is not a one-to-
one correspondence between English and Algonquian. And because a one-to-one 
correspondence between word and thing is the ideal of universal language schemes, 
Eliot‘s acts of interpretation further reveal native languages to be inadequate substitutes 
for a universal language. Only God‘s language is transparent, and all human attempts to 
approximate that fall short. Eliot himself acknowledges this when he prefaces his Logick 
Primer with his ice-breaking metaphor: ―To form Words of Art, is a work that requireth 
time and judgment. I have adventured to break the ice; Lord raise more able Workmen to 
follow, and to mend both the Foundation and the Building.‖56 When Eliot says he has 
―adventured to break the ice,‖ he means that more translations are necessary, that more 
people need to evangelize the Native Americans and to learn their languages, but he 
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intimates that the promise of translation is always unfulfilled. In an August 1664 letter to 
Boyle he writes, 
my purpose is if the Lord will, & that I doe live, to set upon some essay & 
beginning of reducing this language unto rule, which, in the most common 
& usefull points, I doe see, is reducible: though there be corners, & 
anomalities full of difficulty to be reduced under any stated rule, as, your 
selfe know better than I, it is in all languages. I have not so much either 
insight or judgment, as to dare to undertake any thing worthy the name of 
a Grammar. […] But as this is a work for the morrow, to day my work is 
Translation.
57
 
That Algonquian can be reduced to rule means it is like all languages, full of obstacles 
and anomalies, but ―this is a work for tomorrow,‖ Eliot argues. When Eliot published his 
grammar, The Indian Grammar Begun (1666), only two years later, he found 
confirmation that language was ―full of difficulty.‖ Though Eliot never abandoned his 
belief in the necessity of translation, his layering of validating text upon validating text 
betrays his awareness of the opacity of translation and of the difficulty of language. He 
looked to Hebrew as a language free from this difficulty, but unless Hebrew was 
embraced universally, each witness, each confession, each grammatical rule would 
merely break the ice—only to leave the witness, confessor, writer, or reader drowning in 
the difficulties of language.  
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III. A Box Full of Keys: Roger Williams’s A Key into the Language of America 
A little key may open a box, wherein lies a bunch of keys. 
 
-Roger Williams, A Key into the Language of America 
 
Roger Williams writes this in the first paragraphs of A Key into the Language of 
America (1643). Though A Key has been read as a grammar, as an ethnology, or as the 
foundation of our knowledge about seventeenth-century Native Americans, Williams‘s 
text openly presents itself as a text that is more than the sum of its parts, as the door to 
more doors, as the ―little key‖ that opens a box full of keys.58 I take the box full of keys 
to be the guiding metaphor of Williams‘s translation work, in juxtaposition to Eliot‘s ice-
breaking metaphor. Eliot breaks through ice only to find more obstacles, but Williams‘s 
doors open to a multitude of new discoveries. Williams finds door after door, but he has 
the key to each. Because Williams‘s work among the Narragansett was less textually 
centered than Eliot‘s missionary work, he was able to think of translation as generative 
rather than stunting. Native languages offered him more promise than Eliot; he saw them 
as a key to narrowing the gap between experience and text or language. Though he, like 
Eliot, recognized the opacity of translation, he saw this opacity as productive of new 
mixtures that generated new knowledge. Williams idealized the communalizing function 
of Narragansett orality and the language‘s reflection of the natural world. Both of these 
claims about language realized a connection between experience and language that 
mirrored universal language projects. 
David Read, in New World, Known World (2005), argues that ―Williams treats the 
relative simplicity of Native American life not sentimentally but experimentally; to 
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engage with that life is, so to speak, to have a ‗clean lab‘ in which to study God‘s plan 
being acted out in the wilderness—that is, in the human plane.‖59 As Read and others 
explain, Williams‘s A Key provided the English with more knowledge of Native 
American culture than they had previously, and Williams made comparisons between the 
Narragansett and the English in order to better understand God‘s ways working 
themselves out in humanity.
60
 I think Read is right in part: Williams did imagine A Key as 
a study in which careful observation could lead to larger principles. But A Key is much 
more than an ethnological study of ―primitive‖ humanity; it is about how language works. 
The many texts about the new world printed for English audiences, whether language-
centered texts like Williams‘s and Eliot‘s or travel narratives, functioned as curiosity 
cabinets; they presented evidence in the lab Read describes.
61
 But for those engaged in 
the actual work of translation, theory had to become practice. A Key is both an example 
of practical translation and linguistic theory. 
The key to the Narragansett language was also a key to their culture and to 
language itself. The structure of A Key follows its opening logic: each chapter focuses on 
an aspect of Narragansett life and culture, and Williams begins each chapter with 
particular observations on that aspect, moving between observations and dialogues in 
Narragansett that are translated into English. At the close of each chapter the topic opens 
into an ―observation in generall.‖ In chapter VIII, ―Of their persons and parts of the 
bodie,‖ for example, Williams concludes with the general observation that ―Nature 
knows no difference between Europe and Americans in blood, birth, bodies, &c. God 
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having of one blood made all mankind.‖62 Every chapter concludes with a ―more 
particular‖ observation in verse form. Chapter VIII ends with this verse: 
  Boast not proud English, of thy birth & blood, 
  Thy brother Indian is by birth as Good. […] 
  By nature wrath‘s his portio, thine no more  
  Till Grace his soule and thine in Christ restore 
  Make sure thy second birth, else, though shalt see, 
  Heaven ope to Indians wilde, but shut to thee.
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Like many of A Key‟s general observations and verses, this chapter conclusion compares 
the Indians to the English, seizing the opportunity to reprimand the ―civilized‖ English 
for their depravity. Williams proclaims the essential and natural goodness of the Indians, 
a common refrain in the chapters‘ conclusions, but he reminds all readers that ultimate 
meaning lies in the salvation and spiritual transformation of both the ―wilde‖ Indians and 
the English. The closing verses move from the particular to the general and from the 
cultural to the spiritual. Thus, the particularities of Indian culture act as keys for 
understanding the nature of the people in general and for observing the visible as 
evidence of what cannot be seen; English and Narragansett material life and language are 
signs of their respective spiritual states. For Williams, language is most often the key that 
opens both of these doors—a key to culture and a key into divine mysteries. Because 
language is the key, Williams structures his observations, particular and general, around 
dialogues in Narragansett translated into English. The key that opens a box containing 
more keys is language, but language is also what lies behind the unlocked doors.  
141 
 
In Forked Tongues, David Murray writes that Williams‘s A Key has been used 
more as a source of knowledge about early Indian culture ―than for any specifically 
linguistic insight.‖64 Almost twenty years after Murray published Forked Tongues, this is 
still largely true. Even Cohen‘s recent analysis of A Key, which focuses on Narragansett 
communication structures, scarcely comments on the translation at the heart of the 
Williams‘s text. My purpose here is to attend to the linguistic, to mine A Key for insight 
into how Williams might have imagined the epistemological work of language and 
translation.  
If anxieties about the text‘s corruption seep into Eliot‘s translation project, 
Williams presented a more flexible idea of language itself. Rather than viewing language 
as the necessary foundation for civilization and conversion, Williams sought an 
understanding of the language in its own right and for the subsequent knowledge it would 
open. Whereas those surrounding Eliot worried that translation corrupted the text, 
Williams saw the process of translation as productive, generating new knowledge and 
new ways of accessing that knowledge.
65
 A Key thus represents inter-linguistic contact as 
genuine exchange, as opposed to the exchange of religion for riches that Mather suggests 
in Another Tongue. Williams offered the Indians a written language and the English a 
grammar book, but he gained from his education in Narragansett the belief that text could 
faithfully mediate language and experience.  
Like Eliot, Williams thought of translation as an experimental project. Whereas 
Eliot experimented with the role of language in conversion, or the nature of the translated 
text, Williams‘s interest in translation posed an experiment with the theories of universal 
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language projects. Williams‘s language experiment was not, like Eliot‘s, about 
deciphering and representing authentic religious experience; instead Williams argued that 
the Narragansett language functioned ideally as a more transparent mediator between 
words and experience than English. Against Eliot‘s doubt, Williams embraced the ideal 
of a universal language represented in Narragansett and theorized how language in 
general could reach toward this goal. 
Williams‘s relative idealism was possible, in part, because his relationship with 
the Narragansett was not primarily religious and because he imagined his work to be that 
of the linguist more than the evangelist. Because he did not translate the Bible, his 
translation work had the freedom to explore language in its own right rather than as a tool 
for conversion. In A Key‘s opening letter to the reader, Williams writes that knowledge of 
the Narragansett language will enable his countrymen to converse with the ―Natives all 
over the Countrey: and by such converse it may please the Father of Mercies to spread 
civilitie, (and in his owne most holy season) Christianitie.‖66 ―God‘s most holy season‖ is 
a refrain seen throughout A Key; Williams hopes and prays for the conversion of the 
Indians, but he does not see it as his primary calling. He writes that he has ―uprightly 
labored to suite my endeavours to my pretences: and of later times (out of desire to 
attaine their Language) I have run through varieties of Intercourses with them‖ 
concerning the things of religion, and he emphasizes that ―there is no small preparation 
in the hearts of Multitudes of them.‖67 Williams is attuned to the state of Indian souls, but 
he acknowledges his primary goal to be the attainment and understanding of language. 
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 In Christenings Make not Christians (1645), Williams elaborates on his reasons 
for not evangelizing the Indians more aggressively. He notes the objection made against 
him, in which the critic adopts Williams‘s own language: ―Why then if this be 
Conversion, and you have such a Key of Language, and such a dore of opportunity, in the 
knowledge of the Country and the inhabitants, why proceed you not to produce in 
America some patterns of such conversions as you speak of?‖68 The door Williams‘s key 
opens is not the door to conversion; he would not undertake such a ―worke without a 
Word, a Warrant and Commission, for matter, and manner, from God,‖ he writes.69 His 
commission is to open the door of knowledge through language. 
 In his various justifications for not engaging more heavily in the project of Native 
American conversion, Williams emphasizes language as his first priority. Christenings 
defends Williams‘s lack of ―productivity‖ by noting the ―hardship‖ and necessity of 
learning Narragansett: ―In matters of Earth men will helpe to spell out each other, but in 
matters of Heaven (to which the soule is naturally so averse) how far are the Ears of men 
hedged up from listening to an improper Language?‖70 A proper language, Williams 
suggests, will open ears to heavenly matters. Hence, he writes A Key partly with the goal 
of converting the Native Americans: language acquisition is the first step in evangelism. 
This, too, was Eliot‘s position, but A Key demonstrates more than just Williams‘s 
education in Narragansett; it also reveals what it had taught him about communication or 
language in general. ―In matters of Earth men will helpe to spell out each other,‖ 
Williams wrote, and Narragansett offered him a model for the kind of communal verbal 
exchange that could open reluctant ears. He structures A Key as a dialogue for the sake of 
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accessibility but also in order to demonstrate the kind of verbal exchange he sees as the 
foundations of Narragansett culture. The Narragansett conventions he describes in A 
Key—authenticity and community—are the principles on which he bases his translation. 
Narragansett oral codes were the keys to understanding their culture and the keys 
to transforming language in general. The Narragansett relied on oral communication to 
persuade the community to consensus, and Williams saw oral persuasion as a linguistic 
and social ideal. In A Key, one sees the beginnings of a colonial interest in the eloquent 
Indian, which Thomas Jefferson wrote about more than a century later.
71
 Williams does 
not go as far as Jefferson will in suggesting that the Indian practice of deciding all 
communal action through persuasion, rather than through compulsion, is a model on 
which to build the early Republic, but Williams does idealize Narragansett oral practice. 
In chapter XXII, ―Of their Government,‖ he notes that the leaders, or sachims, ―have an 
absolute Monarchie over the people; yet they will not conclude of ought that concernes 
all, either Lawes, or Subsides, or warrers, unto which the people are averse, and by gentle 
perswasion cannot be brought.‖72 When taken with Williams‘s opening remarks on the 
importance of pronunciation and on the ―copiousness‖ of the Narragansett language, this 
passage suggests that Narragansett has a greater capacity to create understanding and 
consensus. And Narragansett ―copiousness‖ mirrors the people‘s ―delight‖ in verbal 
exchange. ―Their desire of, and delight in newes,‖ Williams writes in Chapter VIII, ―Of 
Discourse and Newes,‖ ―is great, as the Athenians.‖73 As Cohen notes, Williams ―links 
Native audiences explicitly to classical republicanism through their valorization of 
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information circulation‖—and I would add, through their belief in the ability of language 
to persuade, transform, and create consensus.
74
 
There is evidence of such a position with the text of A Key, as well. Williams 
structures the text around snippets of dialogue. He writes in the prefatory, ―Directions for 
the use of the Language,‖ that he had originally intended to shape the entire text as a 
dialogue but abandoned it ―for brevities sake.‖ But he continues: ―yet (with no small 
paines) I have so framed every Chapter and the matter of it, as I may call it an Implicite 
Dialogue.‖ This form gives the text wider application, Williams believes, than a grammar 
or dictionary would, but it also highlights the role of conversation in Narragansett culture: 
dialogue is the key that opens an authentic exchange of minds.  
That Williams configures the text through dialogue further demonstrates the 
centrality of verbal exchange to Narragansett culture and to his own linguistic theory. The 
dialogue that follows Williams‘s observation on Narragansett government highlights the 
role of verbal exchange:  
  Péititeatch.    Let him come 
  Mishaúntowash.   Speak out. 
  Nanántowash.    Speak plaine. […] 
  Wunnadsittamútta   Let us search into it. […] 
  Cuttiantacompáwwem.  You are a lying fellow.
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In this exchange, the speakers use dialogue to ―search into‖ truth. Thus, dialogue 
functions not only as a cultural ideal, but as an epistemological tool. Verbal exchange 
keeps the speaker accountable and uncovers the truth. The demand for authentic, plain, 
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and honest speech does not only reveal a defect in the Christianized English and an innate 
tendency toward civil order in the Indians; it also forms a foundational principle of 
Narragansett culture.  
In chapter VIII, Williams describes a typical scene of Indian orality demonstrating 
why the language has many ways of describing honesty and falsehood. Honesty in 
communication is valued because verbal exchange determines who will lead: ―Their 
manner is upon any tiding to sit round double or treble or more‖ wherein ―a deepe silence 
they make, and attention give to him that speaketh; and many will deliver themselves 
either in a relation or news, or in a conflutation with very emphaticall speech and great 
action, commonly an houre, and sometimes two hours together.‖76 The audience‘s 
attentive silence is matched by the speaker‘s vocal and bodily presence; the speaker 
commands attention through his eloquence and physical persuasion. This description 
underscores the importance of public speech in Narragansett culture, and it marks orality 
as material. The body, not just words, persuades, and the body‘s materiality mirrors the 
mouth‘s speech. The body, then, becomes another mark of authenticity. It reflects the 
―emphaticall speech,‖ creating union between the oral and the material. 
Williams‘s praise for the orality of Narragansett culture was directly opposed to 
the politics of verbal exchange he fought in his own culture. Williams‘s stance on the 
issue of conscience in religion informed his idealization of Narragansett orality. In the 
years surrounding A Key‘s printing, Williams engaged in a pamphlet war with John 
Cotton on the subject of freedom of conscience. In his The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution 
(1644), Williams professes freedom of conscience, taking Cotton to task for a letter 
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written some years earlier that argued the state should punish religious offenses (such as 
blasphemy and idolatry) as well as civil ones.
77
 The Narragansett practice of forestalling 
action until reaching a verbal consensus was the model Williams desired in his own 
public sphere. Open religious debate, he believed, would strengthen both church and 
state.  
Cohen most persuasively examines the relationship between A Key and William‘s 
theology and politics and argues that the ―visual, linguistic, and generic features of A Key 
imply, rather than insist on, a separation of the religious garden from the civic realm.‖78 
The formal elements of the text, including ―material and linguistic structures,‖ Cohen 
writes, ―model[] the mode of passive proselytization‖ Williams practiced.79 The content, 
Cohen argues, matches Williams‘s political writings, but the very materiality of the text 
demonstrates this claim. Thus both A Key and the larger body of Williams‘s work verify 
his admiration for the Narragansett practice of persuasion; a society in which language 
was used for debate and eventual consensus was more desirable than a society wherein 
language trapped and divided, which was Williams‘s own experience with his expulsion 
from Massachusetts.  
Williams idealized Narragansett orality as politically and socially efficacious, but 
he seems to have understood the challenge of textualizing an oral language. In his 
prefatory ―Directions for the use of the Language,‖ Williams writes that he has ―been at 
the paines and charges to Cause the Accents, Tones or sounds to be affixed‖ to the 
Narragansett type, ―Because the Life of all Languages is in the Pronunciation.‖80 The 
Narragansett admiration for one who speaks eloquently with ―great action‖ is reflected in 
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Williams‘s sense that Narragansett is a living, oral language, but he extends this claim to 
―all Languages.‖ Williams is aware that his act of textualizing Narragansett transforms it 
in some way.  
Sandra Gustafson argues that in Eliot‘s missionary model, ―‗the Book‘ is the 
central symbol,‖ but Williams‘s model, she claims, is the spoken word.81 He held a 
―relatively deep understanding of and appreciation for Narragansett society‖ that 
―included a lively sense of the spoken word‘s power for them and the importance of 
authentic speech.‖82 She speculates that if Williams had ―continued with his early 
missionary efforts, he might have developed a missionary style with some fidelity to 
native oral modes of spiritual practice,‖ a fidelity that Eliot, in her account, ignores.83 I 
take this distinction between Eliot and Williams, for Williams‘s interest in orality enabled 
him to imagine language and translation as more generative than Eliot did. For Williams, 
the text did not necessarily undermine experience, and the material textuality of A Key 
mirrors Narragansett principles of orality.
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In ―Directions,‖ Williams guides his reader through the process of maintaining the 
original character of the language as best as possible, but in these instructions he also 
acknowledges that the translations are not always equivocal: ―The English for every 
Indian word or phrase stands in a straight line directly against the Indian: yet sometimes 
there are two words for the same thing […] and then the English stands against them 
both.‖ Williams is describing the material appearance of the translations on the page: the 
translations are arranged in columns, with the English directly parallel to the original, 
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divided by a vertical line. Often there is more than one Narragansett word for the English 
equivalent: 
 Npenowauntwâumen.   I cannot speak your language. 
 Matta nippánnawem   I lie not. 
Cuppánnowem.   You lie. 
Mattanickoggachoùsk   I am no lying fellow. 
Matntiantacómpaw. 
Matntiantásampáwwa.
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The last three Narragansett words all translate to ―I am no lying fellow,‖ but they each 
have a slightly different connotation. Williams does not elaborate here on these 
distinctions, yet in the preface, he writes that ―their Language is exceeding copious, and 
they have five or six words sometimes for one thing.‖86 The material page reflects 
Williams‘s translation theory: translation is not equivocal. ―In a straight line directly 
against‖ materially represents the exchange between the two languages, but the columns 
on each side of the line are not equal; each language represents meaning differently. The 
movement on the page attempts to reflect the living, spoken word.
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 The copiousness of 
Narragansett opens it to a larger capacity for authentic verbal exchange, and this 
abundance is manifested on the material page. 
Narragansett verbal profuseness, Williams argues, is beneficial, but it is also the 
result of Narragansett‘s reflective relationship to the land. Ultimately, both of these 
qualities mean a more mutually reflective relationship between language and experience. 
Cohen notes the Narragansett‘s connection between the people, their language, and the 
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landscape: they were a people on the move, he observes, ―cued by the flux of food 
availability, disease, and trade.‖88 And landscape and language mutually structure one 
another: ―Brush and rock piles were used to commemorate people and events, while 
landscape features in the undulating New England topography […] were used to structure 
storytelling.‖89 The most striking aspect of Cohen‘s analysis, though, is its extension to 
the material page. Cohen brings our attention specifically to layout and typography, 
arguing that ―these features play with the temporality of reading, analeptically and 
proleptically restructuring interaction with the text.‖90 This ―moving page,‖ as Cohen 
terms it, is in my reading also a manifestation of Williams‘s interest in the relationship 
between the landscape and the Narragansett language. The oral/aural and material 
components of language are intimately connected, and both, Williams demonstrates, are 
structured by the land. 
Throughout A Key, Williams observes that the Narragansett language displays the 
people‘s unique relationship to the land; they are formed by their relationship to nature. 
In his chapter on the religion of the Narragansett, for example, Williams presents a 
dialogue concerning the creation of the world: 
Tà suóg Mannítoowock.  How many Gods bee there? 
 Maunaũog Mishaúnawock.  Many, great many. 
Nétop machàge.   Friend, not so. 
Paũsuck naũnt manìt.   There is only one God. 
Cuppíssittone.    You are mistaken.  
Cowauwaúnemun.   You are out of the way.
91
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Williams observes how this last phrase—―Cowauwaunemun‖—―much pleaseth them, 
being proper for their wandering the woods, and similitudes greatly please them.‖92 That 
Narragansett is structured by ―similitudes‖ to nature suggests to Williams the people‘s 
organic relationship to the land. In Dispossession by Degrees (1997), Jean M. O‘Brien 
argues for a related reading of native language, one in which linguistic conventions 
―formed a principal source of identity and a sense of place that included but also 
transcended natal village.‖93 Language literally marks place. She gives as an example a 
reading of a passage from A Key: ―The Narragansett word ‗Nqussutam, ‗I remove house,‘ 
gave expression to a mobile way of life geared toward reaping seasonally available 
resources that fundamentally shaped the relationship of Indians to the land.‖94 O‘Brien 
argues that language shaped native identity, but Williams goes beyond her model in 
suggesting that language organically reflects an identity shaped by the land; language 
grows out of landscape. 
Language‘s rootedness in nature reflects a major goal of universal language 
projects: to create a more organic language in which the word or symbol inheres in the 
meaning of the thing represented. John Wilkins‘s An Essay Towards a Real Character 
and Philosophical Language (1668) offers a representative example of these universal 
language projects. His text attempts to reverse linguistic corruption by creating a 
language in which ―signs and names express their natures,‖ and he argued that in his new 
scheme there would be no semiotic ambiguity, no false appearances caused by this 
ambiguity, and that words would be ―answerable in their character‖ to the things to 
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which they correspond.
95
 Williams saw in Narragansett an expression of the nature of 
things, because their language was situated so closely to the natural world.  
Though he never explicitly linked Narragansett, or native languages in general, to 
universal language projects, Williams did identify Narragansett with Hebrew. In A Key‘s 
letter to the reader, he observes that ―some of their words […] hold affinitie with the 
Hebrew,‖ and he connects Narragansett culture to that of the Old Testament Jews (they 
both anoint heads, offer dowries for wives, and separate their women ―during the time of 
their monthly sicknesse‖).96 So though he did not claim native languages as a model for 
universal language schemes, he did see Narragansett as functioning as a universal 
language would. Williams saw the potential in indigenous language to narrow the space 
between text and experience. A language that emerged from the land and that structured 
communal life better reflected experience of the natural world and of daily life. 
The success of Wilkins‘s project was dependent upon his assumption that all 
people agree to the same ―internal notion or apprehension of things‖ because these 
notions are communicated to the mind through sensory experience.
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 Williams‘s A Key 
similarly assumes that the English and Narragansett had the same ideas about things, but 
the process of translation also reveals distinctions between languages that are ultimately 
productive of new knowledge: the copiousness of Narragansett gives the English a new 
way of thinking about honesty, for example, and the text-likeness of English prepares the 
Indian for eventual conversion.
98
 Linguistic exchange is productive, but it is not 
transparent. In Williams‘s assessment, it neither corrupts the English text nor erases 
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Indian orality. The key opens the door from both sides. And because translation is not 
transparent, it becomes a key opening a box containing many more keys. 
 
IV. Eliot and Williams in Context 
Of course, the trans-cultural exchange A Key represents is also fraught with 
political trouble. Williams‘s key also affords the English a tool of control. Ultimately, A 
Key represents an orthodox desire to subsume native languages within a theologically 
prescribed hierarchy—even as Williams‘s own heterodoxy makes this a text about the 
superiority of ―natural‖ language over the performative rhetoric of the plain style. He, 
like Eliot, cannot be exonerated from charges that translation also works to erase and 
control.  
Both Williams and Eliot professed ideals about language that corresponded in 
many ways to contemporary universal language projects. Rather than reading their 
translation work as effacing the process of translation, I propose we read them as 
explicitly acknowledging that translation was not transparent. Instead, they worried about 
what it does efface—the original Hebrew text and authentic experience—that ultimately 
revealed a gap between text and experience that was the landmark anxiety of early 
American Puritanism—even in its heterodox forms.  
Earlier seventeenth-century texts depicting inter-cultural communication often 
erased the process of translation, as Murray argues, or represented linguistic barriers as 
irrelevant in light of ―English eloquence,‖ as Randall C. Davis says in his ―Early Anglo-
American Attitudes to Native American Languages‖ (2006).99 But Eliot and Williams are 
154 
 
representative of English colonial attitudes toward translation. They first imagined native 
languages as complex in their own right and then openly depicted the work of translation 
as often opaque and riddled with difficulties, and these distinctions were a result of their 
Puritanness. 
 Translation sometimes exacerbated the Puritan anxiety about the gap between text 
and experience and sometimes offered new ways of compensating for that gap. Later 
Puritan encounters with Native Americans do not display this same anxiety. Jonathan 
Edwards‘s missionary work almost a century later demonstrates this shift: he avoided any 
direct linguistic encounter with Native Americans. Though he preached many sermons to 
Native American audiences during his tenure at Stockbridge, he always relied on 
interpreters. Translation was not effaced in Edwards‘s life and work; he entirely avoided 
it. Perhaps he never learned native languages because his career at the Northampton 
congregation ended in disaster, perhaps because he was getting along in age, or perhaps 
because it aroused an anxiety his philosophy worked to dispel. Edwards gave his career 
to theorizing and attempting to bridge the gap between text and experience, but Indian 
language never attracted his attention. Williams and Eliot, however, confronted the gap 
between text and experience. In this, they were very much like their fellow New England 
Puritans.
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Chapter 4 
The Material Word: Jonathan Edwards and Language as an Image of the Divine   
I. Words, those Dreadful Enemies  
From March of 1739 to March of 1745, during the height of the Great Awakening 
in New England, Sarah Pierpont of New Haven, Massachusetts kept a diary.
1
 Over the 
course of these years, Pierpont documented the sermons she heard and her reactions to 
them. In June of 1742, she records, she heard a sermon ―Preached from those words 
‗Examine yourselves whether ye be in the Truth,‘‖ and she writes that she saw an image 
of herself in the minister‘s words, just as the face sees its reflection in a mirror: ―My 
Heart went sweetly along with the Sermon I thought I could say that a face answers to 
face in a glass. So my Heart answered to the Marks there given My soul seemd for a 
Little Space to be almost overcome with a sense of the sweet union.‖ Throughout the 
manuscript, Pierpont flags her spiritual journey through sermons such as this one. 
Sermons, the diary is explicit, do something to her: they instigate change, reflection, 
hope, and conviction. But spiritual transformation took place in the space between 
sermons as she reflected on them, wrote about them, and worked out her doubt through 
the act of writing. As minister Ebenezer Parkman‘s introductory remarks to the Memoirs 
state, ―She was one that obtained her orthodoxy not only by Tradition and History but by 
Tryal and Experience.‖ The sermons she heard communicated tradition and history, but 
they also gave her ways to work out her salvation experientially—through tests and trials. 
Pierpont‘s diary was a space of testing herself against the sermons; the material act of 
writing was as important as hearing the sermon and sensing God‘s work on the soul.  
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In April of 1740, Pierpont records hearing eighteen sermons preached by ―the 
wonderful Mr. J…E.‖2 These sermons, she writes, are the ―most soul-searching sermons 
that ever I heard,‖ giving ―shocks‖ to her soul and her whole ―frame.‖ This passage 
begins as a recollection of Mr. J. E.‘s sermons but ends as a self-reflection: Pierpont 
transitions from recalling her unsteady frame at the time of hearing the sermon to a soul-
searching, present-tense plea for God to appear ―to discover to me that I am in a state of 
nature and […] push me out of doubt.‖ J. E.‘s sermon awakened Pierpont‘s soul and body 
in the moment of its aural reception, but its effective work continued and deepened as 
Pierpont reinforced the initial experience through the act of writing. Jonathan Edwards, 
perhaps Pierpont‘s mysterious ―J…E,‖ would have been well pleased with Pierpont. 
Throughout his career as pastor of the Northampton, Massachusetts church, he worked to 
retain a sense of spontaneity and the Spirit‘s immediate presence in his sermons. 
Pierpont, whether her J. E. was Edwards or another Great Awakening preacher, 
experienced an unmediated encounter with God in the eighteen sermons she heard, and 
her Memoirs model just what Edwards desired: that the auditor would experience the 
immediate presence of God in the sermonic moment and then reflect on and carry out that 
encounter through her own experience. 
Jonathan Edwards was the most important chronicler and philosopher of the 
experimental faith fostered by the Great Awakening. As part of this philosophy, he 
forged a middle ground between the Old and New Lights—the two rival doctrinal groups 
of the Great Awakening—attempting to work out a philosophy of religious experience 
and to develop a vocabulary for bodily affect so that language would mirror the 
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performance of religious affection.
3
 There were, Edwards argued, no sure visible signs of 
regeneration, but he maintained the importance of right religious affections. Pierpont‘s 
Memoirs offer an archive for how Great Awakening sermons were experienced—for how 
they were heard. They describe daily religious experience in a language less mediated by 
religious authority; they demonstrate right religious affections that are written on the 
body in language that attempts to mirror and capture that experience; and they exhibit a 
reflexive relationship between experience and text. The Great Awakening, with its 
extemporaneous preaching and highly physical religious experience, threatened to 
separate these—or to create a gap between experience and theology. Edwards‘s 
philosophy responded to this gap; he attempted to write empiricism into a rigorous 
theology, hoping to suture experience and theology. And text was always the mediating 
center: for Edwards, experience was initiated, reflected on, and manifested in language.  
In this sense, Edwards differs from the other figures I have treated throughout the 
dissertation. He turned the problem of the mediating text into an advantage: the convert 
could literally write his or her own experience as a tool for accessing the divine. The act 
of writing was a means for bridging theology and experience. Yet Edwards‘s 
philosophical mind at times saw language as an inadequate tool for accessing and 
describing spiritual things. In this sense, he struggles with the same epistemological 
problems of language his Puritan predecessors had. Edwards is distinguished from them 
by his philosophical redefinition of language and by his belief in the writing act as 
spiritually transformative. Here I trace the development in his thought that allowed him to 
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view language as both a part of the natural world and a bridge between the material and 
the divine.  
In Edwards‘s early writings language is always a problem: ―Oh, how the world is 
darkened, clouded, distracted and torn to pieces by those dreadful enemies of mankind 
called words,‖ Edwards laments at the close of his Miscellanies no. 4.4 The gap between 
language and experience was, it seemed to Edwards, unavoidable. Yet his philosophy and 
his sermons worked to overcome this, and he turned to experimental accounts of grace in 
his case histories—accounts that seemed to reflect and generate experience—in order to 
determine how experience and text could merge or how the textual account of conversion 
could deepen the experience of grace and even transfer it to readers. Edwards‘s lament 
over cloudy words in the Miscellanies would seem to suggest that he saw words as 
entirely arbitrary, yet he came to the conclusion that language—though a part of the 
natural world—was an image of the divine, capable of clarity and agent of spiritual 
transformation. I argue in what follows that Edwards came to this conclusion through his 
typology and cosmology and turned to the case histories as evidence that the materiality 
of language could capture and generate authentic religious experience. And the sermon 
was a space wherein Edwards‘s philosophy of language manifested itself with the highest 
stakes. 
 
II. Solid Shadows: Edwards’s Philosophy of Language 
Edwards urged his audience to meditate on sermons in the manner Pierpont‘s 
diary demonstrates. In his sermon Heeding the Word, and Losing It (1734), he opens with 
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the necessity of hearing and obeying God‘s word: ―there is a dependence on the word,‖ 
he writes.
5
 Edwards means to alert his auditors to their responsibility in making 
experimental the text heard from the pulpit; the hearer needs to embrace the word, like 
Pierpont, in order to make it more than empty sounds—in order to give it application to 
lived experience. Although the individual listener has responsibility, ultimate agency 
rests in the word, and the word, in Edwards‘s definition, is God ―speaking of himself, 
after the manner of men.‖6 Throughout this sermon, language is the medium for God‘s 
communication, and it seems a relatively transparent one: although Edwards lists several 
reasons men might lose the word, language does not appear as an obstacle. That is, until 
the close of the sermon, when Edwards warns his auditors that action alone demonstrates 
true ―heeding‖ because ―words are cheap:‖ ―it would be more desirable to see a man use 
some vigorous endeavors to restrain degeneracy once, than to hear him lament 
degeneracy a hundred times.‖7 Heeding the Word demonstrates the linguistic tension at 
the core of Edwards‘s philosophy and sermonic theory. ―There is a dependence on the 
word,‖ because God communicates himself in human language, but words are cheap. By 
this, Edwards means that words do not necessarily correspond to the internal state of the 
soul.  
Edwards came to think something like this concerning any external signs of an 
individual‘s spiritual state. His Treatise Concerning Religious Affections (1746), written 
throughout the revivals in Northampton, asks as its central question: ―what are the 
distinguishing qualifications of those that are in favor with God,‖ or ―What is the nature 
of true religion? and wherein do lie the distinguishing notes of that virtue and holiness?‖8 
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Official doctrine did not sanction the religious experience of many Great Awakening 
converts, but Edwards established a philosophy of religious affections that validated 
affective experience without reading the affections as empirical evidence of grace. The 
contradictions between experience and theology Edwards observed during the Great 
Awakening manifested themselves in contentious debates about the validity and type of 
external signs of redemption. The Great Awakening has come to be characterized by 
several attributes ―new‖ to American religion: the extemporaneous sermon, characteristic 
of much lay preaching, affected bodies materially, manifesting the signs of the New 
Birth.
9
 These outward manifestations were read, alternately, as evidence of enthusiasm, 
hypocrisy, redemption, and hysteria. Counterfeit religion, Edwards argued, was the 
devil‘s greatest advantage, and saints lacked discernment to distinguish between what 
was true and what was counterfeit.  
The first part of Religious Affections lays out various signs, like the ―appearance‖ 
of love, that are ―no certain signs that religious affections are truly gracious, or that they 
are not,‖ and the second part establishes ―what are distinguishing signs of truly gracious 
and holy affections.‖ Even this second part clearly acknowledges that certainty is 
impossible: ―it was never in God‘s design to give us any rules, by which we may 
certainly know, who of our fellow professors are his.‖10 Although true religion is judged 
by the ―fixedness and strength of the habit that is exercised in affection,‖ it is also true 
that ―the strength of that habit is not always in proportion to outward effects and 
manifestations.‖11 Thus, there is a gap between true godly affection and external signs. 
Edwards was concerned that revival converts misread outward signs—even in 
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themselves—as ―certain‖ because they felt great spiritual desire, heightened sorrow for 
sin, or some other emotional response to God‘s glory. He argued that there could be 
discontinuity between one‘s experience of God and the theology of religious affections he 
describes. These gaps—between external signs and the state of one‘s soul or between 
theology and experience—led Edwards to write Religious Affections, and he was led to 
his conclusions about the possible gaps between sign and thing represented by his reading 
of John Locke.
 
 
Edwards‘s Puritan predecessors understood language as a divine gift, within 
which any failures or fissures were due to human error, but Edwards merged this concept 
with his reading of Locke‘s notion that words signify ideas rather than things. Edwards‘s 
worry, expressed in Miscellany no. 4, that the world is darkened by words, was also 
Locke‘s: Book III of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ―Of Words,‖ 
addresses what Locke sees as the ―imperfection‖ and ―abuse‖ of words. Edwards and 
Locke both worked to clarify the relationship between language and knowledge, 
understanding language as a system of signs whose primary purpose was the 
communication of knowledge. In his sermon The Importance and Advantage of a 
Thorough Knowledge of Divine Truth (1739), Edwards argues that visible signs, of which 
the gospel is composed, are meant ―to convey some knowledge of the things signified,‖ 
and Locke contends that language‘s purpose is to make understanding possible—between 
people and of ideas.
12
 Without functioning signs, Edwards argues, knowledge is 
impossible, and a sermon might as well be delivered in ―the Chinese or Tartarian 
language, of which we know not one word.‖13  
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Language as human construct meant for Edwards, re Locke, that words were signs 
of ideas arrived at through sensory experience. He addresses this again in Knowledge of a 
Divine Truth. Paul, in Hebrews 5:2, writes to his addressees that they need the taste of 
milk before strong meat, and Edwards argues that Paul is here reproving them for their 
lack of ―spiritual and experimental knowledge of divine things.‖14 Spiritual and 
experimental knowledge are not synonymous for Edwards; experimental knowledge is 
derived through visible signs whereas spiritual knowledge comes from the Spirit. 
Edwards adds that Paul reproves the Hebrews for their lack of doctrinal knowledge, and 
this rational knowledge—alongside the necessary experimental knowledge—comes 
through visible signs, like language.  
But here Edwards faces a problem: sensory experience and rational knowledge, he 
argues throughout his writings, do not give one full apprehension of spiritual or moral 
things. Language is at its most cloudy when trying to represent the immaterial. In 
Miscellanies no. 782, where Edwards first lays out the new sense, to which Perry Miller 
attributes Lockean influence, he writes that God does not rely on language or signs, for 
he ―understands himself, and all other things, by the actual and immediate presence of an 
idea of things understood.‖15 Man, on the other hand, cannot excite actual ideas in his 
mind, and he relies on signs because they are more efficient—the exciting of actual ideas 
being a slow process and not amenable to communication among people. Actual ideas, 
Edwards continues, are even more difficult to excite in the mind when not concerning 
sensible and external things. Things of a divine, supernatural, sublime, and metaphysical 
nature are only truly understood (ideally apprehended, in Edwards‘s language) through 
170 
 
the extraordinary work of the Spirit of God, which is inaccessible through natural reason 
or sensory experience.
16
 Edwards again addresses the inability of language to express 
spiritual things in Freedom of the Will: ―Words were first formed to express external 
things,‖ but words ―applied to express things internal or spiritual, are almost all 
borrowed, and used in a sort of figurative sense.‖17 And figurative language is one of 
Locke‘s abuses of language: ―all the artificial and figurative application of words 
eloquence has invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the 
passions, and thereby mislead the judgment.‖18 Edwards often employed figurative 
language, especially in his sermons, but he did suggest that figurative language can be 
obscuring. Despite this, Edwards found ways, through and beyond Locke, to make 
language rational and authentic—even figurative language describing spiritual things. 
Edwards scholars have noted his connection to Locke since Perry Miller first 
wrote that Edwards made ―holiness‖ a new simple idea, but less attention has been given 
to how Locke‘s theory of language influenced Edwards after Miller‘s ―Edwards, Locke, 
and the Rhetoric of Sensation‖ (1950).19 Miller‘s essay describes how Edwards used 
Locke‘s theory of sensory psychology to move the passions: Edwards determined that 
―an idea in the mind is not only a form of perception but is also a determination of love 
and hate. […] to apprehend [things] by their ideas is to comprehend them not only 
intellectually but passionately.‖20 Miller addresses Edwards‘s reading of Locke‘s theory 
of language, describing Edwards‘s ―sensory rhetoric‖ as one that took Locke a step 
further by arguing that ideas could be apprehended emotionally, not just intellectually. 
Miller‘s claim that Edwards believed ideas were emotional as well as intellectual is 
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critically accepted, and it uncovered a fundamental aspect of Edwards‘s philosophy, but 
Miller fails to account for Edwards‘s thought on language itself. 
Edwards did share much with Locke‘s conception of language, but Edwards also 
argued for divinely organized substantial forms and the essential connection of words to 
those forms. In other words, Edwards believed that words could signify things or real 
essences. Locke argues that because words are dependent on the speaker‘s own ideas, the 
speaker‘s words may fail to excite in others the same ideas he intends: ―no one hath the 
power to make others have the same ideas in their minds that he has, when they use the 
same words he does.‖21 Edwards, as sermonizer, however needed to believe that his 
words would excite in his listeners the ideas he took them ―to be signs of.‖22 Locke 
acknowledges the possibility—and necessity—of exciting in others the ideas the speaker 
―makes them stand for,‖ and Edwards made this his sermonic goal. Edwards, though, did 
not consider this as difficult a task as did Locke. In Locke‘s view, one of the false 
assumptions that leads to an ideal disjunction between speaker and hearer is ―that nature 
works regularly in the production of things, and sets the boundaries to each of those 
species, by giving exactly the same real internal constitution to each individual which we 
rank under one general name.‖23 Such names, he goes on, signify only complex ideas and 
not real essences; the ―doctrine of substantial forms‖ does not imply that general words 
are connected to real essences. Edwards, though, disagrees on precisely this point. In 
―The Mind‖ no. 43 he writes  
that God has not only distributed things into species by evidently 
manifesting, by his making such an agreement in things, that he designed 
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such and such particulars to be together in the mind, but by making the 
soul of such a nature that those particulars which he thus made to agree are 
unavoidably together in the mind, one naturally exciting and including the 
others.
24
 
Against his interpretation of Locke, Edwards argues that nature, or rather God, does work 
regularly in giving the same essential qualities to things tied together under a general 
name. Therefore, there is a ―union‖ in the ideas tied together under genera and species—
―the tying of ideas together in genera and species is not merely the calling of them by the 
same name.‖25 Because of this natural union of ideas, and because language is part of the 
natural world, Edwards argues that words are connected to real essences. And he adheres 
to something like the ―doctrine of substantial forms‖ in his typology and cosmology. 
Miller argues that Locke had taught Edwards ―that the words used by persons 
‗signified nothing that really existed in nature,‘‖ but Edwards believed the things that 
existed in nature were in themselves signs—and signs of real substances.26 The natural 
world, Edwards argued, was ―full of images of divine things,‖ and these images were but 
shadow of what Edwards called the more substantial spiritual world.
27
 Although language 
often seemed, to Edwards, incapable of grasping the glory of God, he found a solution in 
his philosophy of the universe. He believed that the material world inhered with spiritual 
truths, and this meant, in turn, that material language was capable of reaching spiritual 
truths. Language may be a human construct, but the material world itself is full of images 
of the divine. Edwards ultimately concluded that language, too, could reflect the divine. 
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Although Edwards believed that words as signs were cloudy when attempting to 
represent spiritual things, he always maintained that the words of sermons had agency. 
They could, as Pierpont wrote, transform the hearer. Edwards‘s reading of Locke 
presented him with a problem, but he resolved it through his view of God‘s 
communications through nature. Recent work on Edwards has noted that he saw 
communicativeness as one of God‘s most essential qualities.28 ―God is a communicative 
Being,‖ he wrote.29  Some scholars take this as a vital starting point for examining 
Edwards‘s sermonic career, the rhetorical structure of his works, his typology, his sense 
of his pastoral role, and his biblical hermeneutics, among other things, but few examine 
what this meant for his theory of language. Janice Knights‘s ―Learning the Language of 
God,‖ comes the closest to accounting for Edwards‘s philosophy of language: 
―Edwards‘s fundamental conviction of God‘s effulgence underwrote his theory of divine 
communications that overflow the human categories of history and ontology. The first 
and essential attribute—the impetus in God‘s self-generation and his generation of the 
world—is being and its communication.‖30 Although Knight writes that Edwards 
believed God‘s communicative nature overflowed into the natural world and in the 
―words of the prophets,‖ she adds that he often seemed hesitant about the value of human 
communication. Edwards had concluded, Knight says, that the ―greatness of God must 
always elude mortal description.‖31 Edwards did at times express this sentiment, and to 
an extent, he had to admit that divine glory transcends human understanding, but because 
―God‘s effulgence […] overflow[s] the human categories of history and ontology‖ even 
language captures something of the divine glory.  
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That one can access spiritual reality through the material world is the fundamental 
premise of ―Images of Divine Things,‖ a collection of Edwards‘s typological writings.32 
Edwards reads the material world—including rivers, the sun, the Olympic games, and 
even wheels—as representations of moral and supernatural realities, as shadows of true 
substance. His eighty-fourth ―Miscellany‖ from ―Images,‖ for example, reads fire as a 
type:  
The torrents and floods of liquid fire that sometimes are vomited out from 
the lower parts of the earth, the belly of hell, by the mouths of volcanoes, 
indicate or shadow forth what is in hell.
33
 
Fire is not mere metaphor for hell; it ―indicate[s] or shadow[s] forth‖ hell. For Edwards, 
the natural world and all it contains is a shadow of divine reality, and he means shadow in 
a neo-platonic sense. Edwards‘s types are images, ―used in a sort of figurative sense‖ to 
express spiritual things, but they are not merely metaphorical. ―The material world, and 
all things pertaining to it,‖ he writes in ―Images,‖ ―is by the Creator wholly subordinated 
to the spiritual and moral world.‖34 This hierarchy means that spiritual truths inhere in 
material things. Against Locke, Edwards argues that words are inherently imbued with 
the representation of particular things. The difficulty is reading that connection. 
―Images of Divine Things‖ is devoted to reading these inherent truths, and it 
contains a systemized hermeneutic for discerning the divine in the natural world. The 
manuscript‘s alternative title, ―The Language and Lessons of Nature,‖ suggests a 
theorization of language that overshadows Edwards‘s worry that ―words are the enemies 
of mankind.‖ He understood the types in the natural world as signs, a system of language, 
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by which humanity accesses God‘s communication of his own being: ―The works of God 
are but a kind of voice or language of God, to instruct intelligent beings in things 
pertaining to himself.‖35 Certainly, this language is not perfect; again, Edwards argued 
that only the extraordinary work of the Spirit could excite actual ideas in the mind. But if, 
as Edwards argues, the lessons of nature are empirically legible through the natural 
senses—if not fully apprehensible as ideas—human language must, too, be able to 
capture the spiritual truth that even man-made objects reflect.  
In ―Images of Divine Things,‖ Edwards quotes George Turnbull‘s The Principle 
of Moral Philosophy to support his own argument that ―external things are intended to be 
images of things spiritual, moral and divine.‖36 Turnbull espouses a similar position—
that moral objects are ―clothed with a sensible form or image, and represented to us as it 
were in a material shape and hue.‖37 The material world is a manifestation of true 
(spiritual) substance. Edwards quotes Turnbull further:  
not only are wit and poetry owned to take place only in consequence of 
this analogy or resemblance of moral and natural ideas; but even all 
language is confessed to be originally taken from sensible objects, or their 
properties and effects….Words cannot express any moral objects, but by 
exciting pictures of them in our minds. But all words being originally 
expressive of sensible qualities, no words can express moral ideas, but so 
far as there is such an analogy betwixt the natural and moral world.
38
 
Turnbull reads language itself as a type, reasoning back from language to the nature of 
the universe. Edwards does not suggest that language is a type, but it does work like a 
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type. In Miscellany no. 782 Edwards writes that the signs we ―substitute in the room of 
the actual ideas themselves‖ are ―the ideas of some external sensible thing that some way 
belongs to the thing, some sensible image or resemblance, or some sensible part, or some 
sensible effect.‖39 The names of things do have some relationship to the material qualities 
of the thing, or the material qualities of some analogous thing. 
In ―The Mind,‖ Edwards more fully articulates the cosmological foundation for 
his typology: the ―corporeal world is to no advantage but to the spiritual,‖ he writes, 
arguing that true substance is ―the infinitely exact and precise and perfectly stable idea in 
God‘s mind together with his stable will.‖40 In other words, the world exists as ideas in 
God‘s mind. However, as Jasper Reid points out in ―Jonathan Edwards on Space and 
God,‖ this does not mean that bodies (those excited by God‘s mind) do not exist outside 
of the mind. In ―The Mind‖ no. 51 Edwards writes that when he says ―the material 
universe exists only in the mind, I mean that it is absolutely dependent on the conception 
of the mind for its existence.‖41 For Edwards, Reid argues, the world exists in God‘s will, 
or in ―God‘s volition to arrange ideas—created ideas, that is—in certain particular 
patterns in our minds.‖42 Reid‘s argument for Edwards‘s conception of the divine will 
reinforces his interpretation of Edwards as an immaterialist, but it also implicitly 
refocuses our attention on the status of the material in Edwards‘s philosophy. The 
material world is a shadow of immaterial substance; the immaterial is more substantial 
than the material; and the material world is read through sensory experience. In ―The 
Mind‖ no. 13, when arguing that the universe exists in God‘s mind, or will, Edwards 
writes ―That which truly is the substance of all bodies […] shall gradually be 
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communicated to us, and to other minds, according to fixed and exact established 
methods and laws.‖43 Because the natural world is God‘s language about and to himself, 
and human language is derived from the natural world, there is some connection, 
however shadowy, between God‘s essential communicative nature and human language.  
God‘s essential quality of communicativeness was never far from Edwards‘s 
mind, and ―The Mind‖ and ―Images,‖ taken together, establish a system for reading 
God‘s communication of himself in the material world, allowing human minds to 
apprehend ideas by natural law and its attending epistemologies as well as spiritual 
methods and laws. If the material world gives humans access to the spiritual, then 
language—derived from the material world—must be, at least in part, able to 
communicate something of the spiritual. Language, then, is saved from clouding the 
world in two respects. It works like Edwards‘s typology: words are images of ideas just 
as material things are images of spiritual ideas. And words themselves are natural, 
connected to the natural world in such a way that they work like simple ideas. So, 
Edwards returns to Locke, writing in Religious Affections that ―Ideas of certain marks 
upon paper, such as any of the twenty-four letters, in whatever order, or any sounds of the 
voice, are as much external ideas, as of any other shapes or sounds whatsoever.‖44 Words, 
then, can act as external ideas. If words communicate simple ideas it would make sense 
within Edwards‘s philosophical universe that words would be inadequate for 
communicating spiritual, or sublime, things to the mind, but the relationship between the 
material and immaterial means that those material or sensible qualities that generate 
language are shadows—though but shadows—of moral truths. Words become extensions 
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of the natural world. By accepting language as part of the natural world (re Locke) and by 
understanding the natural world as the shadowy reflection of the divine, Edwards 
constructs an epistemology that is connected to and grounded in experience. And by 
accepting from Locke the notion that words exist in order to communicate ideas in the 
speaker‘s mind, Edwards ameliorates the gap between text and experience.45 
In ―Images,‖ Edwards makes a direct comparison between typological images and 
the words of language:  
I expect by very ridicule and contempt to be called a man of a very fruitful 
brain and copious fancy, but they are welcome to it. I am not ashamed to 
own that I believe that the whole universe, heaven and earth, air and seas, 
and the divine constitution and history of the holy Scriptures, be full of 
images of divine things, as full as language is of words.
46
 
That Edwards opens this claim with an anticipation of ridicule suggests his awareness of 
the novelty of his typology, as others have noted, though very little has been made of the 
comparison Edwards makes here.
47
 The analogy Edwards draws between the ―whole 
universe‖ and language suggests that language can function like Edwards‘s universe: 
words as signs, though human constructs, can represent actual ideas of a spiritual nature. 
Edwards‘s concerns about the imperfections and abuses of language appeared most often 
when he was combating bad theology or attempting to describe particularly complicated 
aspects of his philosophy. Worries about language expressed in such texts have 
dominated critical perceptions of Edwards on language, but Edwards did express hope in 
the ability of language to capture the divine.
48
 In ―Images‖ Edwards makes an essential 
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comparison between his typology and language: the world is as full of images as 
language is of words. For Edwards, the material universe consists in images; it is only 
images. Just as words are images. The material universe and language work in just the 
same way. 
Edwards embraced Locke‘s idea of language as a human construct signifying ideas in 
the mind of the speaker, but he then merged it with his own belief that the material world 
is a kind of divine language, and he ended with a sense that language is a material 
reflection of immaterial truth. Part of Edwards‘s initial concern that words were 
incapable of expressing spiritual ideas came from his sense that language and experience 
did not always seem to match up, but his typology reveals a world in which experience 
occurs through signs; spiritual knowledge can be, at least partially, apprehended in signs 
and images, and words are such signs and images. Nothing suggested this to Edwards 
more strongly than his study of conversions and religious experiences during the Great 
Awakening. Edwards wrote several texts describing the experiences of converts as they 
were related to him, and he edited one diary—that of missionary to the Indians, David 
Brainerd. These texts influenced Edwards‘s understanding of the relationship between 
language and experience, reflected his philosophy of language and the material world, 
and informed his composition of sermons. Text and experience, the case histories 
demonstrate, need not be separated. Language is capable of capturing spiritual ideas.   
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III.  Let the Judicious Reader Observe: The Case Histories 
Language, Edwards argued, is material: a human construct, corporeal, and a 
shadow of spiritual substance. But as another image of divine things—even man-made 
things like clocks were images for Edwards—language had agency to instruct spiritually 
and to generate and reflect authentic religious experience. And Edwards waged spiritual 
war with material words. He introduces his Some Thoughts Concerning the Present 
Revival (1743) with a defense of the text itself as a published expression of his opinions 
on the awakening. Although he condemns ministers for supposing ―that they were the 
persons to whom it especially belonged to dictate, direct and determine,‖ he 
acknowledges the necessity of such expressions in tumultuous times.
49
 ―Private subjects 
offer their sentiments to the public from the press, concerning the management of the war 
with Spain,‖ he says, and the Great Awakening suggests New England is ―engaged in a 
more important war.‖50 Therefore, it is imperative that ―something should be published, 
to bring the affair in general […] under a particular consideration.‖51  
Some Thoughts was but one of the texts Edwards penned during and after the 
Great Awakening about the revivals, and it contains one of the several spiritual 
autobiographies or conversion narratives that have come to be known as his case 
histories. In A Faithful Narrative of the Surprising Work of God (1737) he describes the 
conversion experiences of Abigail Hutchinson and a child, Phebe Bartlet; in Some 
Thoughts he shares that of his wife, Sarah Edwards, though he disguises her identity by 
omitting any reference to name and gender; and in The Life of David Brainerd (1749) 
Edwards edits and annotates the missionary‘s diary.52 Edwards represents each of these 
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cases as exemplars of Christian experience, a particularly important task for him in light 
of the controversies and debates stimulated by the revivals over what constituted true 
conversion and piety. Edwards‘s goal in the case histories was to defend the ―raised 
affections‖ of the Great Awakening as not necessarily enthusiastic, and thus he describes 
the affective responses of Bartlett, Sarah Edwards, and Brainerd, among others, as 
examples of ―truly, holy and solid affections.‖53 The case histories demonstrate 
Edwards‘s philosophical arguments concerning the agency of material language. Words 
affect their hearers: bodies manifest these effects, and the act of writing one‘s experience 
is spiritually transformative. 
Though the case histories act as evidence for language‘s agency—the converts 
describe sermons and the biblical text as transformative, and these accounts are meant to 
correct wrong assumptions about the awakening and also transform their readers—they 
contain a tension between the material and immaterial. Each convert demonstrates a 
renewed focus on his or her spiritual state through a seeming unconcern for material life 
and a range of affective responses to spiritual realizations. David Brainerd, for example, 
writes again and again of trying to penetrate the immaterial world, and Phebe Bartlett 
tells her family that she has found God in heaven, adding that ―heaven was better than 
earth.‖54 Though the converts seem to reject the material world, the case histories reveal 
that religious experience is also material—or sensory—experience. As the converts 
undergo religious experience, their very bodies react. The immaterial subsumes the 
material, mirroring Edwards‘s cosmology: the universe exists as ideas excited by God‘s 
mind or will. As we have seen, it is this very philosophical perspective that allowed 
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Edwards to see the natural world as the language of God; God inscribes himself in the 
material world because communicativeness is his most essential attribute. The case 
histories are a rational companion to this: when God communicates, the body responds. 
God‘s language infuses bodies.  
Part of the exemplarity of these cases lies in the converts‘ realization that the 
supernatural is more substantial than what they can see, touch, and hear, but also that the 
supernatural is fundamentally something that can be seen, felt, and heard—that the 
immaterial could be sensibly experienced. Edwards believed the material world was but a 
shadow of immaterial substance, but he also believed it was an experimentally 
communicative and instructive shadow. During the Great Awakening, bodies were 
frequently targeted as sites of legibility—of hypocrisy or piety—but Edwards argues that 
those who ―are full of concern about the involuntary motions of the fluids and solids of 
men‘s bodies, and from thence full of doubts and suspicious of the cause‖ are ―out of the 
place that Christ has set them in.‖55 Edwards reprimands ministers who would seek 
concrete evidence of an individual‘s spiritual state in physical appearances and argues 
that the body is not a legible sign, but his case histories inevitably read bodies.  
The body is not a certain sign, Edwards writes in Religious Affections, but 
whatever occurs in the soul or mind will inevitably affect bodies: ―Such seems to be our 
nature, and such the laws of the union of soul and body, that there never is any case 
whatsoever, any lively and vigorous exercise of the will or inclination of the soul, without 
some effect on the body, in some alteration of the motion of its fluids, and especially of 
the animal spirits.‖56 This does not imply that the motions of the body‘s fluids are 
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therefore certain signs of spiritual authenticity, because the mind, and not the body, ―is 
the proper seat of the affections.‖57 The body‘s motions are only effects and are ―distinct 
from the affections.‖58 Edwards allows that bodily motions might be effects of something 
other than the lively operations of grace, such as a person‘s voluntary ―exercises‖ or, 
more dangerously, Satan‘s wiles. But in Religious Affections, as in the case histories, 
Edwards works to undermine the frequent accusations against any and all bodily 
exercises as manifestations of deceptive demons or deluded converts. In Some Thoughts, 
therefore, Edwards uses Sarah Edwards as an example of how right religious affections 
can and will affect the body materially: ―there is such a thing as having the bodily 
strength weakened by strong and vigorous exercises of love to‖ God.59 Like fire, wheels, 
and words, bodies are images of divine things. 
Edwards devotes much of Some Thoughts to the demonstration of this claim 
through the accumulation of small case histories, arguing that bodily effects occur 
because the spiritual world subsumes the material.
60
 The material world is not always 
perfectly legible, but it manifests God‘s movements; bodily effects can be signs of many 
things, but the body manifests whatever occurs in the mind and soul. Edwards‘s 
defensive acknowledgement of bodily affect soon becomes a full-fledged reading of 
Sarah‘s physical religious experience. In the section of Some Thoughts dedicated to her 
case, ―An Example of Evangelical Piety,‖ Edwards focuses heavily on the body, despite 
his earlier warning against this kind of faulty epistemological reasoning. He describes 
Sarah, though cloaked in anonymity, dwelling ―in that clear and lively view and sense of 
the infinite beauty and amiableness of Christ‘s person‖: 
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the soul remained in a kind of heavenly Elysium […] without being in any 
trance, or being at all deprived of the exercise of the bodily senses […] 
being frequently attended with very great effects on the body, nature often 
sinking under the weight of divine discoveries, the strength of the body 
taken away, so as to deprive of all ability to stand or speak; sometimes the 
hands clinched, and the flesh cold, but senses still remaining; animal 
nature often in a great emotion and agitation, and the soul very often, of 
late, so overcome with great admiration, and a kind of omnipotent joy, as 
to cause the person (wholly unavoidably) to leap with all the might.
61
  
The language of bodily experience overtakes the description of Sarah‘s spiritual 
perception, and Edwards demonstrates how her religious experience has transformed her 
senses: she now has a ―clear and lively view‖ of spiritual things. Her view of the spiritual 
world is even more substantial than her bodily senses, though Edwards qualifies that 
those are at work as well. A trance in which the bodily senses cease operating would 
suggest enthusiasm, and Edwards lists these bodily manifestations as evidence against 
enthusiasm. Sarah‘s bodily responses were not, he argues, ―attended […] with the least 
appearance of any laughter or lightness of countenance‖—commonly suspected as signs 
of enthusiasm—but ―have had abiding effects in the increase of the sweetness, rest and 
humility that they have left upon the soul.‖62 Although Edwards argues that he is not 
deducing authentic religious experience from these signs, by marshalling them as 
evidence for Sarah‘s character and true piety, he seems to. He is, instead, arguing that the 
body necessarily manifests the internal, spiritual state. 
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The various spiritual experiences and realizations Sarah has, such as an awareness 
of God‘s greatness or a sense of mourning for sin, are accompanied by bodily effects. As 
Edwards describes the ―increase‖ of Sarah‘s sense of ―divine views and divine love,‖ he 
mentions how it affects or overcomes her body no less than fifteen times in the space of a 
few paragraphs: ―The strength of the body very often taken away with a deep morning for 
sin;‖ a sense of God‘s wisdom that ―swallow[s] up the soul, and overcome[s] the strength 
of the body;‖ and a ―compassion […] to saints under darkness, so as to cause the body to 
faint‖ occurs in Sarah.63 Although Edwards reads Sarah‘s body, the body is not an 
epistemological site in the sense that it can be read as evidence of true piety, but is 
instead one more shadow of the supernatural. One more image of God at work.  
Edwards reads the body as a sign in the same manner in which he reads the fire as 
a shadow of hell. He continues by describing how Sarah‘s experience enables her to see 
the natural world as an image of the divine: she had ―a sight of the fullness and glorious 
sufficiency of Christ, that has been so affecting as to overcome the body: a constant 
immovable trust in God through Christ, with a great sense of his strength […] so that the 
everlasting mountains and perpetual hills have appeared as mere shadows to these 
things.‖64 This is the new sense at work: Sarah‘s vision recalibrates, and she sees the 
mountains as shadows of God‘s strength. In turn, Edwards‘s reads her overcome body as 
a shadow of God‘s glory. The material world is subordinated to the spiritual, but Sarah 
Edwards does not, as a result, reject the material world: ―High experiences and religious 
affections in this person have not been attended with any disposition at all to neglect the 
necessary business of a secular calling […] but worldly business has been attended with 
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great alacrity, as part of the service of God.‖65 Because the material world is subordinated 
to the spiritual, material business is always spiritual business. For Edwards, the revivals 
confirm his immaterialism: ―The New Jerusalem […] has begun to come down from 
heaven, and perhaps never were more of the prelibations of heaven‘s glory given upon 
earth.‖66 Heaven is better than earth, as Phebe Bartlett says. 
Heaven may well be better than earth, but Edwards was stuck on earth. Edwards‘s 
philosophy of language as man-made, material image was one way of bridging the gap 
between heaven and earth. His typology imagined an earth full of legible images of 
heaven, and the case histories represent that same paradigm in the language of 
experience. They are the chronicles of individuals experiencing God‘s 
communicativeness, and they demonstrate one manner in which language reaches toward 
heaven: by showing God‘s communicative movement through the body and capturing 
that movement in written language. The introduction to Some Thoughts is not simply a 
justification for the text that follows; Edwards lays out an argument for the role of texts in 
public controversy. Texts, like Pierpont‘s sermons, do things. In and through them, wars 
are waged, individuals are transformed, and bodies are moved.  
An individual‘s own words, ostensibly unmediated by meddling authorities, have 
an even greater ability to effect such transformation. Edwards often represents the case 
studies as dictations, suggesting the transparency of language and erasing his own strong 
editorial presence. His Life of Brainerd is even more suggestively transparent; it is, after 
all, a diary. Edwards instructs the reader that he or she will see in the Life ―not only what 
were the external circumstances and remarkable incidents‖ of Brainerd‘s life, but also 
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―what passed in his own heart, the wonderful change that he experienced in his mind.‖67 
Although Edwards believed all of his case histories would set right wrong opinions or aid 
in saints‘ self-reflection, he attached special privilege to the Life. His prefatory remark 
that Brainerd wrote the diary for his ―own private use‖ suggests that Brainerd‘s own 
language could transparently represent his heart, mind, and affections, and it ostensibly 
erases Edwards‘s presence.  
Like Some Thoughts and A Faithful Narrative, The Life was meant to act as a 
concrete example of true and false religious experiences.
68
 Brainerd had come through 
the fire of the Great Awakening‘s more dangerous enthusiasms and its ―extraordinary 
effects‖ into a ―solid piety.‖69 In his preface, Edwards writes that Brainerd was not 
subject to affections that were merely ―strong impressions on the imagination,‖ because 
he distinguished between those and ―rational and scriptural‖ affections.70 Because of his 
experiments in enthusiasm while at Yale, Edwards argued, Brainerd was keenly 
discerning. When George Whitefield preached at New Haven, even singling out Yale for 
its spiritual deadness, Brainerd found himself moved in enthusiastical fashion. In the 
winter of 1741-2 Brainerd was overheard criticizing Yale‘s rector, Thomas Clap, for his 
opposition to the Awakening, and lambasting tutor, Chauncey Whittelsey, for having ―no 
more grace than a chair.‖71 To his life-long regret, Brainerd was expelled.  
The expulsion alone did not instigate his guilt over his indiscreet enthusiasm. 
Throughout The Life Brainerd bemoans his sinful inclinations—especially toward 
pride—and the trials of maintaining piety in a world so full of physical hardship, social 
distractions, ―party spirits‖ (enthusiasm), waning faith, and hardhearted sermon 
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audiences. Edwards‘s introductory remarks frame what will be a great theme of 
Brainerd‘s life: discernment between good and bad affections. Edwards introduces 
Brainerd in a way that seems directly pitched at the anti-revivalists: ―however undesirable 
the issue of the awakenings of that day have appeared in many others, there have been 
manifestly happy and abiding affects.‖72 Brainerd is an even stronger example than Sarah 
Edwards, whose religious experience began ―seven years before‖ the revivals, because he 
experienced ―lively actions of true grace‖ during the Great Awakening but later 
acknowledges ―that his religious experiences and affections‖ during the revival ―were not 
free from a corrupt mixture.‖73 The Life, then, acts as a model of piety in a context of 
great confusion and debate over what constituted true piety, but as both Edwards and 
Petit note, Brainerd was not a man without fault. Brainerd‘s melancholy, or ―morbid 
introversion,‖ distinguishes his case history from that of the others.74 
Norman Petit, editor of the Yale edition of The Life, suggests that Edwards goes 
to great lengths to dismiss Brainerd‘s melancholy, and Edwards does not make 
Brainerd‘s melancholy the focus of exemplarity, writing in his preface that Brainerd‘s 
melancholy is not a moral flaw and that it is not in any way tied to religious experience. 
Along with his introductory anticipations of Brainerd‘s melancholy, Edwards‘s editing 
practices reveal his resistance to Brainerd‘s affliction, as Petit remarks: ―When Brainerd 
too vividly describes his thoughts, or shows a self-concern that Edwards deems extreme, 
the sentence of paragraph is dropped.  […] Because Brainerd frequently sank into deep 
despair, Edwards condensed certain passages and changed the wording. When Brainerd 
sank too low, the passage was simply left out.‖75 Others have agreed with Petit that 
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Brainerd‘s melancholy was an obstacle for Edwards, and because Edwards claimed that 
he compiled and edited Brainerd‘s diary as a model of faith, few have offered more 
complicated interpretations of the apparent conflicts between The Life and Edwards‘s 
own theology and philosophy. Though little has been written on Brainerd‘s melancholy 
within the body of Edwardsean scholarship, that which exists argues that Brainerd‘s 
melancholic spirit undermined Edwards‘s goals. David L. Weddle, in ―The Melancholy 
Saint‖ (1988) argues that ―Brainerd is, at best, an ambiguous example of Edwards‘s 
theology of religious experience‖ and his melancholy is ―out of harmony with Edwards‘s 
own analysis of religious experience.‖76And even Petit‘s more delicate reading suggests 
that Brainerd‘s melancholy was something Edwards hoped would not strike his readers as 
―out of harmony.‖ But Brainerd‘s melancholy was not at odds with Edwards‘s purpose in 
editing the diary: it enabled Edwards to combat prejudice against the revivals, because 
Brainerd suffered from melancholy and yet was not excited by ―enthusiastical 
imaginations.‖ 
Initially, Brainerd‘s melancholy does appear to undermine his exemplarity, but it 
ultimately reinforces Edwards‘s broader philosophy of religious experience and his 
typology. Brainerd yearns to ―penetrate the immaterial world‖ and bemoans the material 
realities of life as distractions from true piety. He describes a moment during prayer: ―I 
think my soul scarce ever penetrated so far into the immaterial world in any one prayer 
that I ever made, nor were my devotions ever so much refined and free from gross 
conceptions and imaginations framed from beholding material objects. […] I have reason 
to think that my religion is become more refined and spiritual.‖77 Penetrating the 
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immaterial world, Brainerd feels freed from his distracting physical senses, which he 
thinks induce dangerous or enthusiastic ideas. While preaching in Greenwhich, New 
Jersey, Brainerd learns of a sick man on the verge of death, rides to visit him, and prays 
with the mourners when the man dies—all typical activities for a minister. But this event 
especially distresses Brainerd. Meditating on the reality of death, which had never 
―appeared more real to me,‖ Brainerd envisions himself in death: ―I saw myself in the 
condition of a dead corpse, laid out and dressed for a lodging in the silent grave. […] I 
never felt such an universal mortification to all created objects. Oh, how great and solemn 
it appeared to die! Oh, how it lays the greatest honor in the dust! And oh, how vain and 
trifling did the riches, honors, and pleasures of the world appear!‖78 The ―universal 
mortification to all created objects‖ that reveals itself to Brainerd in this moment marks 
his entire existence. This is in stark contrast to Edwards‘s instance, throughout Some 
Thoughts, that Sarah‘s religious experiences never implied a separation from bodily 
existence or a rejection of the material business of life. And it seems to undermine 
Edwards‘s own sense of the instructive quality of the natural world developed in his 
typology.  
Yet Brainerd‘s melancholic view of the natural world—his disdain for nature and 
his own body—suggest the very connectedness of body and mind that Edwards argues 
for in Religious Affections and demonstrates in Some Thoughts. Brainerd writes that his 
physical journeys to and from Stockbridge tax his soul, not just his body. And Edwards 
observes that Brainerd‘s ―great bodily weakness‖ and ―exceeding painfulness in religion‖ 
occur simultaneously.
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 Brainerd‘s journeys wore heavily on his already weak body, and 
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Edwards comments on one such journey that Brainerd ―fear[ed] that the diversions of it 
would prove a means of cooling his religious affections, as he had found in other 
journeys.‖80 When Brainerd‘s faith wanes, his body fails; when his faith is strong, so is 
his body. His body manifests internal spiritual experiences; they are written on the body. 
The Life, then, reinforces the philosophy of Edwards‘s typology: the material world is 
full of signs of the immaterial world.  
The Life documents a world of experience in which internal, spiritual experiences 
are written on the body, but Brainerd‘s melancholy serves Edwards an additional 
purpose. Edwards argues that Brainerd displays careful discernment that grows deeper 
through the regular practice of self-examination in writing. ―Tis a rare thing indeed, that 
melancholy people are well sensible of their own disease,‖ Edwards writes, but Brainerd 
―gained it gradually,‖ as the diary demonstrates.81 Early on, Brainerd ―had so little 
opportunity for reading, observation and experience,‖ Edwards explains, that it is not 
surprising that he ―should for a while be dazzled and deceived with the glaring 
appearances of that mistaken devotion and zeal‖ (94). But it will be ―easy for the 
judicious reader to observe‖ that Brainerd grows ―more and more distinguishing in his 
judgment‖ (96). The diary itself was an essential instrument of this discernment, as 
Edwards hoped it would be for all its readers. The text of the diary demonstrates 
Brainerd‘s growth into discernment. He writes of his youthful enthusiasm and spiritual 
struggle that he ―was not yet effectually and experimentally taught that there could be no 
way prescribed whereby a natural man could, of his own strength, obtain that which is 
supernatural.‖82 Brainerd‘s awareness of his own spiritual and physical weaknesses 
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matures as we see him, late in the Life, acknowledging that his lack of fervency in prayer 
―was very much owing to my bodily weakness‖ and not spiritual defect.83 The Life 
records a connection between religious experience and text: text reflects, authenticates, 
and deepens experience.  
Edwards‘s Life chronicles the trial and experience of religious life. It models the 
religious experience of every reader—the cycle of faith and doubt every individual 
striving for piety will encounter—and Brainerd‘s inclination towards melancholy makes 
that tension more intense. The entries record his struggle to overcome all obstacles to 
piety, and Edwards often breaks in to highlight the tension between faith and 
despondence. After a June 8, 1742 entry, for example, Edwards writes that Brainerd, for 
the three following days, ―complains of desertion and want of fervency in religion; but 
yet his diary shows that every day his heart was engaged in religion, as his great and as it 
were only business.‖84 Though Brainerd‘s bodily strength waned and his spiritual doubt 
grew, his diary acts as a tool of self-examination and a site of religious experience. On 
November 2, 1743, Brainerd writes of his intense pain and loneliness while ministering at 
Stockbridge. But, in the act of recording these events in his diary, Brainerd pauses: ―But 
blessed be the Lord […] I have a house and many of the comforts of life to support me,‖ 
and ―some sense of [God‘s] presence.‖85 The reader sees Brainerd working out his faith 
through the act of writing—much as Sarah Pierpont does. Edwards fully intended the Life 
to act as an example of spiritual life but also as an example of how to experience that life 
and interpret that experience. Brainerd was one who was knowledgeable, Edwards tells 
the readers, ―especially in things appertaining to inward experimental religion,‖ and 
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models right interpretation of religious experience.
86
 The manuscript of the diary opens 
with Brainerd‘s accounts of his early life and conversion, and he begins where Edwards 
began, with a claim that the diary records private, internal experiences: ―For my own 
private satisfaction, etc (may it likewise be for the glory of God) I make the following 
remarks upon the various scenes of my life.‖87 Edwards, for one, believed the diary did 
glorify God and act as a material tool of spiritual growth, for Brainerd and for his readers. 
Brainerd was an ideal example of true piety for Edwards because he was both an 
―eminent person[]‖ and an ‗eminent teacher:‖ Brainerd offers the world ―confirmation of 
the truth, efficacy, and amiableness of the religion taught, in the practice of the same 
persons that have most clearly and forceably taught it.‖88 Brainerd was an example of 
what Edwards calls, in a 1744 ordination sermon for Robert Abercrombie, both a shining 
and a burning light: a preacher of doctrine and an example of one who has experienced 
and lives God‘s power. These two characteristics made for an effective minister, Edwards 
believed, and he strove to emulate this in his own preaching. 
 
IV. Words Burning and Shining: Edwards’s Sermons 
The Life of David Brainerd and other case histories bridged the gap between text 
and experience by demonstrating experience that was manifested externally, reflected in 
language, and transformative for its readers. But the sermon was the most important text 
of religious experience, and Edwards worked, first and foremost, to bridge text and 
experience in his preaching. Text, experience, and theology are fused in the linguistic 
character of Edwards‘s sermons. He hoped his sermons encoded an epistemology in 
194 
 
which both the spoken and printed text retained immediacy to God‘s Spirit. The revival 
context in which Edwards worked out his philosophy was fraught with concerns about 
hypocrisy, enthusiasm, false prophets, and emotionally-charged lay and itinerant 
preaching, and Edwards‘s system for understanding, reading, and communicating 
individual religious experience forged a middle ground between the extremes of these 
responses. Although he searched for such an ordered system, Edwards concluded—in 
accordance with his Puritan predecessors—that external signs were effects, rather than 
conditions, of saving grace.
89
 Hypocrisy, in other words, was not always legible.  
This put the sermon in a tricky place: it was composed of man-made words but 
ideally composed through the assistance and inspiration of the Spirit, and it should ideally 
(working like the biblical text) communicate God‘s revelations without much interruption 
and confusion. In addition, Edwards needed to avoid charges that his sermons were 
merely inducing enthusiasm while he held to the claim that sermons should generate 
affective responses. These tactical challenges were not new to Edwards, but they were 
important to the hell-fire preaching in which he engaged at his Newhampton church. 
Solomon Stoddard was pastor of the Northampton congregation until 1729, when he died 
and passed the position to his grandson, Jonathan Edwards. Stoddard heavily influenced 
Edwards‘s sermonic philosophy—most importantly, his emphasis on the experience of 
conversion and his use of rhetoric.
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 As Wilson H. Kimnach argues, ―in the hands of 
Stoddard,‖ the plain style sermon form ―had become a finely tuned instrument of 
psychological manipulation. […] For Stoddard, rhetoric was power.‖91 The hell-fire 
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sermon, most prevalent around the awakenings in the 1710s, for Stoddard, and in the 
Great Awakening, for Edwards, was the most obvious and effective of such instruments. 
But manipulation was not the way Stoddard would have described his rhetoric; he 
desired to transmit an authentic experience to his auditors. Like Pierpont, he understood 
the value of both tradition and experience, but elevated the latter. Stoddard‘s sermons 
inculcated terror in his congregation, but they did not arouse the fear of hell because they 
demonstrated with reasonable proof but because they awakened the soul to new 
experiential realities. ―Wit and eloquence,‖ obtained through learning, could not 
communicate saving grace or God‘s presence, but an experience of God, Stoddard 
argued, would ―set the Consciences of Men on fire.‖92 Stoddard wrote several sermons 
intended to awaken both sermon-givers and sermon-hearers to this important argument. 
The Presence of Christ with the Ministers (1718), for example, argues that only the 
minister with experimental knowledge of God can communicate powerfully through the 
medium of the sermon. Tradition is not meaningless, but only experimental knowledge 
can make the minister‘s words resonate with the auditor. This privileging of experience 
could, of course, lead to dangerous enthusiasms, but Stoddard was no enthusiast, and he 
asked his auditors to hear sermons with a cautious ear and to read their own experiences 
with careful discernment.  
In Stoddard‘s view, the sermon was, aside from the Bible, the main channel for 
accessing God‘s communications, and in his 1724 sermon, The Defects of Preachers 
Reproved, he demanded that ministers obtain an experimental faith if they were to have 
any success in the pulpit, lambasting those ministers who believed learning and 
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eloquence would have true or lasting spiritual efficacy. The opening letter to the reader 
sounds in many respects like a typical Congregationalist preaching discourse, but the 
circumstances surrounding Stoddard‘s composition of the sermon change the tenor. The 
sermon about sermons had been a standard genre for a long while when Stoddard 
preached The Defects, but previous sermons were usually limited to reprimanding bad 
preachers and preparing the auditors for right hearing. Stoddard added to this what he 
saw as a more essential focus on the difference between preaching and teaching: good 
sermons did not make good preaching. This distinction rests, for Stoddard, on experience: 
―some Preachers are men of Learning & Moral men‖ but ―they want Experience.‖93 A 
good preacher must be able to ―speak exactly and experimentally to such things as Souls 
want to be instructed in‖; experience alone ―fits men to Teach others.‖94 But Stoddard 
also speaks about experimental knowledge of faith in general, for the auditors and not 
just the orators of sermons. Those who receive their religion from their ―fore-fathers by 
Tradition‖ have religion only by ―hear-say,‖ Stoddard writes, and thus have false faith.95 
Religion embraced by the understanding only, bypassing the will, is false exactly because 
it is not experimental. As an example of true faith, distinguished from religion received 
by tradition, Stoddard writes that figurative expressions of faith, such as ―coming to 
Christ,‖ ―do imply not only an act of the Understanding, but also an act of the Will.‖96 
Stoddard seems to see in these expressions—―opening to [Christ]…flying to Him for 
Refuge, building on Him‖—an active agency on the part of the faithful.97 Yet this 
attribution of agency is at odds with Stoddard‘s doctrine: individuals receive grace from 
God, and nothing in their own strength can earn or achieve it. Stoddard is clear to whom 
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agency is granted: ―Justifying faith is wrought in men by the mighty Power of God,‖ he 
writes in the following paragraph.
98
 This apparent contradiction is resolved, though, in 
the space of figurative language.  
The figurative phrases Stoddard lists do attribute agency to the individual 
―feeding‖ on Christ, but what Stoddard emphasizes here is action over understanding. 
Faith, he argues, is a ―living principle,‖ and figurative language captures experience over 
reason. These figurative expressions are the sole example of true faith Stoddard names in 
opposition to some ministers‘ ―wrong account of the nature of justifying faith.‖99 To use 
and appreciate these figurative expressions of faith, Stoddard suggests, one must have 
experimental knowledge of flying to, building on, or sitting under Christ. Otherwise, they 
convey understanding without holiness, reason without experience. Stoddard‘s sermonic 
theory emphasized the inefficacy of reasoned argument in securing sanctifying faith, but 
this did not imply that rhetoric had no relationship to experimental faith. Defects opposes 
reason to revelation in a fairly conventional manner, arguing that faith comes through 
revelation and not through reason: 
Men cannot believe […] upon probable Arguments: Probable Arguments 
must be looked on but as Probable and not Convincing. Men must have 
infallible Arguments for loving God and believing His Word; the 
foundation of Believing the Divine Authority of the Scripture, is the 
manifestation of the Divine Glory in them. There is a Self-evidencing 
Light in the Works of God […] so there is a Self-evidencing light in the 
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Word of God; there are such things Revealed there as can be made known 
by none but God.
100
 
Infallible arguments are necessary for faith, but these come through the ―self-evidencing 
light‖ of scriptural revelation. Only God can make himself known, but he does so through 
his Word and Works in an empirically accessible manner. This is not the empiricism of 
reason, but of revelation, and the self-evident light of the Word is that to which the will 
assents. The understanding is a sign of true grace only when accompanied by the 
witnessed self-evidence.  
Experimental faith, then, was at the root of Stoddard‘s argument in these sermons, 
and he had clear faith that sermons could inculcate experience. Stoddard concludes 
Defects with a reinstatement of his conviction that the minister‘s calling is ―to set the 
Consciences of Men on fire:‖ ―Experience shews that Sermons Read are not so Profitable 
as others. It may be Argued, that it is harder to remember Rhetorical Sermons, than meer 
Rational Discourses; but it may be Answered, that it is far more Profitable to Preach in 
the Demonstration of the Spirit, than with the enticing Words of mans wisdom.‖101 The 
wit and eloquence of rhetoric that Stoddard opposes to effective sermons in the earlier 
quotation from The Presence of Christ here become tools of the Spirit. Rhetorical 
sermons are preferable to persuasive arguments read from the pulpit, because rhetoric can 
stir the emotions. But the ―enticing Words of man‘s wisdom‖ are unprofitable compared 
to preaching ―in the demonstration of the Spirit,‖ which, in the world of Stoddard‘s 
Defects at least, requires rhetoric. Thus, even as Stoddard creates an opposition between 
rhetoric and ―wit and eloquence‖ or ―enticing words,‖ he also makes the case that 
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rhetoric and preaching in the Spirit are kin.  By this seeming inconsistency, Stoddard 
means that the Spirit instills in inspired sermons a power in language otherwise absent. 
This empowered language communicates experience to the auditor. 
 Edwards‘s approach to sermonic rhetoric did not deny this empowered language, 
but unlike Stoddarean preaching, Edwardsean sermons relied on the power of the 
reasoned argument and a natural empirical experience. Edwards learned from Stoddard 
the experimental purchase of figurative language, but he carried it further by organizing 
his sermons around single metaphors and incorporating their use into his larger 
philosophy of religious experience: figurative language offered sensory experience to 
sermon audiences. Edwards, like Stoddard, saw rhetoric as a tool of the spirit, and he 
relied on figurative language to address the heart. But he combined the strategies learned 
from his grandfather with a belief in the value of reason: an effective minister was not 
just a burning light; he should also be a shining light and instruct the mind. The Spirit 
moving through his words enacted change, but the words themselves were essential. 
In his Warnings of Future Punishment (1727), a sermon squarely within the hell-
fire genre, Edwards argues that the reality of hell has to be realized in the audience 
through evidence. People dismiss the fear of hell, the sermon states, because it does not 
―seem real to them,‖ and it does not seem real because they do not have a ―sensible idea 
or apprehension of it.‖102 The Edwardsean hell-fire sermon presented the sensible 
experience of hell, and Edwards‘s philosophy of language meant that the words of the 
sermon were capable of provide this experience. The sermon gave the audience a sensible 
idea, or experience, of hell, therefore inculcating belief based on evidence, not just 
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tradition and example. We find ourselves, then, returning to Sarah Pierpont‘s 
categorization of faith into tradition and trial. Both Edwards and Stoddard believed the 
sermon‘s role was both experimental and traditional. But Edwards, unlike Stoddard, 
combined the reasoned argument with Stoddard‘s hell-fire sensory rhetoric to transmit 
experience to his auditors.
103
  
That said, Edwards worried that those who doubted the reality of hell did so 
precisely because they relied too much on sensory experience to determine truth: ―they 
have been used to concern themselves only about sensible things, and used to depend on 
their senses only; and therefore nothing seems real to them but what is sensible. The 
business of their life has been about things that they can see and hear and feel and taste. 
[…] They have tied down their minds to such objects of their senses.‖104 Yet Edwards 
does not attempt to change the epistemological mechanism on which his target audience 
relies; instead he says the sermon‘s goal is to ―make future punishment seem real to you: 
first, to make you really believe that there is such a thing; and second, that you may have 
a more lively sensible apprehension of it.‖105 After making a rational case for the 
existence of hell, Edwards describes it in concrete details (fire, scorpions, lack of water), 
in order to give his auditors a ―lively sensible apprehension.‖ In this early sermon we can 
see the beginnings of Edwards‘s philosophy of sensory experience concerning things 
immaterial. He worries that his auditors have ―tied down their minds‖ by relying on 
sensible things only, yet he makes the case that hell also reveals itself to the mind as 
sensible objects do. This works because hell was a material reality for Edwards; it was 
true substance.  
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The work of the sermon, then, according to Warnings of Future Punishments, is 
that of presenting sensible evidence of spiritual, moral, and divine realities. Reason and 
evidence, Edwards argues outside Warnings, are not sufficient for the human mind to 
apprehend spiritual ideas, but the natural workings of the mind are still necessary: the 
mind can receive speculative, sensible knowledge of spiritual realities.
106
 The sermon 
helps in this regard by transmitting reasonable arguments in language (tradition) and 
presenting the fodder for sensory experience (trial).   
The paradigm Edwards establishes in Warnings is evident in many of his 
sermons. As Wilson H. Kimnach argues in his ―General Introduction‖ to the Yale series 
of Edwards‘s sermons, Edwards used imagery as a vehicle for ―immediacy‖ and 
―meaning.‖ Kimnach writes that images offered Edwards a solution to what I call the gap 
between experience and language: ―Imagery, fused metaphorically to abstract concepts, 
would touch the mind of the auditor as surely as an ‗immediate sensation‘ […] A well-
chosen image could transform thought into experience and neatly fix the most 
paradoxical of concepts.‖107 Kimnach implies that Edwards‘s typology poses this 
solution, but he still sees Edwards as full of ―doubts about the adequacy of words.‖ 
Certainly, Edwards always had doubts: his Newhampton congregation always returned to 
their hard hearts, and his expulsion from the church in 1750 once again gave him pause 
over his own oratorical skills. But the images Edwards deployed in his sermons were 
words, and he believed those words were capable of doing things. Warnings uses images 
to make the terrors of hell sensory and therefore real, like the image of ―these roaring 
lions dare then lay hold as it were with open mouths‖ to the souls of sinners.108 Or, more 
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famously, Edwards employs the image of the spider suspended above a pit in Sinners in 
the Hands of an Angry God. These and like images reach the listeners‘ hearts, arouse the 
fear of hell, and thus ―lure‖ them into heaven.109 But Edwards also firmly believed that 
the minister had a duty to educate his congregation, to instruct them in doctrine as well as 
arouse their emotions. The combination of these two purposes makes a minister‘s words 
effective. 
Edwards‘s 1744 sermon The True Excellency of a Minister of the Gospel offers an 
argument about the efficacy of ministry that explains how reason and passion work 
together in the sermon to make language productive for salvation. Edwards‘s text is John 
5:35: ―He was a burning and shining light,‖ referring to John the Baptist, a ―harbinger of 
the gospel day [who] excelled all the other prophets.‖110 Edwards uses John as an 
example of how all ministers should be both burning and shining lights. Ministers are, 
Edwards writes, like the moon and stars to the sun of Christ, and therefore their burning 
and shining lights are ―the communications and reflections of something of his 
brightness.‖111 A minister‘s burning light means ―that his heart be filled with much of the 
holy ardor of a spirit of true piety,‖ full of ―power and energy.‖ Thus, his preaching must 
be earnest and powerful, ―declar[ing] to sinners their misery, and warn[ing] them to fly 
from the wrath to come,‖ just as Sinners and Warnings do.112 But the minister must also 
shine, or guide and direct: he must ―be pure, clear and full in his doctrine,‖ which for 
Edwards means ―his instructions are clear and plain, accommodated to the capacity of his 
hearers, and tending to convey light to their understandings.‖113 This dual work of the 
sermon—to arouse the passions toward action and to direct the understanding—occurs in 
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language. As we have seen, Edwards relies on detailed descriptions and figurative images 
to speak to the heart, arousing terror. But those images also work on the understanding 
because they provide a kind of sensory experience.  
Words, for Edwards, were material signs of divine substance. And as such, they 
acted as sensory evidence for spiritual things, always pointing toward and arousing love 
for true substance, or God. Diaries, Edwards‘s written accounts of religious experience in 
the case histories, and sermons all demonstrate the philosophy of language Edwards 
establishes throughout his writings. Material words, written or spoken, act as fire, clocks, 
and flowers; they are shadows of the divine.
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Coda 
After Edwards: The Bodily Language of George Whitefield 
 Most studies that trace sermonic or popular religious rhetoric through Edwards‘s 
lifetime argue that an important shift occurred during the Great Awakening. Most often, 
this shift is defined as a burgeoning American evangelicalism that emphasized experience 
over reason or the text. Many scholars see extemporaneous preaching, preaching without 
preparation and relying on the immediate inspiration of the Spirit, as the agent and 
embodiment of this shift. Sandra Gustafson, for example argues that ―the 
extemporaneous ideal required the speaker to inhabit Scripture fully and personally 
experience its meaning‖; extemporaneous sermons revealed ―an unmediated access to 
truth.‖1 Thomas Kidd‘s recent narrative of the Great Awakening also stresses the 
individual‘s experience of salvation. He opens The Great Awakening: The Roots of 
Evangelical Christianity in Colonial America with these words: ―To expect revival, one 
had to experience despair.‖2  
 These and related narratives assume that experience was a category not 
emphasized as adamantly in orthodox forms of colonial religion before the outbreak of 
revivals.
3
 Even if they locate the beginnings of evangelicalism in the late seventeenth-
century, as Kidd does, they see the extemporaneity of the Great Awakening as inducing 
experiential faith in a novel way.
4
 But throughout this dissertation, I have argued that 
experience was always thought to be essential to early American religion. The Great 
Awakening did see a shift in the nature of that experience, but evangelicalism was not 
more experiential than the Congregationalism before it. Though experience had always 
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defined religious faith and had always been essential to the sermon, the character of 
sermon delivery did change in the Awakening.
5
 George Whitefield, the Grand Itinerant of 
the Great Awakening, introduced a sermonic style that would characterize American 
evangelicalism through the twentieth-century. Here I will briefly treat Whitefield‘s 
sermonic theory to suggest one of the ways in which the narrative of the sermon and 
religious experience I have traced changes after Edwards. 
 To set the scene: in The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, The 
African, Equiano chances by a church where ―a number of people were even mounted on 
ladders, looking in at the windows.‖6 The event he witnesses here is a sermon given by 
George Whitefield, the fiery revivalist and famous Great Awakening preacher. Equiano 
presses into the church, interested in witnessing for himself the performance of this man 
whom he had ―wished to see and hear.‖ The one impression Equiano shares about 
Whitefield focuses on his bodily, physical presence and not on his sermon itself: ―I saw 
this pious man exhorting the people with the greatest fervour and earnestness, and 
sweating as much as I ever did while in slavery at Montserrat beach.‖7 Whitefield 
preached to crowds reaching numbers in the thousands. He often preached outdoors, and 
he preached itinerantly—in various locations without a home church. These 
characteristics distinguished Whitefield from previous preachers, yet the philosophy 
underlying these changes is usually characterized as one emphasizing the experiential. 
But this characteristic was not new to Whitefield. What was actually occurring in the 
very theatrical, bodily, and public space of Whitefield‘s pulpit that changed the nature of 
religious experience for the audience? The complicated rhetorical relationships between 
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minister, word, and lay listener were negotiated through the audience‘s act of witnessing 
and through Whitefield‘s body, not through words and rhetoric as it was for Cotton or 
Edwards. 
 By shifting agency away from the spoken words of the minister to the experience 
of hearing, Whitefield demanded a more active participation from his audience. His 
Directions How to Hear Sermons (1740) theorizes the purposes of sermons and the role 
of preacher, God, and audience within the particular rhetorical situation of the sermon. 
Whitefield asks his audience ―not only to prepare your Hearts before you hear, but also to 
give diligent heed to the Things that are spoken‖ and to ―lend an attentive Ear to 
[Christ‘s‘] Ambassadors.‖8 Nothing Whitefield explicitly asks from his audience is 
substantially different than the work of preparation Shepard or Hooker asked of their 
congregants. Although Cotton, Shepard, Stoddard, and Edwards all asked their auditors 
to hear carefully, Whitefield‘s emphasis is different.  
Whitefield‘s voice was thunderous, and it was the voice and not the words 
themselves that he thought brought God and auditor together. Whitefield locates agency 
within the audience‘s attentiveness and in his own performance. For example, in the 
closing words of Directions Whitefield describes two types of hearers and suggests an 
agency grounded in the act of hearing: 
It does indeed sometimes happen that GOD to magnify his free Grace in 
CHRIST JESUS, is found of them that sought him not; a notorious Sinner 
is forcibly worked upon by a publick Sermon, and plucked as a Fire-brand 
out of the Fire. But this is not GOD‘S ordinary Way of acting.  No; for the 
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Generality, he only visits those with the Power of his Word, who humbly 
wait to know what he would have them to do. And sends unqualified 
Hearers not only empty, but hardened, away.
9
 
Agency is located within the listener‘s willingness, and without this openness the Word 
has no power to persuade. Whitefield assumes and bodily performs an immediacy that his 
Puritan forebears tried to achieve rhetorically.  
 Whitefield located religious experience in the act of hearing the minister‘s voice, 
and he dictated and modeled the kind of experience he argued that hearing would induce. 
He accomplished this through the bodily, performative spectacle of his preaching style.
10
 
His power proceeded not just from extemporaneity, because Whitefield‘s sermons were 
not always or truly spontaneous. As the Grand Itinerant, Whitefield repeated sermons 
over and over. In his Autobiography, Benjamin Franklin addresses Whitefield‘s practice 
of revisiting sermons:   
By hearing him often I came to distinguish easily between Sermons newly 
compos‘d, and those which he had often preach‘d in the Course of his 
Travels. His Delivery of the latter was so improv‘d by frequent 
Repetitions, that every Accent, every Emphasis, every Modulation of 
Voice, was so perfectly turn‘d and well plac‘d, that without being 
interested in the Subject, one could not help being pleas‘d with the 
Discourse […] This is an Advantage itinerant Preachers have over those 
who are stationary: as the latter cannot well improve their Delivery of a 
Sermon by so many Rehearsals.
11
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Franklin hears not an unmediated access to truth but a performance that improves with 
practice. This is hardly surprising given Franklin‘s disposition, but it does reveal 
extemporaneous preaching as not truly extemporary.  
Despite the repetition of sermons, the physical relationship between Whitefield 
and audience theoretically allowed for an authenticity and transparency in the rhetorical 
moment. Equiano focuses on the sweat pouring from Whitefield‘s body, not on the words 
of the sermon. And many have noted Whitefield‘s borrowings from the theatrical stage. 
The bodiliness of Whitefield‘s sermons mediates a new kind of relationship between 
speaker and audience; as a result of the theatrical spectacle, the distinction between 
speaker and audience collapses. Harry Stout comments on the physicality of Whitefield‘s 
preaching, arguing that ―[t]he effect of all of Whitefield‘s innovations was to free his 
body for performance, erasing all intermediaries between him and his audience. […] 
Oftentimes it was the audience who left emotionally drained and exhausted after a 
Whitefield revival.‖12 The audience reacts to Whitefield‘s performance with a 
reenactment, an authentically felt imitation that seems to remove all mediators between 
God and convert. 
 Whitefield‘s contemporaries were aware of the singularity of Whitefield‘s 
preaching style. Josiah Smith, minister during the Great Awakening and defender of 
Whitefield, describes the ―manner of [Whitefield‘s] preaching‖ as physical performance. 
Smith laments the inability of his pen to represent the ―action and gesture‖ of the Grand 
Itinerant; Whitefield‘s performance cannot be translated onto the printed page. Smith 
describes the reaction he witnesses in Whitfield‘s audiences: ―The Awe, the Silence, the 
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Attention, which sat upon the Face of so great an Audience, was an Argument, how he 
could reign over all their Powers.‖13 The evidence for power of Whitefield‘s preaching, 
Smith argues, is not in his listeners‘ conversion, but on their faces. Whitefield‘s ―reign 
over all their powers‖ also translated to the fainting, groaning, tears, and other external 
manifestations his audiences enacted. They respond to Whitefield‘s affective 
performance with their own bodily performance.
14
  
Franklin addresses the differing agency between Whitefield‘s writings and his 
spoken addresses: ―His Writing and Printing from time to time gave great Advantage to 
his Enemies. Unguarded Expressions and even erroneous Opinions [delivered] in 
Preaching might have been afterwards explain‘d, or qualify‘d,‖ and Franklin concludes 
that if Whitefield ―had never written any thing he would have left behind him a much 
more numerous and important Sect.‖15 Franklin repeatedly expressed amazement at the 
sheer power of Whitefield‘s voice to arouse fleeting emotions in the hearer, and he 
recognized the indelibility of the written word; Whitefield could never unsay what he 
printed. The printed word did not possess the power to disrupt the boundary between 
speaker and audience in the same manner as did Whitefield‘s visceral and affective voice. 
It was the bodily nature and theatrical power of Whitefield‘s sermons that disrupted the 
audience‘s ability to locate agency in the speaker or the Word and to simultaneously 
imitate the experience Whitefield modeled in the pulpit. 
In Religious Affections Jonathan Edwards establishes a philosophy of bodily 
affect: ―Such seems to be our nature, and such the laws of the union of soul and body, 
that there never is any case whatsoever, any lively and vigorous exercise of the will or 
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inclination of the soul, without some effect on the body, in some alteration of the motion 
of its fluids, and especially of the animal spirits‖ (98). Whitefield would have agreed, and 
this philosophy became the practice of his preaching. His affective performances in the 
pulpit and his audiences‘ bodily responses modeled Edwards‘s philosophy. Edwards, 
then, is a bridge between Whitefield‘s sermonic performance and earlier rhetorical efforts 
to narrow the distance between text and experience. While Edwards practiced a sermonic 
rhetoric that borrowed aspects from his Puritan predecessors, he diverged from them in 
his philosophy of religious affections. That philosophy, though, did not manifest itself in 
his preaching like it did in Whitefield‘s, and Edwards warned his congregants not to 
confuse the preacher and the message. In a 1740 sermon series on the parable of the 
sower from Mathew 13, Edwards advised his auditors:  
examine & try whether or no your Joy has only been that sort of Joy [that 
takes] more a delight in the manner of preaching than a Rejoicing in the 
thing Preached . was the pleasure you had principally in the Eloquence & 
aptness […] fervency & becoming de livery of the speaker more than in 
the divine Excellency of the things that were spoken.
16
  
Edwards implies that Whitefield‘s success was due to the fervent manner of his 
preaching, not to the sermon‘s message. Yet without Edwards‘s philosophy, Whitefield‘s 
performances in the pulpit would have had much less success, and would have received 
even more criticism than they did. If the preachers, laypeople, and thinkers traced 
throughout this dissertation were always worried that language would be an obstacle to 
an immediate experience of God, Whitefield was unconcerned about language as a 
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barrier to immediate divine experience. Language essentially disappeared in the body of 
the preacher.
17
  
Language falls away as a mediator or vehicle in tension with the experience, 
because Whitefield‘s body performs a natural, not linguistic language.18 At some point in 
the conversion process language fails, and bodily, emotional response is the only possible 
response. Whitefield‘s bodily performance replaces language. This is an obvious shift 
away from the kind of physical presence William Perkins suggested in The Art of 
Prophesying, where he warned ministers to be grave in their gestures: ―It is fit therefore, 
that the trunke or stalke of the bodie being erect and quiet, all the other parts, as the arme, 
the hand, the face and eyes have such motions, as may express and (as it were) utter the 
godly affections of the heart.‖19 Each small physical movement was calculated to 
correspond to the message but never to distract from it. But in Whitefield‘s sermons, the 
movement was the message.  
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Personality for an implicit corrective to narratives in which the Great Awakening is described as a 
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 Thomas Kidd begins his narrative of American evangelicalism with the New England declension sermons 
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1660s. Kidd also, and in my mind rightly, identifies ―an emphasis on the outpouring of the Holy Spirit‖ as a 
crucial characteristic of American evangelicalism. Yet he still sees Whitefield‘s preaching style as 
innovative. See Kidd, The Great Awakening: The Roots of Evangelical Christianity in Colonial America, 
44. 
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Puritans through Edwards. Though Edwards relied on the four-part sermon of early Reformation preaching, 
his process of notation, preparation, and delivery was his own, and it changed throughout his career. See 
Kimnach, ―General Introduction,‖ Sermons and Discourses: 1720-1723 for more on how Edwards‘s 
sermonic process changed over the course of his life. 
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 Olaudah Equiano, The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano,or Gustavus Vassa, The 
African, Written by Himself (New York: The Modern Library, 2004), 129. 
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8
 George Whitefield, Directions How to Hear Sermons (Boston, 1740), 9. 
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11
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14
 While Whitefield‘s bodily performance transformed witnesses, he also printed and circulated his sermons 
throughout the colonies, believing they could instigate revival and conversion just as powerfully as his oral 
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performances. Whitefield seems to have valued not only the aural and visual experience of the sermon in 
the fields but also the power of texts peripheral to the Bible to bring enlightenment to the reader. What 
seems like a contradiction is resolved by the fact that Whitefield performed through the press just like he 
did in the fields. Timothy Hall‘s Contested Boundaries recognizes Whitefield‘s ―manipulation of the press‖ 
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of the Colonial American Religious World (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1994), 33.Whitefield 
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Sense philosophy in the early eighteenth-century, which argued for a naturally expressive language that 
relied on bodily, vocal, and facial modulations to convey meaning.  In this scenario, affect is not a threat to 
genuine experience or linguistic clarity, nor is it merely ornamentation for language; affect is language.   
 
19
 Perkins, The Arte of Prophecying, 143. 
 
221 
 
Bibliography 
 
Ames, William. The Marrow of Theology. London, 1623. 
 
Anderson, Wallace E., ed. Scientific and Philosophical Writings. New Haven: Yale  
 
University Press, 1980. Vol. 6. of The Works of Jonathan Edwards. 26 vols.  
 
1957-2008. 
 
---. Mason I. Lowance, and David H. Watters, eds. Typological Writings. New Haven:  
 
Yale University Press,1993.Vol. 11. Works of Jonathan Edwards. 
 
Austin, Samuel. The Charity of a Quaker in his True and Proper Colours, or, The  
 
Clownish Hypocrite Anatomized. London, 1672. 
 
Battis, Emery. Saints and Sectaries: Anne Hutchinson and the Antinomian Controversy 
over Massachusetts Bay. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962.  
Bauer, Ralph. The Cultural Geography of Colonial American Literatures: Empire,  
 
Travel, Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
 
Bauman, Richard. Let Your Words be Few: Symbolism of Speaking and Silence among 
Seventeenth-Century Quakers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
Baxter, Richard. A Call to the Unconverted. London, 1658. 
 
Beck, Cave. The Universal Character by which all the Nations in the World may  
 
Understand one Anothers Conceptions. London, 1657. 
 
Bercovitch, Sacvan. The American Jeremiad. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,  
 
1978. 
 
Bernard, Richard. The Faithful Shepherd. London, 1607. 
 
Boyle, Robert. Occasional Reflections upon Several Subjects. London, 1665. 
 
222 
 
Bradshaw, Ellis. The Quakers Whitest Divell Unvailed, and their Sheeps Cloathing  
 
Pulled off, that their Woolvish Inside may be Easily Discerned. London, 1654. 
 
Britten, William. Silent Meeting, a Wonder to the World, yet Practised by the Apostles, 
and Owned by the People of God, Scornfully Called Quakers. London, 1660. 
Brooks, Joanna. ―From Edwards to Baldwin.‖ Early American Literature 45.2 (2010):  
 
425-440. 
 
Bross, Kristina. Dry Bones and Indian Sermons: Praying Indians in Colonial America.  
 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. 
 
Brown, Robert Eric. ―Edwards, Locke, and the Bible.‖ The Journal of Religion 79. 3  
 
(1999): 361-384. 
 
Burn, Jacob Henry. Descriptive Catalogue of London Traders, Taverns, and Coffee 
Houses. London, 1855. 
Burnham, Michelle. Folded Selves: Colonial New England Writing in the World System.  
Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2007. 
Caffyn, Matthew. The Deceived, and Deceiving Quakers Discovered. London, 1656.   
 
Caldwell, Patricia. ―The Antinomian Language Controversy.‖ Harvard Theological 
Review 69.3 (1976): 345-367. 
Castillo, Susan. Performing America: Colonial Encounters in New World Writing, 1500- 
 
1786. London: Routledge, 2006.  
 
Chamberlain, Ava. ―The Grand Sower of the Seed: Jonathan Edwards‘s Critique of  
 
George Whitefield.‖ The New England Quarterly 70.3 (1997): 368-85. 
 
---, ed. The "Miscellanies:" Entry nos. 501-832. New Haven: Yale University Press,  
 
223 
 
2000. Vol. 18 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards. 
 
Clark, Michael P., ed. The Eliot Tracts: with Letters from John Eliot to Thomas  
 
Thorowgood and Richard Baxter. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. 
 
Cohen, Matt. The Networked Wilderness: Communicating in Early New England.  
 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010. 
 
Coffman, Ralph J.  Solomon Stoddard. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1978. 
 
Cotton, John. The Bloudy Tenent Washed and Made White in the Bloud of the Lambe.  
 
London, 1647. 
 
---. A Modest and Cleer Answer to Mr. Ball‟s Discourse of Set Formes of  
 
Prayer. London, 1642. 
 
---. A Practicall Commentary or Exposition with Observations, Reasons, and Uses upon  
 
the First Epistle Generall of John. London, 1658. 
 
Cogley, Richard W. John Eliot‟s Mission to the Indians before King Philip‟s War.  
 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. 
 
Davidson, Kathy. Revolution and the Word: The Rise of the Novel in America. Oxford:  
 
 Oxford University Press, 2004. 
 
Davis, Randall C. ―Early Anglo-American Attitudes to Native American Languages.‖  
 
Di Biase 229-238. 
 
Deacon, John. The Grand Imposter Examined. London, 1656. 
 
Di Biase, Carmine G., ed. Travel and Translation in the Early Modern Period.  
 
Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006. 
 
Edwards, Jonathan. A Faithful Narrative. Goen 97-212. 
 
224 
 
---. Freedom of the Will. ed, Paul Ramsey. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1957. Vol.  
 
1 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards. 
 
---. Heeding the Word, and Losing It. Lesser 39-57. 
 
---. ―Images of Divine Things.‖ Anderson. Lowance, and Watters 50-131. 
 
---. The Importance and Advantage of a Thorough Knowledge of Divine Truth.  
 
Stout, Sermons and Discourses: 1739-1742 83-104. 
 
---. The Life of David Brainerd. Ed. Norman Petit. New Haven: Yale University Press,  
 
1985. Vol. 7 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards. 
 
---. Miscellanies no. 332. Stout, The “Miscellanies”410. 
 
---. Miscellanies no. 782. Chamberlain 452-466. 
 
---.  ―The Mind.‖ Anderson, Scientific and Philosophical Writings 362. 
 
---. Religious Affections. Ed. John E. Smith. New Haven, Yale University  
 
Press: 1959.Vol. 2 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards. 
 
---. Sermon on Matt. 13:5-6 . Works of Jonathan Edwards Online. 576. Sermon on Matt.  
 
 13:5-6 (a) (1740). 
 
---. Some Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival. Goen 291. 
 
---. The True Excellency of a Minister of the Gospel. Kimnach, Sermons and Discourses:  
 
1743-1758, 82-102. 
 
---. ―Types.‖ Anderson, Lowance, and Watters 146-156. 
 
---. Warnings of Future Punishment. Minkema 200-212. 
 
Egan, Jim. Authorizing Experience: Refigurations of the Body Politic in Seventeenth- 
 
Century New England Writing. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
 
225 
 
Eliot, John. A Brief Narrative of the Progress of the Gospel Amongst the Indians in New  
 
England, in the Year 1670. Clark 397-406. 
 
---. Eliot to Boyle, 26 August 1664.‖ Hunter, Clericuzio, and Principe 304-306. 
 
---. ―Eliot to Boyle 30 Sept 1670.‖ Hunter, Clericuzio, and Principe 188. 
 
---. ―Eliot to Boyle 17 June 1681.‖ Hunter, Clericuzio, and Principe 255-257. 
 
---. The Indian Grammar Begun. London, 1666. 
 
---. The Glorious Progress of the Gospel Amongst the Indians in New England. Clark  
 
141-168. 
 
---. A Late and Further Manifestation of the Progress of the Gospel among the Indians in  
 
New England. Clark 297-320. 
 
---. ―The Learned Conjectures of Reverend Mr. John Eliot touching the Americans, of  
 
New and notable consideration, written to Mr. Thorowgood,‖ Clark 409-428. 
 
---. The Light Appearing More and More Towards the Perfect Day, or a Farther  
 
Discovery of the Present State of the Indians in New England. Clark 169-210. 
 
---. Logick Primer. London, 1672. 
 
---.  Tears of Repentance; Or, A Further Narrative of the Progress of the Gospel among  
 
the Indians in New England. Clark 249-296. 
 
---. The Glorious Progress of the Gospel Amongst the Indians in New England. Clark  
 
141-168. 
 
Equiano, Olaudah. The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano,or Gustavus  
 
Vassa, The African, Written by Himself. New York: The Modern Library, 2004. 
 
Erasmus, Desiderius. Ecclesiastes: sive de ratione concionandi libri quatuor. Basle:  
 
226 
 
Forben, 1535. 
 
―The Examination of Mrs. Anne Hutchinson at the Court at Newton.‖ Hall 311-348. 
 
Farnworth, Richard. The Pure Language of the Spirit of Truth. London, 1655. 
Field, Jonathan Beecher. ―A Key for the Gate: Roger Williams, Parliament, and  
 
Providence.‖ New England Quarterly 80. 3 (September 2007): 353-382. 
Fiering, Norman. Jonathan Edwards‟s Moral Thought and Its British Context. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981. 
Fliegelman, Jay. Declaring Independence: Jefferson, Natural Language, and the Culture  
 
of Performance. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.  
 
Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London:  
 
Routledge, 2002.   
 
Fountain, Catherine. ―Worthy the Name of a Grammar Verb Morphology and  
 
Conjugation in Carochi‘s Arte de la Lengua Mexicana (1645) and Eliot‘s The  
 
Indian Grammar Begun (1666).‖ Historiographia Linguistica 36:2/3  
 
(2009): 281–298. 
 
Fox, George. A Battle-door for Teachers & Professors to Learn Singular & Plural. 
London:, 1660. 
---. A New England Fire Brand Quenched, Being an Answer unto a Slanderous Book,  
 
Entituled, George Fox Digged out of his Burrows. London, 1679. 
 
---. Something Concerning Silent Meetings. London, 1657. 
 
---. Surely the Magistrates of Nottingham are Blinde. London, 1659. 
 
Franklin, Benjamin. Autobiography and other Writings. Oxford: Oxford University Press,  
 
1993. 
227 
 
 
---. ―To the Abbe Morellet.‖ The Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin. Ed John  
 
Bigelow. New York: G P. Putnam‘s Sons, 1888. 401-403. 
 
Gordis, Lisa. Opening Scripture: Bible Reading and Interpretive Authority in New 
England. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2003. 
Goen, C. C., ed. The Great Awakening. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972. Vol. 4  
 
of The Works of Jonathan Edwards. 
 
Grasso, Christopher. ―Images and Shadows of Jonathan Edwards,‖ American Literary  
 
History 8.4 (1996): 683-698. 
 
Gray, G. Edward and Norman Fiering, eds. The Language Encounter in the Americas,  
 
1492-1800: A Collection of Essays. New York: Berghahn Books, 2000. 
 
Gray, Kathryn Napier. ―Written and Spoken Words and Worlds: John Eliot‘s Algonquian 
Translations.‖ Symbiosis 7.2 (2003): 241-260. 
 
Gustafson, Sandra. Eloquence is Power: Oratory and Performance in Early America.  
 
Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 
 
---. ―Jonathan Edwards and the Reconstruction of ‗Feminine‖ Speech.‖ American  
 
 Literary History 6.2 (1994): 185-212. 
 
Hall, David D., ed. The Antinomian Controversy, 1636-1638: A Documentary History. 
Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1968. 
---, ed. The Antinomian Controversy, 1636-1638: A Documentary History. 2
nd
 ed. 
Durham: Duke University Press, 1990. 
Hall, Joseph. ―Upon the Sight of a Man Yawning.‖ Occasional Meditations by Ios  
 
London, 1630. 286. 
228 
 
 
Hall, Timothy. Contested Boundaries: Itinerancy and the Reshaping of the Colonial  
 
American Religious World. Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1994. 
 
Harvey, Tamara. Figuring Modesty in Feminist Discourse Across the Americas 1633-
1700. Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2008. 
Hatch, Nathan O. and Harry S. Stout, eds. Jonathan Edwards and the American  
 
Experience. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
 
Heimert, Alan. Religion and the American Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University  
 
Press, 1966. 
 
Helm, Paul. ―John Locke and Jonathan Edwards: A Reconsideration‖ Journal of the  
 
History of Philosophy 7.1 (1969): 51-61 
 
Higginson, Francis. A brief Relation of the Irreligion of the Northern Quakers. 
London,1653. 
Hindmarsh, D. Bruce. The Evangelical Conversion Narrative: Spiritual Autobiography in  
 
Early Modern England. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005. 
 
Hoffer, Peter. Sensory Worlds in Early America. Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University  
 
Press, 2003. 
 
Holbrook, Clyde A. Jonathan Edwards, the Valley and Nature. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell  
 
University Press, 1987. 
 
Hooker, Thomas. Application of Redemption by the Effectual Work of the Word, and  
 
Spirit of Christ. London, 1656. 
 
---. The Soules Preparation for Christ being a Treatise of Contrition. London, 1632. 
 
---. Wisdomes Attendants: or, the Voice of Christ to be Obeyed. London, 1651. 
229 
 
 
 
Hunter, Michael. Robert Boyle Reconsidered. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
 
1994. 
  
---. Science and Society in Restoration England. Cambridge: Cambridge  
 
University Press, 1981. 
 
Hunter, Michael, Antonio Clericuzio, and Lawrence M. Principe, eds. The  
 
Correspondence of Robert Boyle. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2001. 
 
Irving, Washington. A History of New York, From the Beginning of the World to the End 
of the Dutch Dynasty by Diedrich Knickerbocker. New York: Dodd Mead, 1915. 
Kamensky, Jane. Governing the Tongue: The Politics of Speech in New England.  
Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997. 
Kibbey, Anne. The Interpretation of Material Shapes in Puritanism: A Study of Rhetoric,  
 
Prejudice, and Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.  
 
Kidd, Thomas S. The Great Awakening: The Roots of Evangelical Christianity in  
 
Colonial America. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. 
 
Kimnach, Wilson H. ―General Introduction to the Sermons: Jonathan Edwards‘s Art of  
 
Prophesying.‖ Sermons and Discourses: 1720-1723 2-259. 
 
---. ―Jonathan Edwards‘s Pursuit of Reality.‖ Hatch and Stout 102-117. 
---, ed. Sermons and Discourses: 1720-1723. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.  
 
 Vol. 10 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards. 
 
---, ed. Sermons and Discourses: 1743-1758. New Haven: Yale University Press,  
 
2006. Vol.  25 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards. 
 
230 
 
Knight, Janice.  ―Learning the Language of God: Jonathan Edwards and the Typology of  
 
Nature.‖ The William and Mary Quarterly 48.4 (1991): 531-551. 
 
---. Orthodoxies in Massachusetts: Rereading American Puritanism. Cambridge, MA:  
 
Harvard University Press, 1994. 
 
Kupperman, Karen Ordahl. Indians and English: Facing off in Early America. Ithaca,  
 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2000. 
 
Lambert, Frank. Inventing the Great Awakening. Princeton: Princeton University Press,  
 
1999. 
 
LaPlante, Eve. American Jezebel: The Uncommon Life of Anne Hutchinson, the Woman 
Who Defied the Puritans. New York: Harper Collins, 2004. 
Lee, Sang Hyun. ―Does History Matter to God?‖ Stout, Minkema, and Maskell. 1-12. 
 
---. ―Jonathan Edwards‘s Theory of the Imagination‖ Michigan Academician 5 (1972):  
 
233-41. 
 
Lesser, M. X., ed. Sermons and Discourses, 1734-1738. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2001. Vol. 19 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards. 
Levy, Babette May. Preaching in the First Half Century of New England History. New  
 
York: Russell and Russell, 1945. 
 
Jooken, Lieve. ―Descriptions of American Indian Word Forms in Colonial Missionary  
 
Grammars.‖ Gray and Fiering 293-309. 
 
Locke, John . An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. Alexander Campbell  
 
Fraser, 2 Vols. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1894. 
 
Lodowyck, Francis. A Common Writing. London, 1647. 
 
231 
 
Looby, Christopher. Voicing America: Language, Literary Form, and the Origins of the  
 
United States. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997. 
 
Lowance, Mason I. ―Images of Shadows of Divine Things: The Typology of Jonathan  
 
Edwards‖ Early American Literature 5.1 (1970): 141-181. 
 
Maclean, James F. ―Anne Hutchinson and the Mortalist Heresy.‖ The New England 
Quarterly 54. 1 (1981): 74-103. 
Markley, Robert. Fallen Languages: Crises of Representation in Newtonian England,  
 
1660-1740. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993. 
 
Marx, Leo. The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America.  
 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
 
Mather, Cotton. Another Tongue Brought in to Confess the Great Saviour of the World. 
 
Boston, 1707. 
 
---. Magnalia Christi Americana, or, The Ecclesiastical History of New-England, from  
 
its First Planting in the Year 1620. Unto the Year of our Lord, 1698. London,  
 
1702. 
 
Miller, Perry. ‖Edwards, Locke, and the Rhetoric of Sensation.‖ Critical Essays on  
 
Jonathan Edwards.  Ed. William J. Scheick. Boston: G. K. Hall, 1980. 120-135. 
 
---. Errand into the Wilderness. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. 
 
---. Jonathan Edwards. New York: Meridian Books, 1949. 
 
---. ―Jonathan Edwards on the Sense of the Heart.‖ The Harvard Theological Review  
 
41.2 (1948): 123-145. 
 
---. The New England Mind: From Colony to Province. Boston: Beacon Press, 1953. 
232 
 
 
Minkema, Kenneth P., ed. Sermons and Discourses: 1723-1729, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1997.Vol. 14 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards. 
Morgan, Edmund Sears. The Puritan Dilemma: The Story of John Winthrop. New York: 
HarperCollins, 1958. 
Morrison, Dane. Praying People: Massachusett Acculturation and the Failure of the  
 
Puritan Mission, 1600-1690. New York: P. Lang, 1995. 
 
Murray, David. Forked Tongues: Speech, Writing, and Representation in North American  
 
Indian Texts. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991. 
 
New, Elisa. ―Variety as Religious Experience: The Poetics of the Plain Style.‖ Religion  
 
and Literature 38.1 (2006): 9-25. 
 
O‘Brien, Jean M. Dispossession by Degrees: Indian Land and Identity in Natick,  
 
Massachusetts, 1650-1790. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
 
Paw, Amy Plantinga. ―Edwards as American Theologian.‖ Stout, Minkema, and Maskell 
 
13-24. 
 
Penn, William. A Brief Account of the Rise and Progress of the Quakers London, 1694. 
 
---. Reason Against Railing. London, 1673. 
 
---. The True Christian Quaker. London, 1674. 
 
---. Quakerism, a New Nick-name for Old Christianity. London, 1672. 
 
Perkins, William.  The Arte of Prophecying, or, A treatise Concerning the Sacred and  
 
onely True Manner and Methode of Preaching. London, 1592. 
 
---. A Declaration of the True Manner of Knowing Christ Crucified. London, 1596. 
 
233 
 
---. A Golden Chaine. London, 1592. 
 
---. The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience. London, 1619. 
 
Pestana, Carla Gardina. Quakers and Baptists in Colonial Massachusetts. Cambridge:  
 
Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
 
Rath, Richard Cullen. How Early America Sounded. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University  
 
Press, 2003. 
 
Rawson, Edward. A True relation of the Proceedings against Certain Quakers, at the 
Generall Court of the Massachusets Holden at Boston in New England, October 
18, 1659. London, 1660. 
Read, David. New World, Known World: Shaping Knowledge in Early Anglo-American  
 
Writing. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2005. 
 
Reid, Jasper. ―Jonathan Edwards on Space and God,‖ Journal of the History of  
 
Philosophy 41.3 (2003): 385-403. 
 
R. H., The Character of a Quaker in his True and Proper Colours or, The Clownish  
 
Hypocrite Anatomized. London, 1671. 
 
---. Plus ultra, or, The Second Part of the Character of a Quaker. London, 1672. 
 
Rivett, Sarah. ―Empirical Desire: Conversion, Ethnography, and the New Science of the  
 
Praying Indian.‖ Early American Studies 4.1 (2006): 16-45. 
 
Rogers, John. Ohel or Beth-Shemesh. A Tabernacle for the Sun. London, 1653. 
 
Rosenmeier, Jesper. ―Clearing the Medium: A Reevalutation of the Puritan Plain Style in  
 
Light of John Cotton‘s A Practicall Commentary upon the First Eipistle Generall  
 
of John,‖ The William and Mary Quarterly 37. 4 (1980): 577-591. 
 
234 
 
 
Rudyard, Thomas. The Libeller Characteriz'd by his own Hand in Answer to a  
 
Scurrilous Pamphlet, Intitluled, The Character of a Quaker. London, 1671. 
 
Ruttenburg, Nancy.  Democratic Personality: Popular Voice and the Trial of American  
 
Authorship.  Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. 
 
Schmidt, Leigh Eric. Hearing Things: Religion, Illusion, and the American  
 
Enlightenment.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000. 
 
Schreyer, Rüdiger. ‗Savage Languages in Eighteenth-Century Theoretical History of  
 
Language.‖ Gray and Fiering 310-326. 
 
Shapin, Steven and Simon Schaeffer. Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and  
 
the Experimental Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. 
 
Shepard, Thomas, Subjection to Christ in all his Ordinances, and Appointments, the Best  
 
Means to Preserve our Liberty. Together with a Treatise of Ineffectual Hearing  
 
the Word. London, 1652. 
 
Smith, Josiah. The Character, Preaching, &c. of the Reverend Mr. George Whitefield,  
 
Impartially Represented and Supported. Boston, 1740. 
 
Smith, Nigel. Perfection Proclaimed: Language and Literature in English Radical  
 
Religion, 1640-1660. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
 
Stein, Stephen J. ―The Quest for the Spiritual Sense: The Biblical Hermeneutics of  
 
Jonathan Edwards.‖  The Harvard Theological Review 70.1/2 (1977): 99-113.  
 
Stevens, Laura. The Poor Indian: British Missionaries, Native Americans, and Colonial  
 
Sensibility. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. 
 
Stoddard, Solomon. The Danger of a Speedy Degeneracy. Boston, 1705. 
235 
 
 
---. The Defects of Preachers Reproved. New London, 1724. 
 
 ---.  The Presence of Christ with the Ministers of the Gospel. Boston, 1718. 
 
Stout, Harry. S., ed. The "Miscellanies:" Entry nos. a-z, aa-zz, 1-500. New Haven: Yale  
 
University Press, 1994. Vol. 13 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards. 
 
---. The New England Soul: Preaching and Religious Culture in Colonial New England.  
 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
 
---. ―Preface to the Period,‖ Sermons and Discourses: 1739-1742. 3-47. 
 
---, ed. Sermons and Discourses: 1739-1742. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.  
 
Vol. 22 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards. 
 
Stout, Harry S., Kenneth P. Minkema, and Caleb J. D. Maskell, eds. Jonathan Edwards  
 
at 300: Essays on the Tercentenary of his Birth. Lanham, MD: University Press of  
 
America, 2005. 
 
Swift, Jonathan. Gulliver‟s Travels: An Annotated Text with Critical Essays. Ed. Robert  
 
Greenberg. New York: Norton, 1961. 
 
Taves, Ann. Fits, Trances, and Visions: Experiencing Religion and Explaining 
Experience from Wesley to James. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
Toulouse, Teresa. The Art of Prophesying: New England Sermons and the Shaping of  
 
Belief.  Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1987. 
 
Traister, Bryce. ―Anne Hutchinson‘s ‗Monstrous Birth‘ and the Feminization of 
Antinomianism.‖ Canadian Review of American Studies 27.2 (1997): 133-159. 
Travers, Rebecca. For those that Meet to Worship at the Steeplehouse. London: 1659. 
Vickers, Brian and Nancy S. Struever, Rhetoric and the Pursuit of Truth: Language  
236 
 
 
Change in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Los Angeles: William  
 
Andrews Clark Memorial Library, University of California Press, 1985. 
 
Wabuda, Susan. Preaching During the English Reformation. Cambridge: Cambridge  
 
University Press, 2002. 
 
Wainwright, William J. ―Jonathan Edwards and the Language of God.‖ Journal of the  
 
American Academy of Religion 48.4 (1980): 519-530. 
 
Warner, Michael. The Letters of the Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in  
 
Eighteenth-Century America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990. 
 
Weber, Donald. Rhetoric and History in Revolutionary New England. New York: Oxford  
 
University Press, 1988. 
 
Weddle, David L. ―The Melancholy Saint: Jonathan Edwards‘s Interpretation of David  
 
Brainerd as a Model of Evangelical Spirituality.‖ Harvard Theological Review  
 
81.3 (1988): 297-318. 
 
Weld, Thomas. Preface. A Short Story of the Rise, Reign, and Ruin of the Antinomians. 
Hall 201-218. 
White, Craig. ―The Praying Indians‘ Speeches as Texts of Massachusett Oral Culture.‖  
 
Early American Literature 38.8 (2003): 437-461. 
 
Whitefield, George. Directions How to Hear Sermons. Boston, 1740. 
 
Wilkins, John. An Essay Towards a Real Character and Philosophical Language. 
 
London, 1668. 
 
Williams, Roger. The Bloudy Tenent Yet more Bloudy: By Mr. Cotton‟s Endeavour to  
 
Wash it White in the Bloude of the Lambe. London, 1652. 
237 
 
---. Christenings Make not Christians. London, 1645. 
 
---. George Fox Digg'd out of his Burrowes. Boston, 1676. 
---. A Key into the Language of America. London, 1643. 
 
Winthrop, John. The History of New England from 1630 to 1649. V 1. Boston: Little, 
Brown and co., 1853.
 
  
---. A Short Story of the Rise, Reign and Ruin of the Antinomians. Hall 201-310. 
Worrall, Arthur J. Quakers in the Colonial Northeast. Hanover, NH: University Press of  
New England, 1980. 
Yarbrough, Steven R. and Jon C. Adams, Delightful Conviction. Westport, CT:  
 
Greenwood Press, 1993. 
